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Preface
Not long after I decided on a title for this work, I realized that it came not
from my cleverness but was unconsciously derived from "Economic Mod-
ernization and the Americanization of Appalachia," a chapter in Henry
Shapiro's Appalachia on our Mind.1 This debt is appropriate, since Shapiro's
analysis of the creation and sustenance of an ideology of Appalachian "other-
ness" is important to any inquiry into the region's relationship to the nation.
And just as Shapiro states in the opening passage of his work that it is not a
history of Appalachia but of the idea of Appalachia, I should tell readers that
The Americanization of West Virginia is not a study of Appalachian identity.
Rather it is a study of the efforts of a minority of state elites to instill in the
people of West Virginia an authoritarian ideology of American identity, to
secure popular devotion to a universal value system that equated the inter-
ests of business to that of the nation.
Many scholars have pointed out the need to address Appalachian
issues in a national as well as regional context, and to reassess the idea that
Appalachian problems are exceptional in character. They point to national
institutional forces that have shaped the contours of regional development
and suggest that the history of Appalachia is best understood in the broad
context of industrial capitalist development. It is becoming more apparent
that the study of recent regional history must also transcend national
boundaries, taking into account the roots of modern economic globaliza-
tion. Most recently Stephen L. Fisher has suggested the connection of local
events to global forces. Nearly two decades ago, David Walls and Dwight
Billings noted that Appalachian historians must be prepared to expand their
horizons to encompass world economic structures. In 1980 Helen Lewis
and Myles Horton foresaw the internationalization of Latin American and
Appalachian resistance struggles in confronting transnational corporations.
John Gaventa succinctly sketched the outline for the global focus in a 1987
essay in which he introduced the memorable phrase, "the Appalachianiza-
tion of America."2
The Americanization of West Virginia investigates, through the case study
of an industrial state in a time of rapid change, rudiments of a nationalistic
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developmental ideology geared toward insuring long-range American domi-
nance of world markets. Disciples of that ideology zealously pursued legiti-
mation of probusiness values and beliefs, impelled by a mission to control
the production and distribution of goods and the allocation of power. Al-
though purposefully using terminology contemporary to the era 1916-25
(i.e., "molding of opinion," and "manufacture of consent"), the analysis
herein is consistent with recent observations on cultural hegemony and the
emergence of an American corporate state. T.J. Jackson Lears notes that the
closest precise definition of hegemony is Antonio Gramsci's identification of
the consent by the masses to the general direction of social life by dominant
groups. A recent study emphasizes that the notion of hegemony is a complex
process, a struggle in which class "fractions" merge, forming, in Gramscian
terms, "historical blocs."
Elites comprising a bloc build a system of dominance, assuming moral
and intellectual leadership of cultural institutions. A central task of ruling
groups is to define the permissible range of disagreement about institutional
forms and processes and to ingrain consent in subordinates. Under the chal-
lenge of cultural resistance, which could give rise to "counterhegemonic alter-
natives," legitimation rests on the selective accommodation of the desires and
demands of subordinate groups in such a way as to delegitimize direct chal-
lenges to the hegemonic culture. Dominance therefore implies negotiation,
usually between unequal forces, and recognition by elites that control re-
quires shaping laws, policies, and the assumptions people have about their
daily lives.3 The management strategy of welfare capitalism in the 1920s is a
case in point. Employers exercised selective accommodation to their workers'
discontent, with the intent of influencing the direction of employees' work
and social lives.
Many historians of Appalachia have brilliantly analyzed the impact of
industrialization on the region and processes of conflict and control accom-
panying its integration into the national economy. The work of Ronald D
Eller, John Gaventa, Altina Waller, and Ronald L. Lewis stands out in illumi-
nating the social and cultural dissonance inherent in the transformation of
autonomous individuals and communities into components of industrial
capitalism, dependent on the vicissitudes of technical and market forces
that were national and international in scope.4 John A. Williams, Ronald L.
Lewis, Joe William Trotter, and David A. Corbin have written widely on the
commoditization of labor in industrializing West Virginia, as has Alan Banks
for Kentucky. Their contributions have done much to enrich our awareness
of the cultural heterogeneity of coal regions during the era coterminous
with this study, and of resistance to the dominance of industrial interests.
Corbin notes that the counterhegemonic movement of southern West Vir-
ginia miners in the early 1920s was attributed by federal investigators to
Preface xv
"the nature and racial characteristics of the people." A bloc of the dominant
system of institutional power thereby bestowed the "otherness" imprimatur
on the region.5 These and other works therefore reflect Herbert Reid's call
for Appalachian studies to focus on "the mainstream theatres of our emerg-
ing corporate state," in part to learn how the dominant system's "cultural
ethos" relied on perpetuating the image of Appalachians as a people apart
and needful of controlling influences.6
In some ways this book is a cautionary tale. The management state's
current breathless infatuation with artificial intelligence, high-tech warfare,
privatization of futuristic classrooms, and workplace re-engineering is at
many tangents strikingly similar to the elite social agenda venerated by the
industrial Americanizers of 1916-25. Much of the sloganeering that per-
meates the litany of today's "win-win," "total quality" corporate culture
differs little in substance from the banalities of the early 1920s. The termi-
nology of that time played a central role in instilling compliance, elevating
corporate dominance of the nation's social and cultural life to the plane of
"civic religion," "cooperation," and "mutual interests." Similarly, today's ped-
agogical emphasis on productivity and international competitiveness often
caters to free-market demagogues who view children primarily as "human
resources." That emphasis threatens to overshadow the public imperative of
education to nurture imaginative and independent citizens, who can navi-
gate the social and ethical conundrum of the continuing industrial revolu-
tion.7
Industrial Americanizers of 1916-25, employing the vocabulary of de-
mocracy, embraced a social model in which order and efficiency superseded
social and economic justice and sought to legitimate their claim to rule by
narrowing the field of tolerable discourse, dissent, and alternatives to indus-
trial capitalism. The alleged democratic promise of post-cold war America
in the Information Age will melt away unless we reject the resurgent hier-
archical vision promulgated by modern industrial Americanizers and work
to "democratize the structures of political economy and everyday life."8 It
should be our task to make information a tool for social liberation rather
than social control, and to reverse the nation's current replication of the
concentration of wealth and power that marked the period of this study.

Introduction
The Americanization oj West Virginia examines complementary attempts by
political, educational, and industrial leaders in the state to insure mass ac-
ceptance of state and corporate authority during and after the First World
War. These leaders were convinced that a well-regulated citizenry was im-
perative in order to capitalize on the anticipated war legacy of expanded
international market opportunities. Employing modern organizational and
public relations tactics that were refined during the war crisis, state and na-
tional elites sought to connect free-market business principles to national
loyalty, incorporating a business ideology into a universal form of American-
ism that would guarantee a literate, loyal, and obedient producing class. As
outlined here, the First World War consolidated the dominant position of
professionals, business people, and political capitalists as arbiters of national
values, and served to catalyze the reorganization of American society in ser-
vice to these values. American business, educational, and political leaders
emerged from the war devoted to the application of scientific management
to all arenas of American life. They pledged to efficiently arrange society to
maximize social welfare and the nation's economic expansion.
The wartime mobilization of industrial, agricultural, and human re-
sources demanded utmost loyalty to the aims of the national government.
The emotional commitment necessary to achieve the productive demands of
the war was realized largely through the pervasive propaganda mechanism
established by the Wilson administration, the Committee on Public Informa-
tion (CPI). Determined to carry the urgency and mission of the war into
every community and home, the CPI organized with remarkable swiftness to
reach not only urban areas but the most remote rural settlements, one-room
schools, small-town theaters, daily and weekly newspapers, and churches.
Acknowledging the principle that an open society must permit its people to
have access to information, the committee proceeded to manage the produc-
tion and distribution of that information, calling on tens of thousands of vol-
unteers to deliver officially approved war news from Washington. National
and local CPI volunteers sought, with a great degree of success, to insure
unity of thought and action through processes called the "engineering of
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consent" by the architects of the molding of public opinion.1 As explained in
chapters 1 and 2, the propaganda mechanism was well-organized in West
Virginia. The mobilization of public opinion in the state depended largely on
West Virginia's nearly two hundred newspapers, with a combined circula-
tion of more than four hundred thousand, and on the published and spoken
exhortations of influential individuals from the business, religious, civic, and
educational communities.2
The engineering of wartime consent occurred in the context of the or-
ganization of national, state, and corporate bureaucracies to fulfill wartime
production demands. A major task of the Wilson administration was to rec-
oncile longstanding labor-management hostility, exacerbated by the rapid
late nineteenth and early twentieth-century transformation of American
social and work relations during the growth of industrial capitalism. To effect
this temporary reconciliation, the national government created a maze of
regulatory bodies, merging business and labor sectors, to arbitrate disputes,
rationalize production and distribution, and eliminate radical influences
among American workers. These regulatory bodies reflected the dominant
position of corporate capitalism in American culture and created wartime
opportunities for business leaders and conservative unionists to marginalize
alternative ideologies. The functions of these regulatory bureaucracies, es-
pecially the national Council of Defense and its West Virginia counterparts,
are addressed in chapter 3, with particular emphasis on labor-management
relations.
When the war ended, business, political, and educational leaders
across the country applied the tactics of the engineering of consent to the
"labor problem." Alarmed by widespread industrial conflict and fearful of the
destabilizing of the American business culture by radical activism, industrial-
ists led the national movement to organize private patriotic bodies to resist
the potential power of industrial unionism. The result, prompted by the
1919 national steel strike, was the "open-shop" drive, which was led in West
Virginia by a coalition of business leaders under the banner of the American
Constitutional Association (ACA). The ACA, one of dozens of similar organi-
zations nationwide, articulated a body of principles designed to create a pro-
ductive, content working class that would identify the well-being of business
with the well-being of the country. An analysis of these ideals, which were
promoted under the rubric of "industrial Americanization," forms the basis
of chapter 4. This chapter studies the convergence of the social purpose of
scientific management with the successful mobilization tactics of the war
years and lays the groundwork for analysis in chapter 5 of the political cul-
ture of the immediate postwar period in West Virginia.
Chapter 6 addresses the course of the open-shop drive in West Virginia
in the context of the industrial strategy of "welfare capitalism," which was es-
sentially the recognition by modern industrialists that company flexibility
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and benevolence would maximize production and expedite employer social
control over workers. Open-shop and welfare-capitalism objectives were in-
corporated into the concept of the "American Plan," a manifesto for anti-
union activists that promoted a preindustrial ideal of individually negotiated
contracts for the age of mass industrial capitalism. The purity of individual
bargaining, however, applied only to workers; the proponents of the Ameri-
can Plan saw no inconsistency in their own collective association to protect
their corporate and class interests, which they equated with the public wel-
fare. Assisted by access to teacher training and classroom programs, by 1923
anti-union forces in West Virginia had rolled back wartime gains of the
United Mine Workers of America, the state's largest industrial union. As a
corollary to the growing power of industrial leaders to influence national law
and domestic policy, many union leaders, notably John L. Lewis of the
United Mine Workers of America, cultivated complex working relations with
industrial leaders. Lewis and other conservative unionists, modernizing and
strengthening the diverse tenets of traditional "business unionism," capital-
ized on general fears of domestic radicalism to push industrialists toward the
bargaining table and neutralize radical internal union opposition.
Just as the CPI and private patriotic organizations, such as the ultrana-
tionalist National Security League, had depended on public schools to trans-
mit their particular brand of Americanism, the middle-class voluntary
associations, which permeated American society in the early 1920s, sought
to reach the people, in a common phrase, "through the medium of the chil-
dren." Campaigns to "inculcate" industrial Americanization typically donned
the vestments of the late war as educators sought to train "our army of
young workers" for work "that needs to be done."3 West Virginia teachers
were instructed that the mobilization campaigns of the war "have trained us
well in methods of getting action in any cause of general importance." They
should understand that their pupils represented "the capital of civilization,"
to whom teachers must impart the knowledge for them "to contribute intel-
ligently to the fundamental needs of human welfare: production, exchange,
and wise consumption."4 Led by the American Constitutional Association,
the American Legion, and the West Virginia Federation of Women's Clubs
(WVFWC), the industrial Americanizers gained access to public schools to
organize, with authorization from the state, patriotic observations, "America
First Day" celebrations, and Americanization campaigns. Chapter 7 focuses
on the efforts of some of these voluntary associations, who aspired to make
native and foreign-born West Virginians "think as we do, live as we do, and
feel as we do, and have the same hopes that we have for our country."5
Chapter 8 studies the widespread application of the Americanizers' cam-
paigns in West Virginia and the institutionalization of the goals of industrial
Americanization, symbolized by legislation mandating loyalty and state-
defined patriotism.
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Essentially, this work demonstrates how proponents of an ideology, in
this case industrial capitalism, seek to implant their principles into the
consciousness of a culture and thereby transform ideas into commonly held
values that are immune to debate in the political arena. It is less a study of
the power or force of ideas than of the importance of access to the knowl-
edge and means to transmit ideas. It examines how a relatively small sector
of the public sought to manipulate that access to direct public attitudes in
an industrial state during a period of national crisis and rapid change. This
study places West Virginia in the mainstream of the nation's social, eco-
nomic, and political currents of the era, in which the values of business
achieved almost religious status and alternative visions of the social, indus-
trial, and political organization of the country were virtually expelled from
the national discourse. Far from being isolated during America's transforma-
tion into an international industrial and imperial power, West Virginia's
people and natural resources served crucial functions as producers and fuel
for the post-World War political economy. Linked to the centers of power by
transportation, communication, and professional networks, West Virginia's
educational, political, and industrial leaders helped insure the state's desig-
nated role as a resource zone for the perceived greater good of national ex-
pansion and strength.
It is in this broad sense that I use the expressions Americanization and
industrial Americanization, rather than in the prewar and relatively benign
sense of assimilating immigrants into the national mainstream. Americaniza-
tion in this study implies the struggle by a class-conscious minority of so-
cially, politically, and professionally well-positioned leaders to insure that
their hierarchical vision of community and nation, which they denned as the
national interest, was accepted as valid and incontrovertible by the mass of
Americans. While the Americanization of immigrant populations presented
unique obstacles to the objectives of industrial Americanizers, industrial
Americanization implies far more sweeping objectives than, for example,
universal hygiene, thrift, and English training. Industrial Americanization
sought to achieve these, of course, but only as contributors to the greater
task, made tangible by the World War, of instilling national "habits of indus-
try," obedience to authority, and worship of law and order. To industrial
Americanizers, true independent thought and action were unproductive and
disruptive, and, ultimately, un-American. Their task, therefore, was to estab-
lish loyalty to the state and nation as interchangeable with obedience to
one's employer, teacher, or leader. "Obedience," said one corporate journal,
"helps make men truly great."6
1
War Propaganda and the
Mobilization of Public Opinion in
West Virginia, 1916-1918
On Sunday, April 29, 1917, an estimated four thousand McDowell County,
West Virginia, citizens assembled in Gary, a company town owned by the
United States Steel Corporation. Only a few weeks earlier, the United States
had entered the World War against the Central Powers, and the object of the
Gary demonstration was to show the community and the world that the
people of McDowell were "heart and soul, tooth and nail behind the govern-
ment of the United States and the President in the present national crisis."1
Although native-born whites and blacks predominated in the crowd—
Matthew Whittico, editor of the McDowell Times, a black newspaper, announced
that the "colored people" were loyal to the nation in the emergency—a "gen-
erous intermixture" of foreign-born also participated in the day's events. Coal
Age noted that the "foreign element" in the crowds, including Hungarians,
Poles, Slavs, Italians, and Greeks, lacked "nothing of the patriotic spirit
shown by their neighbors and co-laborers." The parade, which preceded a
flag-raising ceremony and a program of patriotic speeches, passed by com-
pany housing with neat gardens lining Gary's tidy main street. America's
German enemies were "remarkably proficient in the matter of food produc-
tion," and the gardens bore witness that "the people of McDowell would do
well to imitate them." The war would be waged not only by the men at the
front but by Americans helping to feed the Allies, and practically every house
in Gary sported a small garden for this purpose. Efficiency was the keynote
of the day, with Circuit Court Judge Isaiah C. Herndon of Welch explaining
that it was efficiency that had made United States Steel a mighty industrial
organization, and it was efficiency that made effective fighting machines of
the German and English armies. In war and peace, "it is efficiency that counts
for most."2
The Gary demonstration was one of many anticipated in the valley of
the upper Tug River to arouse public sentiment. Similar expressions of na-
tional unity were organized in communities throughout West Virginia as
America went to war. A patriotic meeting was held in St. Mary's, in Pleas-
ants County, on the heels of President Woodrow Wilson's April 2 war mes-
sage to Congress. On the same day Congress declared war, "patriotic and
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zealous" citizens gathered for a loyalty meeting in the town auditorium to
affirm that St. Mary's did not lag behind other communities in declaring
loyalty to Wilson and the government. In Marshall County, Moundsville
Mayor Evan G. Roberts urged his neighbors to "unite in a fervent and stir-
ring patriotic demonstration." Crowds jammed a Moundsville movie theater
and spilled into the street, cheering the patriotic speeches and eliminating
any doubts "as to the Americanism of the people of Marshall county." In the
wake of the meeting, industries, churches, and schools in the county con-
ducted flag-raising ceremonies, and within a week "Marshall county was
burning with patriotic fervor, which was to continue, until the defeat of the
German Imperial government." Fairmont staged a successful patriotic cel-
ebration, with the business houses closed and the city proudly decorated
with flags and bunting.3
College campuses also stirred with patriotic ardor. As war loomed,
West Virginia University's (WVU) Daily Athenaeum had announced that the
"Men and Spirit of the Gold and Blue Eagerly Await the Call to Arms." WVU
took its place beside other American universities in its passionate enthusiasm
for the country and the president, and the campus anticipated the "almost
certain prospect of service to the nation." Flag raisings at university buildings
were held almost daily, and a mass demonstration called for April 2 promised
patriotic addresses by distinguished speakers including university president
Frank Trotter, history professor James M. Callahan, economics professor E.
Howard Vickers, and former governor William E. Glasscock, a Morgantown
attorney. Vickers would also speak at "the next scheduled outburst of enthu-
siasm" a few days later.4
Newspapers across West Virginia recommended ways for citizens to
express their patriotic sentiments and protect their neighborhoods and
country as the war crisis grew. A typical appeal admonished readers to be
loyal "in thought, word and deed," and to eliminate "any sore places" in
their communities. Responsible citizens were advised not to embarrass the
government by criticizing "that which you do not fully understand," dis-
courage seditious talk by others, and "inculcate in the hearts of the young
the blessings of a free country." Suspected un-American or pro-German be-
havior was quickly becoming intolerable. In Huntington, American factory
workers compelled recalcitrant, unnaturalized German workers to fly the
American flag in their department by turning a firehose on them. To gen-
eral approbation, Wisconsin's antiwar senator Robert La*Follette, who had
"opposed the will of the people," was burned in effigy in St. Albans, West
Virginia.5
These few examples reflect broad support for the United States declar-
ation of war, but policymakers at the national and state levels sought a
mechanism to regulate the flow of information about the war to sustain and
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deepen the public's commitment to the cause. President Wilson had cam-
paigned for reelection just a few months earlier on the slogan "He Kept Us
Out of War" and had resisted until late in his first term the privately led
"preparedness" movement for substantial increases in the nation's armed
forces and weapons capacity. Preparedness advocates insisted that France
and England were fighting a  war that was also America's and that defeat for
the Allies would imperil democracy everywhere. Capitalizing on growing
public fears of armed invasion by Germany and increasing suspicion of
German immigrants, the preparedness lobby had attracted considerable
support for their contention that German military might had to be resisted.
From August 1914 until April 1917, these private lobbyists had assumed a
major role in education and propaganda about the war. With the United
States declaration of war, the Wilson administration quickly moved to direct
the molding of public opinion. The mass mobilization of the American mind
was entrusted to the Committee on Public Information (CPI), established by
Wilson's Executive Order 2594 on April 13, 1917.6
The Committee on Public Information technically was overseen by the
secretaries of state, war, and the navy, but the heart of the organization was
its civilian director, a muckraking journalist named George Creel. So closely
linked was Creel to the CPI that it was commonly called the Creel commit-
tee.7 Creel and his nominal superiors were aware that the American press
objected to the widespread censorship imposed upon newspapers by the
belligerent states in Europe. The Europeans depended on their papers for all
war news, a West Virginia newspaper reported, and special efforts had been
expended by the Allied and Central Powers alike to allow only such news ap-
proved by their military commanders. The article warned that "a bad touch
of militarism" had accompanied preparedness and war talk in the United
States, which must not devolve into government censorship. The CPI plan-
ners envisioned an official information agency that would instill in Ameri-
cans a sense of partnership with the Wilson administration based on full
public disclosure of the government's war actions. The committee, therefore,
adopted a policy of literally choking the channels of communication with of-
ficially approved news and opinion, generated in staggering volume by the
CPI. Josephus Daniels, Wilson's secretary of the navy, explained that Presi-
dent Wilson and his cabinet
were very anxious that we should not fall into the stupid censorship
which had marked the action of some countries in dealing with war
news. Immediately upon our entrance into the war I called in all the
newspapermen in Washington, and particularly the representatives of
the press associations, and told them that we would have no censorship
but that the President and his Cabinet wished them and all newspaper-
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men in America to impose self-censorship; that we would give them
freely the information that would let them know what was going on and
request them from time to time to publish nothing which might fall into
the hands of the enemy or embarrass war operations. . . . Determined to
have no censorship and to give the public all information possible, we
decided to establish the Committee on Public Information.8
Based on the overwhelmingly positive reaction to Wilson's war mes-
sage and the declaration of war, Creel felt certain that the American press
would cooperate with the government to mobilize and sustain public back-
ing for the war. Moreover, within hours after Wilson requested a declaration
of war, professional advertising men volunteered their talents as opinion-
makers to the government, proclaiming that "publicity men can be turned
loose at any moment, for any purpose desired." The ad men disavowed
secret propaganda for improper purposes, seeking only to effectively organ-
ize "facts . . . which the people ought to know. It is a means of turning the
nation's patriotism to practical use." President Wilson gratefully accepted
the ad men's offer, and appealed to the nation's advertising agencies, editors,
and publishers to incorporate the administration's "Ways to Serve the
Nation" into their publications and campaigns.9
Aware of the print media representatives' sentiments and with an
abiding faith in the power of positive media reinforcement, Creel guided the
CPI to a strategy based on aggressive publicity of the government's war aims
and ideals rather than on rigidly secretive censorship. He knew well the po-
tential for shaping public opinion through the conscious and at times in-
flammatory manipulation of words, images, and sentiment, and, in words
William Pencak later used to describe the American Legion, realized that
patriotism "is a way of life inculcated through symbols and ceremonies
rather than a set of intellectual principles." The CPI propaganda model as-
sumed that only constant exposure of America's war aims and efforts could
"arouse national enthusiasm to the proper pitch." Specific appeals were de-
signed to reach all sectors of the population, including blacks, immigrant
groups, women, businessmen, schoolchildren, industrial and agricultural
workers, and students.10
The work of the CPI was filtered through a network of divisions, in-
cluding the Division of News; the Official Bulletin staff, which published a
daily compendium of war news and events; the Foreign Language News-
paper Division, which monitored papers and translated committee pamph-
lets into foreign languages; the Foreign Press Bureau; the Bureau of War
Expositions; the Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation; the Film
Division; the Alliance for Labor and Democracy; the Work with the Foreign
Born Division; and the Bureau of Cartoons. The division with the most
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direct contact with the people, which was particularly effective because of its
close link to the communities, was the Four-Minute Men Division, com-
prised of more than seventy-five thousand volunteer speakers who pitched
short speeches in schools, churches, public halls, and movie theaters across
America. They spoke on topics assigned from Washington, and were admit-
ted into the service only on the recommendation of, so said Creel, "three
prominent citizens—bankers, professional or business men."11
The social requirements for Four-Minute speakers suggest the obli-
gations of public service for educated classes that permeated the various
domestic war campaigns. Owing to their educational advantages, the col-
lege-trained citizens could help create and maintain proper public sentiment
among "ordinary citizen[s]." Reliable information on war-related subjects
was furnished by the United States government, which, fully aware of the
need for access to "correct knowledge," was issuing the War Information
Series of pamphlets through the Committee on Public Information. The CPI
distributed the pamphlets in the belief that the war would not be won on
the basis of established doctrine or official theory, but upon "enlightened
public opinion based upon truth." The Daily Athenaeum reported that col-
lege newspapers had established a good working relationship with the CPI,
which provided accurate war information to college students throughout the
country. Not only did the CPI disseminate authoritative material, but the
agency secured "voluntary censorship of the press" by providing the papers
with all the necessary war news. In addition to daily press dispatches to all
papers, thirty thousand newspapers got weekly feature articles from the CPI,
and millions of foreign-language pamphlets were distributed overseas.12
These and other figures indicate the volume of CPI publications. Guy
Stanton Ford, director of the CPFs Civic and Educational Cooperation Divi-
sion, outlined the pervasiveness of the CPI in shaping the nations's war
consciousness in a 1920 retrospective. His division published and distribu-
ted numerous educational pamphlets, including the semimonthly National
School Service newsletter, issued free to all teachers in the final months
of the war. The division's massive War Cyclopedia was a widely consulted
digest of historical and military references for war-aims speakers and in-
structors. Ford estimated that his division alone mailed fifty-six million
publications and that the total of all CPI divisions—including the daily Of-
ficial Bulletin, Four-Minute Men Bulletins, and foreign service pamphlets—
totaled about 125 million.13
Ford's figures may not be definitive, but the omnipresence of the CPI
in the daily life of Americans during the war is apparent, and the words and
images projected by its propagandists molded the war's issues in the national
consciousness.14 Every item of war news Americans saw in county weeklies,
city dailies, magazines, schoolhouses, movie theaters, churches, county fairs,
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and war expositions was "not merely officially approved information but
precisely the same kind that millions of their fellow citizens were getting at
the same moment." They had been sanitized or given an appropriate twist
either at the source of information in Washington or at the newspaper offices
in accordance with "voluntary" rules issued by the CPI. Harold J. Tobin and
Percy W Bidwell report in Mobilizing Civilian America that Creel and the CPI
orchestrated the most effective war campaign in history:
By the most intensive intellectual and emotional bombardment,
they aroused Americans to a pitch of enthusiasm where a dissident
voice scarcely dared to make itself heard, and where blind support was
forthcoming for everything which seemed to contribute to victory.
There was no escape from the bombardment. The typical Ameri-
can . . . found his morning paper filled with appeals for support of war
activities, both in news columns and in advertisements paid for by pa-
triotic citizens or organizations. The business man at lunch listened to
volunteer speakers urging him to get behind the current government
"drive." His wife at the motion-picture matinee heard an appeal to
cooperate in a "save-food" campaign. At the same time his son was per-
haps urging his schoolfellows to contribute their pennies to the Red
Cross. Posters boosting the war effort stared from store windows and
from signboards on top of buildings, and hung from the walls of facto-
ries and offices. Theaters mixed patriotic appeals with entertainment.
Millions of homes displayed service flags in their windows.15
Throughout the war years, the CPI faithfully adhered to its line that
the committee served not as a censor or source of policing thought but
strictly as an information bureau. To the extent that a war avowedly being
fought for democratic principles must be carried on with the consent of the
masses, the CPI conceptually represented the positive action of the national
state to coerce unity from the American people. But the CPI often failed,
perhaps inevitably, to channel the nation's emotions into "constructive patri-
otism" rather than demagoguery or hysteria, relying on methods of arousing
opinion rooted in hate and fear.16
Negative or police powers regarding acceptable opinion were supposed
to be handled by other government agencies—"another department of the
government looks after those who need threats," said the Daily Athenaeum—
notably the Post Office under Postmaster General Albert Sidney Burleson
and the Justice Department under Attorney General Thomas W Gregory.
Burleson was authorized by the June 1917 Espionage Act to repress and ban
from the mails material the government considered treasonous or insurrec-
tionary, and he used his powers sweepingly. Gregory implemented broad dis-
cretionary enforcement under authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act
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(October 6, 1917) and Espionage/Sedition Act (May 16, 1918), which ex-
tended the original powers of the Espionage Act. The expanded Espionage
Act essentially prohibited spoken or written criticism of U.S. policy, officials,
institutions, or symbols and provided penalties for violations.17
Gregory's Justice Department worked closely with about a quarter
million private grassroots patriots in the American Protective League (APL),
who assumed the task of spying on and informing on alleged violators of
the Espionage Act. The chief targets of the APL were tens of thousands
of German espionage agents who had allegedly infiltrated American com-
munities. These suspected agents and saboteurs reputedly conspired to sub-
vert the American government and the morale of the people and to generate
support for Germany among immigrants from the Central Powers states,
American blacks, and traditional opponents of the British Empire. Presi-
dent Wilson and his supporters, such as progressive reformer Florence
Kelley, praised the APLs service to a country riddled with "skillful intriguers
and spy captains." Wilson affirmed that Germany's masters had dispatched
thousands of spies and conspirators to corrupt the opinion of the American
people, and he encouraged counterconspiracy by the APL and the Justice
Department.18
Although Wilson expressed reservations about the extremism that ac-
companied war fever, to the president the forcible repression of real or
imagined dissent represented the legitimate negative thrust of the state when
faced with threats to wartime national unity. Wilson feared the potential ex-
cesses of war fever, remarking that once the American people were led into
war, "they'll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you
must be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthlessness will enter into the
very fiber of our national life." The president dismissed these fears of excess,
however, when he marshaled his considerable rhetorical talents to tap the
emotionalism that was brewing across the nation. Public relations pioneer
Edward L. Bernays, an important figure in the CPFs Foreign Press Bureau,
anointed Wilson as the country's best "public relations man" during the war.
With his gift to dramatize ideas, his intellectual and verbal powers, and his
ability to marry political arguments to idealistic imperatives, Wilson gave
the government's wartime propaganda its "essential content and immense
moral drive."19
The dual functions of edification and repression that were woven into
the fabric of America's mobilization became virtually indistinguishable as the
barrage of war-related stories escalated. Local media outlets followed the lead
of Wilsonian surrogates such as Kelley, who estimated that as many as three
hundred thousand German agents and subalterns worked in the United
States, and James A.B. Scherer, a member of Wilson's Council of National
Defense, who guessed there were four-hundred thousand spies carrying out
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the "Emperor's nefarious program." The Fairmont Times doubted the loyalty
of all unnaturalized Germans in the United States, accounting for half a mil-
lion potential "enemies in our midst."20
Failure to actively display loyalty was considered identical to disloy-
alty. Disavowing tolerance for "divided sentiment," Guy D. Goff, a native of
Clarksburg, West Virginia, and a member of the U.S. judge advocate gen-
eral's staff, said America would not abide the "venomous German sympa-
thizers within our borders." Natives as well as immigrants living in the
United States must either defend American democracy, or "be shot as trai-
tors." The Clarksburg Daily Telegram applauded an "America for Americans"
campaign, declaring that foreign-born residents of the country were either
true Americans or enemy aliens. A campaign spokesman stated that foreign-
ers should either become "Americanized" or leave, as "there is no room for
aliens. . . . I hope before the war ends to find an alien a curiosity or an
enemy." Local ethnic groups got the message, as the paper soon reported
that Clarksburg Slavs had scheduled a patriotic celebration to prove their
loyalty to America in the war with their home empire.21
The influence of the CPI is suggested in the prevalence and uniformity
of general themes, such as German war aims and war atrocities. Inflamma-
tory atrocity stories, calculated to excite the emotions, were often presented
as factual on evidence that was questionable at best. For example, University
of Indiana history professor Samuel B. Harding's "Topical Outline of the
War," which Harding prepared for the National Board for Historical Service
in cooperation with the CPI, went well beyond a philosophical critique of
the authoritarian German state to implicitly indict the German people.22
Harding quoted Professor A.S. Hershey, his colleague at Indiana, who wrote
that the German war philosophy advocated "absolute war," "ruthlessness,"
and "frightfulness" as legitimate tactics of warfare. Hershey affirmed that
Germany employed assassination, massacre, poisoning, torture, intrigue,
arson, pillage, murder, and rape under the guise of just war. Such a civiliza-
tion, stated a CPI poster, was not fit to live.23
The War Cyclopedia published by Guy Stanton Ford's educational divi-
sion of the CPI also contributed much to the sensationalistic tone of the
"Outline." German brutality was portrayed as calculated and inherent,
marked by torture and mutilation on a wide scale. German outrages against
civilians, particularly in the early days of the European war, were described
as systematic, uniform, and wanton.24 The CPFs weekly National Editorial
Service also featured atrocity stories, like one in the Wheeling Intelligencer that
attributed Germany's "slaughter of the innocents" to racial backwardness.
Endemic German barbarism was described as a function of hereditary ar-
rested development of the brain, leading to "the dominance of the lower im-
pulses" common to the world's backward peoples. The longstanding German
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megalomania, "or exalted conception of their own importance," supported
this "obtrusive hypoplasia" diagnosis, which was "unerring in definition of
all backward races." While some individual British and American citizens
may have occasionally "yielded under stress of intense provocation to pun-
ishments savagely fitting savage crimes," as nations the Anglo-Saxon powers
"have long since realized their responsibility to their standards of civilization
in their dealings with the lower races."25
Given the centrifugal distribution of ideas from the centers of informa-
tion in Washington, it is not surprising that local expressions of patriotic vigi-
lance often equaled or exceeded the CPFs use of overstatement.26
Condemning "slackers" before a federal grand jury in Elkins, U.S. District
Judge Alston G. Dayton denounced Germany as "a mad-dog nation running
amuck and preying upon the civilized world." Urging all Americans to stand
by the president and the flag, Dayton encouraged "spirited and merciless war-
fare" against the spread of "German 'kultur' throughout the civilized world."27
The specter of German Kultur begat spiraling charges of terror in the
daily press, including the horrific accusation that the Germans had erected
plants in which the corpses of German soldiers were treated chemically to
manufacture commercial products, including lubricating oils and pigs' food.
Employees of the Consolidation Coal Company learned that when dealing
with this type of "savages or maniacs peace can be brought about only by
such methods as are appreciated by such creatures." The enemy was "mad
with lust and the spilling of much blood." To defend God and American
civilization, "we must crush them beyond the power of resurrection. The
end justifies any means."28 West Virginia educator Robert A. Armstrong, an
avowed pacifist, suspended his pacifistic principles when it came to Ger-
many. "When a mad dog is running amuck in the world," said Armstrong,
echoing Judge Dayton, "muzzle him at any cost."29
The emotionalism of the war propaganda created and reinforced the
image of a brutal enemy undeserving of mercy or respect and devoid of
human sentiment. To such an enemy, retaliatory outrages were not inhu-
mane but rather just. Our Own People, an employee magazine published by
the Davis Coal and Coke Company, predicted in October 1918 that soon the
Allies would force the kaiser and his "dogs" to "grovel in the dust," begging
for mercy:
But do they deserve mercy? Would it not be better that this viper
and his followers, the German people, be punished for their atrocities
by being tortured by liquid fire in the same manner as they have tor-
tured, and by so doing make an example which will convince the
German people that barbarism will no longer be tolerated for all time
by civilized people?30
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Driven by these sentiments, America's role in the war took on the vest-
ments of a holy crusade. The official propaganda bureau nurtured this im-
pulse to further mobilize public enthusiasm for the war. A CP1 pamphlet,
written by Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane and Secretary of War
Newton D. Baker, cast the war not only in terms of political principle but
also as a religious war between Christianity and barbarism. To the National
Education Association (NEA), Lane proclaimed "a new Americanism," assur-
ing NEA delegates that the United States would "put every boy and every
factory and every dollar and every hand at the service of Christian civiliza-
tion." Linking the mission of America for world progress with the mission of
Christ, Lane concluded, "Americanism must be to us a political religion."31
Messianic Americanism also underlay the public-speaking campaigns
of the CPI's Four-Minute Men Division. The influential West Virginia Uni-
versity historian Oliver P. Chitwood, a specialist in European diplomatic his-
tory, was a Monongalia County Four-Minute man. He praised the speakers
as "the most important single agency in spreading the Gospel of patriotism."
The West Virginia state director of the Four-Minute Men, William Burdette
Matthews, portrayed them as "apostles of the spoken word . . . preaching the
doctrine of undiluted Americanism and educating the people on the sub-
jects of vital interest that constantly arise in the prosecution of the trium-
phant struggle for decency and democracy."32
The mixture of religious and political zealotry spawned the intolerance
predicted by Woodrow Wilson. Indeed, Wilson encouraged the volatile
spiritual climate, admonishing clergymen to embrace his "Ways to Serve the
Nation" as a not "unworthy or inappropriate subject of comment and
homily from their pulpits." Many Christian ministers, caught in the stream
of popular sentiment fomented by Wilson and the CPI, preached a gospel
grounded as much in hate and fear as brotherly love. Many of these later
publicly acknowledged and repented their hateful excesses of the war
years.33 A survey of the roughly one thousand West Virginia Four-Minute
Men reveals that at least 113, or over 10 percent, were men of the cloth. In
some counties, ministers comprised about one-half the rosters. Churches
provided the forum for countless demonstrations of war enthusiasm, such
as the "great patriotic meeting" at the Morgantown Methodist Episcopal
Church in July 1918. An account describes the convocation as "in line with
the program mapped out by the administration for a series of patriotic meet-
ings" all over the country. The meeting would occur "at a time in the history
of the world when the flag and the cross are the symbols of the coming of a
new civilization. The two were never linked so closely as now."34
Local ministers received direct instructions to tailor their spiritual
messages to war needs. On September 30, 1918, the West Virginia Council
of Defense issued a bulletin to the chairmen of the county councils of de-
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fense, the state's Liberty Loan Committees, and the Four-Minute Men advis-
ing them that Sunday, October 6, had been designated "Liberty Loan Church
Day in West Virginia." The state council instructed the chairmen of the three
organizations in each county to advise every minister that the government
wanted at least one sermon on October 6 to be devoted to the Fourth Lib-
erty Loan. Clergy were urged to include the singing of "America" or other
patriotic hymns at each service and to preach a patriotic sermon at least
once a month.35
The West Virginia Council of Defense was deeply involved in all facets
of the mobilization of resources and public opinion. State defense councils
were established under the authority of the Council of National Defense,
which was formed by President Wilson within guidelines of a 1916 congres-
sional resolution, to facilitate the concentration and use of the nation's re-
sources for war purposes. The powers and funding available to the state
councils varied from state to state. Initially, three-quarters of the state coun-
cils were nonstatutory bodies, and the remainder had varying degrees of legal
authority. A few had been granted very extensive statutory powers by their
state legislatures shortly after the war was declared. According to William J.
Breen, historian of the state councils, only Minnesota matched West Virginia
in the extreme authority granted to the council.36
The West Virginia Council was formed in May 1917, when Governor
John J. Cornwell called an emergency war session to "strengthen the arm of
the State" in fulfilling national war aims. The extraordinary session met from
May 14 until May 26, granting ad hoc regulatory power to the governor and
the state council for the operation of railroads, mills, and mines, and for the
suppression of insurrections or rebellions in the state." The executive board
of the state council consisted of Cornwell as chairman and Secretary of State
Houston G. Young as secretary. State Auditor John S. Darst, State Superin-
tendent of Schools Morris P. Shawkey, Attorney General E.T. England, Treas-
urer William S. Johnson, and Commissioner of Agriculture James H. Stewart
rounded out the executive board. Practically all control of state war matters
was nominally vested in the executive board.38 The legislature also provided
for a fifteen-member advisory state council of defense, appointed by the
governor on May 29, 1917.39 The advisory council organized bureaus of in-
formation, education, and publicity; manufacturing; labor; agriculture; fi-
nance; transportation; raw materials; women's defense work; and medicine,
surgery, and sanitation.40
One month after the congressional war resolution, the Council of Na-
tional Defense called governors and state representatives to Washington to
coordinate state and federal strategies for the mobilization of public opinion.
The National Defense Council in Washington considered systematic public-
ity drives to be "of first importance." The West Virginia Council of Defense
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agreed that its major task was to promote patriotism "in the hearts of the
people of the State," especially immigrants who needed guidance in "demo-
cratic principles."41 Accordingly, the advisory council established the Bureau
of Information, Education and Publicity as one of its major divisions. C.P.
Snow of Huntington, president of the West Virginia Board of Trade, was ap-
pointed by the executive board as chairman of this bureau. Superintendent
Shawkey recommended that Jesse V Sullivan, former managing editor of the
Charleston Gazette, be appointed executive secretary and "public man" for
the State Council. Sullivan refused the appointment at the offered salary of
$2,000 and demanded $3,000, which was approved by the executive board.
Sullivan had worked in the West Virginia coal industry since 1904, when he
migrated to the state from Ohio. He later became private secretary to Gover-
nor Ephraim Morgan from 1921 to 1925.42
Sullivan aggressively pursued his duties and soon reported that the
state council had conducted an intensive publicity campaign of education
and war information among the people of the state. In addition to the work of
the Four-Minute Men, this drive was greatly assisted by the state's nearly two
hundred newspapers.43 The West Virginia press was "loyal to the core," Sulli-
van wrote. Newspaper columns "were filled with patriotic propaganda."44 If
not for the "cordial support given them by the patriotic newspapers of the
commonwealth," wrote Oliver Chitwood, the successful wartime publicity
campaigns would have been impossible.45
West Virginia war publicists enjoyed cooperation from the CPI and
such private groups as the National Security League, the Federal Council of
the Churches of Christ in America, the Federation of Women's Clubs, and
the National Committee on Education in Patriotism of the National Bureau of
Education.46 Parades, propaganda films, and war expositions characterized
the campaigns. In 1918, for example, a government war exposition train
rode the rails in West Virginia as part of the truncated Fourth Liberty Loan
Drive, featuring war trophies "from the bloody fields of France. . . . Captured
cannon, flame projectors, hand grenades and other weapons of warfare. Ex-
planations of use by returned soldiers. Everything absolutely free." Should
the train be delayed, speeches and "patriotic gatherings of various kinds"
would fill the time "that might otherwise be lost from war work."47
Other means of reaching the people included lavish patriotic specta-
cles. On July 16, 1917, Jesse Sullivan met in Wheeling with Thomas Wood
Stevens, producer of patriotic war pageants nationwide, to finalize plans to
bring Stevens's "Drawing of the Sword" pageant to West Virginia.48 De-
signed to "stimulate public interest and enthusiasm in the war," the pageant
was performed on three nights in Wheeling, drawing crowds of less than
one thousand, before traveling to Charleston, Huntington, Clarksburg, and
Parkersburg. The patriotic press described the pageant as offering a "closer
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realization of the reasons America joined the allies," beginning with patri-
otic songs before turning "to the appeal of true Americanism." The specta-
cle of pageantry, said the Wheeling Intelligencer, "conveyed a proper sense of
the real causes of the fight against the destroyer of civilization." The educa-
tional quality of the pageant demonstrated that the artist could do "his bit
toward awakening the true sense of duty that lies in every American's
heart." Military draftees from Wheeling and Ohio County particularly bene-
fitted from the pageant, since it aroused in them "a little more patriotic
feeling than they had yet experienced in the great crisis."49 Only a few days
later, the Ohio Valley Knights of Pythias staged a patriotic demonstration
dwarfing the Stevens crowds, drawing some four thousand marchers for a
parade and speeches and including a keynote address by Senator James E.
Watson of Indiana.50
As part of its publicity campaign, the West Virginia defense council also
authorized publication of the West Virginia War Bulletin, edited by Sullivan, to
disseminate "patriotic propaganda." It was at the suggestion of the state coun-
cil that the Committee on Public Information in Washington appointed
William Burdette Matthews, clerk of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, as state director of the Four-Minute Men. Matthews's organization
reached into every county, carrying the "militant message of America" into
practically every movie house and school, and to stores, factories, shops, and
street corners throughout West Virginia.51
Speakers gave freely of their time and energies, said Matthews, and
fully appreciated "the honor of being the mouthpiece of their government."
Some of the Four-Minute campaigns, which lasted from a few days to several
weeks, were "First Liberty Loan," "Food Conservation," "Why We Are Fight-
ing," "The Nation in Arms," "Unmasking German Propaganda," "The Mean-
ing of America," and "Where Did You Get Your Facts?" Oliver P. Chitwood
noted that bulletins were sent from Washington with advisories on directed
campaigns, to be fashioned into four-minute speeches by each Four-Minute
man.52 George Creel understood that in this way each speaker "delivered an
address which he thought was his own but which actually paraphrased one of
the Committee pamphlets." These "short and frequently snappy speeches,"
said Chitwood, reached millions nationwide who might never have read the
bulletins issued by the CPI. One CPI enthusiast credited the Four-Minute
Men with reaching the "vacant minds" of Americans.53
In a largely rural state such as West Virginia, as in most of America in
1917-18, it was essential that the official outreach of the war mobilization
extend into remote areas as well as population centers. Therefore, the pro-
gram of the state council was carried into every county and many commu-
nities by the formation of subsidiary councils, which became clearinghouses
of all official county war activities. Chitwood dismissed reservations harbored
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by some commentators about the expansion of state authority. The accom-
plishments of the state council's "elaborate organization" in furthering the
government's war policy fully justified, in Chitwoood's opinion, the creation
of "so much machinery and the delegation to it of such large powers."54
The state's Third Liberty Loan drive tested the effectiveness of the prop-
aganda mechanism. The campaign began on April 6, 1918, accompanied by
colorful demonstrations and parades in the larger cities. "Never in the history
of West Virginia," one observer commented, "has there been such a revival of
patriotism as was displayed on that date." The West Virginia War Bulletin pro-
claimed that enthusiasm "had been excited and stimulated by the press re-
ports of the raging battle on the fields of Picardy."55 Matthews expanded the
Four-Minute speaking network to encompass remote rural districts, in coor-
dination with county councils, state and local Liberty Loan committees, and
school teachers. In the rural districts, state Liberty Loan chairman William A.
MacCorkle dispatched speakers into the farthest reaches. MacCorkle, Demo-
cratic governor of the state from 1893 to 1897, wrote of the West Virginia
bond campaigns that "never once in all of these dark times did the energy,
character or patriotism inherent in the people ever falter or fail."56 The battle
line was not three thousand miles away "in bleeding France," MacCorkle
said. "It is here among the mountains of our beloved state."57
Convinced that the rural schoolhouse was the key to inducing isolated
rural families to invest their saving in the government, MacCorkle called for
weekly patriotic meetings in every school. He advised county Liberty Loan
chairmen, county Four-Minute chairmen, and county school superinten-
dents to arrange a far-flung speaking campaign.58 Livia Poffenbarger, director
of women's Liberty Loan efforts, appointed officers of all Daughters of the
American Revolution chapters to the state executive board for Liberty Bond
issues.59 Morris P. Shawkey later outlined the mechanics of the cooperative
Liberty Loan campaign. Material was distributed from the CPI in Washing-
ton to all speakers through the county chairmen and subchairmen. The local
chairmen in turn prepared careful reports of each campaign for the state di-
rector, who then submitted a summary report to Creel's office in Washing-
ton. Shawkey claimed that during the Third Liberty Loan drive, more than
sixteen hundred speeches were made to nearly five hundred thousand West
Virginians, "or nearly half the population of the state."60
Plans for an even further reaching campaign were drafted at a state
council-sponsored war convention in Charleston, organized by MacCorkle,
Matthews, and Livia Poffenbarger. Held on September 17 and 18, 1918, con-
ferees at the convention planned to expand the county Four-Minute outreach
to include speaking tours by Allied officers and wounded American soldiers.
The worldwide influenza epidemic, however, curtailed most public meet-
ings.61 The quota for that drive was filled only when MacCorkle appealed
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to clergymen throughout the state to personally solicit donations from their
congregations, urged on by Cornwell's invocation that the difficulties would
be the "real test of the patriotism of all of us."62
While the effectiveness of the varied war drives was undeniable, some
critics charged that the CPI's volunteer local propagandists sometimes ap-
proached hysteria. The committee's defenders note, however, that "hysteria
was generally prevalent at the time. . . .  The most fantastic atrocity stories
were believed."63 This comment by Edward L. Bernays skirts the issue of
whether the CPI created hysteria or simply exploited it, but as committee
spokesmen often explained, "German propaganda had to be counteracted
with American propaganda."64 Bernays was just beginning his pioneering
work in the new field of public relations when he joined the CPI. There he
understood that words and ideas were as important to the war effort as the
world's newest weapons of mass destruction, remarking that "ideas and their
dissemination became weapons and words became bullets." He described
the task of the CPI as the "engineering of consent," and it was practiced on a
"grand scale" for the first time in the Great War. Words were organized to de-
velop "the climate of public opinion" needed to sustain the commitment
necessary for the total mobilization of American resources. From 1914 to
1918, said Bernays, the United States government mobilized every known
public relations device of persuasion and suggestion, "to sell our war aims"
to the American people. Along with preserving the friendship of allies and
neutrals and demoralizing the enemy, a major objective of propaganda that
fell within the mission of the CPI was mobilizing hatred against the enemy.65
The government's war experience expanded the arts of "opinion mold-
ing," leading many in business and government to recognize the organizing
force of public opinion for other purposes. When they returned to civilian
life, many in the CPI, including Bernays, applied wartime publicity tech-
niques to new public and private endeavors, refining them and "broadening
the scope of their operations as the expanding postwar economy and the in-
creasing complexity of their publics demanded."66 After the war, Bernays
wrote that the necessary manipulation of the "organized habits and opinions
of the masses" was an important element of a democratic society. Those who
guided this "unseen mechanism," Bernays said, constituted an "invisible
government which is the true ruling power of our country. . . . it is the intel-
ligent minority which need to make use of propaganda continuously and
systematically."67
Guy Stanton Ford wrote in 1920 that modern war demanded an entire
nation in arms, guided by specialized government agencies. These agencies of
war merged with the "equally multiplex" agencies of "morale building" to con-
trol food production, regulate transportation, and maximize industrial pro-
duction.68 The bureaus of the propaganda apparatus depended on a systematic
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scheme to control the flow of officially generated information that the CPI
approved for public consumption. The cooperation of state and local agen-
cies, media outlets, and volunteers was required by this propaganda model.
No agency was more critical to reaching the masses of Americans, native and
foreign-born, than the institution of public education, from remote one-
room schoolhouses to seats of higher learning.
By 1918 Jesse Sullivan could report that West Virginia schools "are
indeed mobilized."69 War planners realized "the school system comes into
closer relation with all the people than does any other institution." It was,
therefore, self-evident that the school system should be "used extensively in
linking up the people with the numerous and important war activities
launched by the government." One of the many school-based war programs
was the West Virginia Junior Four-Minute Men branch, credited by William
B. Matthews with "working wonders" in the spread of patriotic propaganda.
Oliver Chitwood wrote that teachers created a patriotic environment by gear-
ing curricula to war issues. At the college level, courses in history and civics
"were linked up closely with the war." According to Chitwood, teachers and
administrators contributed "a large share" to the propaganda of patriotism:
In West Virginia, as everywhere else in the country, the young men
in the institutions of higher learning had imbibed such high ideals of
patriotism that a large proportion of those of military age enlisted in the
service of their country. Many of them made the supreme sacrifice on
the soil of France.™
The war was defined as a struggle not only for national honor, but for
national existence. All Americans were expected to subordinate personal
matters to the victory over Germany, and educators acknowledged "every
school should be the center of war work."71 The West Virginia School Journal,
the professional journal of the West Virginia Education Association, advised
its readers that every teacher was to be a "true blue" spokesman for the state
and as such must be on guard for those individuals in every community
who "through ignorance or something worse, spread discord and opposi-
tion." The state "wants no teachers with yellow streaks," and, knowing their
responsibility in "drilling the great army of reserves after the war," teachers
were expected to integrate the war aims and ideals articulated by the CPI
and other public and private information bureaus into their classroom ac-
tivities and curricula.72
The war enhanced the role of the state in instilling common values
and beliefs in native-born and immigrant Americans. Moreover, the war
crisis and its attendant mobilization campaigns led Americans of diverse
social and political opinion to identify nationalistic aims as the objects of
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ethical commitment. Many longtime critics of the abuses of industrial capi-
talism joined in this nationalistic impulse, tailoring their reformism to the
patriotic demands of the war.73 This transformation is evident in the pro-
nouncements of educational leaders. A large number of West Virginia educa-
tors attended the 1918 convention of the National Education Association
held at Pittsburgh, where they heard Guy Stanton Ford credit the CP1 with
helping "define national life." The Committee, said Ford, enlisted every
modern agency of publicity and education, and would be even more inti-
mately connected to the schools and teachers. "The teacher is enlisted in this
war," he continued, "and more and more the morale of the nation and the
thinking in its homes will be determined by what she knows and teaches in
this supreme crisis."74
Ford envisioned the nation's schools unified in a struggle to "make an
Americanized, nationalized American nation." Similarly, L.B. Hill, professor
of education at West Virginia University, summarized the integrative role of
teachers in establishing "an ideal state system." Hill declared that the coun-
try needed soldiers, physicians, Red Cross nurses, and capital to win the
war, but no less vital were teachers in the universities, colleges, normal
schools, high schools, and one-room schools, who must "teach patriotism
and the right attitude of mind for men of military age." Regular work habits,
sanitation, and thrift were as important as patriotic rituals, Hill said. Good
teachers would infuse the daily routine with broad national obligations,
morale building, and social efficiency. Pupils would feel that what they did
for themselves, their school, and their home, they did also for glory of the
country.75
The war expanded upon an idea that schools and colleges essentially
comprised an important American industry, with School and Society identify-
ing colleges as an industry no less important than coal and steel.76 Educators
spoke of children as the "material with which the school deals, as resources
greater than mines, forests, and fisheries." To realize the potential of this re-
source, the schools must develop ideals of discipline and efficiency, which
"are not only military virtues but are also requisites for industrial, commer-
cial, and civic success."77 Such sentiments had long been promoted by
American "New Nationalists" and pro-war progressives, who interpreted the
war as a source of national fulfillment. This view cast public education as a
mechanism for military and industrial efficiency, as the great laboratory for
American patriotism and economic strength. In the "training camps called
public schools" were seventeen million children, comprising the "great army
of citizens of the future." The NEA suggested using patriotic literature and
songs as well as emotive demonstrations allowing elementary schoolchildren
to "share the thrill of drum and flag, to feel the pride of the pomp and
parade that accompany military affairs." Children would then be part of the
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country's patriotic force, and teachers would learn that military discipline
could be transferred to "many other kinds of discipline."78
Patriotic programs in West Virginia schools were consistent with such
recommendations by the NEA. West Virginia schoolchildren often parti-
cipated in junior pageants modeled after the more grandiose affairs like
Stevens's "Drawing of the Sword." Local newspapers frequently carried sto-
ries of such events, and William Burdette Matthews proudly asserted that his
Junior Four-Minute Men "saturated" the whole public school system with "a
proper spirit of patriotism which should prevail in all schools and colleges."
West Virginia University English professor Robert A. Armstrong urged teach-
ers to teach patriotic poetry and music, instilling "the words and the songs
into the children's hearts."79 Dramatic programs were matched by the infu-
sion of school aims into course work, as state Superintendent Morris P.
Shawkey "brought the school organization behind every patriotic move-
ment." In the summer of 1918, Shawkey's Department of Schools published
and distributed thirty-thousand song books containing many patriotic songs
and patriotic readings, for use in the schools and for community singing.
Shawkey estimated that nearly all of the state's fifteen hundred Parent-
Teacher Association and school social center meetings in 1917 and 1918 fea-
tured "patriotic parts." Shawkey reported that the integration of war work
literature, sent to the schools from Washington, into courses in agriculture,
home economics, English, and civics "made a lasting impression upon the
teachers and pupils, many of whom have become leaders and efficient propa-
gandists ready and willing to take part in the moulding of public opinion."80
The West Virginia School Journal reported that in every West Virginia
community, school teachers had been leaders in public thought. Teachers
were well suited to "train the public mind" and had "proven the most
ardent leaders in sturdy patriotism." Applicants taking standardized West
Virginia teacher examinations were asked, "What have you done to help
your country win the war and what more do you intend to do?"81 Much of
the time at the state's summer teacher training institutes was devoted to
discussion of the schools and the war. West Virginia historian Charles H.
Ambler credits the war with reinvigorating county institutes, since through
them the government taught teachers thrift, food conservation, and bond
selling lessons, which they "passed on to their pupils who in turn sold
them to their parents." Shawkey called teacher institutes "the most valuable
of all mediums in reaching the homes of the citizens of West Virginia."82
War patriotism in the schools included negative demonstrations of
loyalty. Calling instruction in the German language "propaganda to over-
throw English," many school systems across the country abolished the
teaching of the German language, and some states took similar action, some
at the request of their state defense councils. German was described as a
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"language that disseminates the ideals of autocracy, brutality and hatred,"
and its defenders were often persecuted or dismissed for alleged pro-
German actions.83 William S. John, a Monongalia County Four-Minute man
and secretary of the Morgantown Independent District Board of Education,
was instrumental in abolishing German studies in the district, to guarantee
"loyal, undivided unity of language, thought, and purpose" in the public
schools.84 Calling instruction in German "un-American and un-patriotic,"
Robert A. Armstrong agreed with some NEA delegates that German instruc-
tion in the schools was a potential tool for the German agent. Since a lan-
guage was "saturated with the standards and peculiar views of the people
who made it and speak it," let American children be exposed to "aspirations
that are proper for the civilization we want in America." A note of caution
was sounded by Shawkey and Oliver Chitwood, who wondered if outlawing
German would undermine America's political and commercial advantage
after the war.85
In spite of such reservations, the West Virginia Board of Education,
following the lead of many local districts, dropped German from the course
of study. L.L. Friend, professor of secondary education at WVU, wrote Presi-
dent Frank Trotter that many schools had discontinued German before the
state board acted; after the board's resolution, practically all state high
schools suspended German. State colleges and normal schools also elimi-
nated German, thus, "no pupil from the kindergarten to the University was
studying the language of our enemy, but a greatly increased number were
studying French and Spanish in preparation for the new and better times."86
The role of higher education in opinion molding and the mobilization
of educational forces, from state and national perspectives, was central to
the war effort. Largely through the agency of academics, especially in the
historical profession, propaganda came to be accepted and presented by
West Virginia educators as objective truth, part of the process, said Guy
Stanton Ford, of "put[ting] propaganda on a level with truth telling." But as
Edward L. Bernays explained, "Honest education and honest propaganda
have much in common. There is this dissimilarity: Education attempts to be
disinterested, while propaganda is frankly partisan."87
2
National and West Virginia
Perspectives on Higher Education and
the Delivery of War Propaganda
When the United States entered the war, institutions of higher learning unre-
servedly lent their intellectual and physical resources to the effort.1 Normal
schools were defined as a "potent factor" for teaching patriotism, with hopes
of faculties "so imbued with the spirit of loyalty" to the institution and the
state that they would not even need to speak of patriotism.2 Teachers were to
offer themselves "as one unit in the great army of those who stand ready to
give all at the nation's summons. . . . let us urge the President of the Republic
to use us in some unified, direct way in the present national crisis."3
The technological character of the war made universities, as primary
research facilities with trained experts, a natural resource for the govern-
ment.4 Chemistry classes focused research on explosives and gas warfare;
physics emphasized electricity, projectiles, and the principles of aerodynam-
ics and submarine technology; biologists taught eugenics and hygiene; geol-
ogists designed trenches; historians addressed military and diplomatic issues
and international law; and sociology and economics anticipated the postwar
reconstruction of "industrial and social institutions."5 Charles H. Ambler, a
distinguished historian of West Virginia, reports that West Virginia Univer-
sity, like other colleges and schools of the country, especially land-grant col-
leges, put its resources at the disposal of the federal government. As noted
by Oliver Chitwood earlier, hundreds of West Virginia University students,
including regular students, vocational students, and members of the Student
Army Training Corps, enlisted in the armed services, and hundreds of others
entered the service under the draft law initiated in May 1917.6
College campuses were converted to "veritable training camps for sol-
diers."7 Students on the WVU campus learned that the imperatives of the
war dominated the contours of the academic year. West Virginia University,
said English professor Waitman Barbe, would be doing everything in its
power to realize victory over Germany. The entire institution, said Barbe,
had been converted into "an instrument of the United States Government in
the great cause to which it is devoting all its powers."8
Physical plant at the university reflected the transformation wrought
by war demands. The executive board of the West Virginia Council of De-
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fense met with WVU President Frank B. Trotter, and E.W Oglebay and
Joseph F. Marsh of the state Board of Regents, to consider an emergency ap-
propriation from the council of defense war fund to equip the Physics De-
partment in Martin Hall for the technical training of conscripted men at the
request of the United States War Department. The state council authorized
$8,000 for the project." University resources were also used for food produc-
tion and control, in scientific investigations for the War Department, and for
public speaking.10
Training of men for the armed services was geared to the "production"
of engineers, machinists, and technicians for war purposes. College of Engi-
neering faculty conducted most of the technical training, while Oliver Chit-
wood directed the war aims and English courses.11 Student Army Training
Corps cadets were required by the War Department to take either a "War
Aims" or "War English" course. Chitwood's The Immediate Causes of the Great
War was used as a text in war aims classes at several universities. Originally
issued before America became a belligerent, a second edition was rushed
into print for 1918, reflecting United States entrance into the war, and de-
pending in part for new information on the CP1 War Cyclopedia and publica-
tions of the National Security League.12
The Daily Athenaeum consistently sought to inspire the student body,
observing that "colleges of America have responded nobly to the call to
arms" and should expand the practice of patriotic exercises and displays.
"Now is the time for America's Home Army to mobilize," the DA intoned.
"Let Germany feel that this is a popular war in America."13 Faculty and stu-
dents at West Virginia's Salem College pledged to wear old clothes, "as far as
respectability will permit," and to remit savings to the government in order
to "promote the coming of the New World Democracy and to aid in the
struggle against Kaiserism."14 Students and faculty were also encouraged to
ferret out enemies of the government's war program, doing their part to
assist, as E.L. Bernays expressed it, the "persuasive action of the agents of
the Department of Justice."15 The West Virginia School Journal warned against
"the disloyal teacher who is poisoning the minds of children with German
propaganda"; schools were not to tolerate any teacher "whose Americanism
is not so warm and vigorous as to be ever uppermost and apparent."16 The
Daily Athenaeum noted that the National Security League encouraged presi-
dents and governing boards of American universities and colleges to investi-
gate their faculties and remove disloyal professors. Scrutiny of suspected
anti-American or pro-German professors and their scholarship was "a
wholesome symptom of an increasing national consciousness."17
Just as ministers were prevalent within the ranks of West Virginia's
Four-Minute Men, so were college professors. Several WVU faculty members
served the cause, including James M. Callahan, a distinguished diplomatic
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historian. In addition to his duties as history professor and dean of Arts and
Sciences at WVU (appointed by Trotter in 1916), Callahan was Monongalia
County's director of Four-Minute Men and a tireless speaker at teacher insti-
tutes and civic meetings.18 Callahan's topics at teacher institutes included
"What to Teach about the War," "Savings and Serving Taught by War Activi-
ties," "Food Conservation Campaigns and Demonstrations," and "A New
Brand of History and Patriotism."19 Callahan was joined as a Four-Minute
man by fellow faculty members Robert A. Armstrong, Waitman Barbe, L.M.
Bristol, Oliver Chitwood, E. Howard Vickers, I.C. White, A.L. Darby, J.H.
Cox, C.H. Jones, and President Francis B. Trotter.20
Chitwood and Callahan represented the nationwide participation in
war education and propaganda among historians; George Creel wrote that
the universities lent "their best men" to the cause. History Teacher's Magazine,
published by the American Historical Association mainly for public school
teachers, encouraged history teachers to write newspaper articles and ad-
dress public meetings, schools, women's clubs, and other organizations on
the "pressing need of united vigorous action." They could use their influence
to insure that commencement addresses, either by pupils or by public speak-
ers, address the war crisis. Readers of the magazine were advised to contact
the Committee on Public Information's Division of Educational Cooperation,
the United States Bureau of Education's Division of Civic Education, the Na-
tional Board for Historical Service, and the Committee on Patriotism through
Education of the National Security League for guidance and materials for pa-
triotic education.21
The History Teacher's Magazine sought and claimed, just as the CPI did,
to strike a balance between "intelligent patriotism" and jingoism. Some his-
torians feared their patriotic impulses and historical training might be ma-
nipulated for impure purposes.22 Professor Herman Ames cautioned readers
against displaying the "fanaticism" of some nineteenth-century European
historians, whose "nationalist histories" he blamed for contributing to the
outbreak of the war. Ames quoted Morse Stephens, president of the Ameri-
can Historical Association in 1914, who warned that in Europe, patriotism
had become "the national creed, filtered through the entire educational
system of modern states."23
Pleas for moderation revealed that the war challenged the "posture
of disinterested objectivity" of the history profession.24 Ideals of detached
criticism and noninterested deliberation fell victim as American academics,
especially historians, became official war propagandists. Historians' war pur-
view ranged from "scholarly expertise to blatant propaganda," from ethical
suggestions for peace plans to writing pamphlets for the "superpatriotic" Na-
tional Security League. Propagandizing historians espoused their reputation
for objective expertise, while they promoted an official government point of
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view about the war." Ames, divining no violence to his cautionary views
about unhealthy nationalism, believed that the entire educational system
should be designed to create patriotic citizens. It was the "especial province"
of history and civics teachers, said Ames, to "lay the foundation for an intel-
ligent patriotism and an enlightened public opinion." Citing the National
Security League, Ames proclaimed that patriotic education should "create a
sense of obligation to others and greatest of all to God and country." Stu-
dents should be inspired to ask not "What can my country do for me?" but
"What can I do for my country?"26
To mobilize "the intelligence and skill of the historical workers of the
country," seventeen eminent American historians established the National
Board for Historical Service (NBHS) on April 29, 1917, the same day as the
patriotic march in Gary, West Virginia.27 In a May 1 letter, the board con-
tacted 165 historians for voluntary contributions, the names being supplied
from the mailing list of the American Historical Review. Frederick Jackson
Turner suggested that professors tailor their classes and seminars to relevant
war issues, and the board recommended that in addition to public speaking
on the war, historians develop special curricula for school systems.28
James T. Shotwell, the first NBHS chairman, described it as a "volun-
tary and unofficial organization" formed to help historians meet the needs of
the public and the government.29 George Creel typically overstated the case
when he contended that the NBHS placed three thousand historians at the
"complete disposal" of the Committee on Public Information, but the unoffi-
cial status of the board claimed by Shotwell is a fabrication.30 The work of
the NBHS was well-coordinated with Ford's CPI committee, and much of
the board's leadership, notably Dana C. Munro, Charles D. Hazen, Evarts
Green, and Harding were contributors to CPI publications, including the
War Cyclopedia.31 The NBHS also enjoyed a quasi-official status through its
connection to the American Historical Association. The AHA donated office
space to the board, and managing editor J. Franklin Jameson and his assist-
ant Waldo G. Leland gave the NBHS extensive free publicity in the pages
of the American Historical Review.32 The History Teacher's Magazine, which
became the principal outlet for NBHS propaganda, was financed by the
AHA; its masthead read, "Edited in Cooperation with the National Board for
Historical Service and under the Supervision of a Committee of the Ameri-
can Historical Association."33
Shotwell contended that teachers and students of history should ar-
range and transmit data scientifically to "aid more directly in the determina-
tion of historical outlook."34 Effective national service required that history
teachers be especially careful in "the rearrangement of material" and "presen-
tation of the facts" [emphasis added]. Such care would, said Shotwell, "ac-
complish the desired result."35
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Historian Peter Novick observes that the principal activity of the histo-
rians was therefore the provision of serviceable propaganda, producing a
"sound and wholesome public opinion."36 Samuel B. Harding, who produced
the "Outline" for the CPI, which was carried by History Teacher's Magazine in
January 1918 (see chapter 1), denied that the historian's ideal of impartiality
was compromised in war service, writing that patriotic historians had never
"consciously allowed our desire to win this war to do violence to our sense
of historical truth."37 Harding denigrated the legitimacy of neutrality in the
crisis. Nothing in the name of objectivity and restraint should restrict the
history teacher from "uttering emphatically his conclusions as to the re-
sponsibility for this world calamity," Harding said. If the teacher could not
wholeheartedly support the war, however, "he ought at least to keep silent."38
Historian Carol Gruber concludes that NBHS historians were eager
and voluntary prosecutors of the Central Powers, engaged in a conscious,
deliberate campaign to manipulate history in the pursuit of Anglo-American
harmony.39 Many educators were alarmed at the indifference toward England
displayed by some Americans, usually blaming unfair textbooks for this "de-
plorable prejudice." Since intermediate-grade teachers were the "advance
guard" in teaching American history, they must cultivate in their students a
"sympathy for and relationship to the nation whose language we speak;
whose customs we have imitated; whose ideas of liberty are really identical
with our own."40
Growing sentiments of Anglo-Saxonism fostered a mainstream revi-
sion of the American Revolution, bemoaning the divisive quarrel between
"race brothers" and paving the way for Anglo-American diplomatic and war-
time rapprochement. West Virginia teachers learned that responsibility for
the American Revolution lay primarily with George III and a small group of
political minions, and that actually "Pitt, Burke, Fox, and others, were, in
spirit, the allies of Franklin, Adams, and Washington."41 George III was,
after all, a "German king," who controlled Parliament by bribery and cor-
ruption and was forced to hire German mercenaries when the English
people "would not volunteer to fight us."42 Jesse Sullivan of the West Vir-
ginia Council of Defense announced that England and America had been
separated by the "mad deeds of a German king, and . . . reunited by the
mad deeds of a German emperor." Albert Bushnell Hart, lauding the sense
of Anglo-American comradeship that had emerged since the Spanish-Ameri-
can War, advised that the American Revolution be taught as an organic
Anglo-Saxon movement in which neither side was thoroughly culpable.
English teachers also recognized the need for "inculcating more clear-cut
ideals of Americanism in our literature classes," since they were "entrusted
with the sacred responsibility of handing down the imperial heritage of the
English-speaking world."43
National and West Virginia Perspectives 29
The political content of academic war propaganda can be inferred
from the comments of C.L. Broadwater, principal of Tyler County High
School. Broadwater, who often spoke at West Virginia teacher institutes, out-
lined competing motives for studying history. The pure purpose, which was
to make the world intelligible to the pupil, prevailed in a democratic state,
since students were taught to "discern between fact and opinion, inference
and conjecture, truth and falsehood." The reverse of the democratic impulse
was statist in implication, teaching that "the state is everything and the indi-
vidual is nothing except a unit in the state." Germany, said Broadwater, had
"used history as a very formidable tool to train the individual citizens for the
interests of the state." German history books were carefully edited to prevent
the people from learning "what the rulers do not wish them to learn." The
history they absorbed did not always correspond to the facts but did accom-
plish "the exaltation of the state." The task of the teacher in a democracy, on
the other hand, was to make the present "intelligible to the pupil under his
charge." The "great questions of the present" must therefore be integrated
into history lessons:
Newspapers and magazines may be used at these times with ad-
vantage, if the teacher remembers to train the pupils a little in judging
historical evidence. The pamphlets and papers issued by the Committee
on. Public Information are very good for such use, as many of those are
well-annotated. There are also many documents sent out by patriotic
leagues and organizations which are of use. Proper teaching of this kind
will result in a clearer understanding of our national aims and every
citizen of democracy should know them in order that he as an individ-
ual unit of that democracy may show no weakness of will which would
break the solid wall of determination to win this war at whatever cost.
A knowledge of individuals that we are right in our causes and aim
will strengthen the national aim for defense against a menace that
threatens to engulf the world and not only for defense against menace,
but this knowledge will stimulate the people of this nation to pursue
into utter destruction the destroyer of the world's peace, of national
faith, of innocent children, of unprotected women, or to die both indi-
vidually and nationally in the hope of democracy and Christianity that
gave our nation birth. German militarism must die or we shall not live,
unless we choose slavery.44
One of West Virginia's leading academic figures in the war propaganda
drives was James M. Callahan. Callahan was born in Bedford, Indiana, in
1864. He earned his Doctorate of Philosophy in 1897 at Johns Hopkins,
studying under Herbert Baxter Adams, and his WVU colleague Oliver Chit-
wood also earned the Doctorate of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins. While at
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Hopkins, Callahan was influenced by the scholarship of Woodrow Wilson,
another Hopkins graduate and Adams's first doctoral student, who lectured
there while Callahan was a student.45 In an 1899 monograph published by
the Johns Hopkins University Press, Cuba and International Relations, Calla-
han expressed a firm belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon principles and
institutions as the model for the modern world, urging Americans to teach
Anglo-Saxon values to the "Spanish children" inherited from Spain in the
Spanish-American War.46 Callahan later described American territorial ex-
pansion as a "heroic, sublime migrating procession," stating that "the mis-
sion of the age was to subdue the wilderness and carry the Anglo-Saxon
frontier farther and farther westward."47
Callahan apparently shared the prevalent notion among American
historians, and supported by the era's dominant scientific consensus, that
people of color were genetically and socially inferior to whites. Fueled by
the authority of "scientific racialism," the doctrine of Anglo-Saxonism dom-
inated the profession by the turn of the century, endowing the "English
race" with full responsibility for America's political and social development
and supporting American imperialism and immigration restriction.48 The
preparedness movement had capitalized on this spirit, claiming that the war
promised a renewal of Anglo-Saxon cultural leadership internationally, and
"from the earliest days of the war, there was little doubt that U.S. elites were
Anglophilic."49 Callahan's colleague Albert Bushnell Hart of Harvard, de-
scended from an abolitionist family, was convinced by contemporary argu-
ments of black inferiority that white superiority, in retrospect, had justified
slavery and black political and social dependence. "Race measured by race,"
said Hart, "the Negro is inferior, and his past history in Africa, and in
America, leads to the belief that he will remain inferior."50 Hart's observa-
tion echoes that of Madison Grant in one of the decade's most influential
racial polemics, The Passing oj the Great Race, published in 1916. Grant
scoffed at the "fatuous belief of Civil War era "sentimentalists" who
claimed that environment, education, and opportunity could "alter hered-
ity." It had taken fifty years, said Grant, to realize that "speaking English,
wearing good clothes and going to school and to church do not transform a
Negro into a white man."51
Grant's well-received work was one of hundreds, beginning in the
1890s, that blended tenets of racial superiority with apprehension about the
new immigration from southern and eastern Europe. The concurrent migra-
tion of American blacks to southern and northern urban areas further galva-
nized the Anglo-Saxon racial consensus on the natural intellectual and moral
advantage of Anglo racial stock.32 American expansionism broadened the
racist consensus. It was America's destiny, said James M. Callahan, "to lead
in new paths" and to "domesticate nature and develop ideas of liberty and
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self-government," guided by the "strong American combination of Norse,
Celt, Norman, and Saxon" stock. Economic strength followed political be-
nevolence. American interests demanded the possession of "distant islands,"
to "provide for naval stations and commercial interests in the Pacific." Amer-
ica would lead the world in trade and industrial expansion, said Callahan,
and must acknowledge the trend of modern history toward colonization
and protectorates for "less civilized peoples." Americans must "reach out in
helpfulness to lift the less enlightened to liberty's plane, to search for fresh
resources, to transform seas into paths for ships, and yoke nature to serve
man." Callahan dismissed those critics who warned that authoritarianism
might accompany imperial growth, "as if empire could grow on freedom's
soil."53
The inevitability of Anglo-Saxon cultural expansion exalted by Calla-
han seemingly drew on several interrelated theoretical formulas that sought
to rationalize international imperialism. Callahan's work, for example, re-
flects the popular philosophical principles of August Comte's (1798-1857)
Positivist theory of development and English philosopher Herbert Spencer's
(1820-1903) application of Darwinian theory to human society. Positivism
envisioned interventionist modern states directing progress, maintaining
order, and imposing social and political stability on the developing nations.
Positivism reached the height of its influence between 1880 and 1900, for-
mative years intellectually for Woodrow Wilson, A.B. Hart, and Callahan.
Comte and Spencer proposed that modern, or industrial and scientific, so-
ciety evolved from traditional culture through a series of complex stages.
Leading the transformation to modern civilization were, as Madison Grant
believed, "selected individuals" who brought mankind from savagery and
barbarism, based on natural capacity that "gave them the right to lead and
the power to compel obedience."54
Callahan's Anglophilia also drew upon his mentor Herbert Baxter
Adams's "Teutonic Germ" theory, which flourished briefly during Callahan's
tenure at Johns Hopkins, and its successor, Frederick Jackson Turner's fron-
tier thesis of the expansion of American institutions. Adams's idea proposed
that English and American liberal democratic institutions grew from an in-
stitutional germ within prehistoric German forest cultures, which was car-
ried to Britain by Teutonic tribes in the fifth and sixth centuries. The purity
of the institutions was preserved by the extermination of racially inferior
Celtic Britons and reinvigorated in North America by the development of
the New England town meeting. In 1893 Turner, who was also trained at
Johns Hopkins by Adams, altered his mentor's emphasis on the direct Ger-
manic influence on American institutions, promoting instead the singular
environmental forces of the wilderness that made the frontier "the line of
rapid and effective Americanization."55 Callahan's writing and actions imply
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a synthesis of the conservative and evolutionary nature of both interpreta-
tions, which stressed the continuous growth of political and social institu-
tions and harbored suspicions of mass action, popular agitation, and re-
bellion.56
Callahan was also influenced by the functionalist views of the progres-
sive era's "New Historians," positing that history "is a social instrument,
helpful in getting the world's work more effectively done," that the study of
the past was justified by its service to the present. This was not a new con-
cept, but the war gave it expanded activist dimensions. New fields of social
and intellectual history had directed scholarly attention to the abuses of
class privilege, poverty, and industrial exploitation, but both conservative
and progressive historians shared a consensus in the superiority of American
institutions and rushed to use history to promote patriotism and the Allied
cause. While traditionalists justified the war as the defense and preservation
of Anglo-Saxon civilization, progressives envisioned an opportunity to
defeat imperialism and German militarism, and achieve the "real democrat-
ization of our industrial as well as of our political life."57
James M. Callahan's sense of American mission steered him to a
fiercely moralistic embrace of the war effort. He wrote his brother that while
personal sacrifices might be painful, "we are paying the cost of a war in a
good cause—to protect the weak, to defend our rights against the brutal mili-
tary masters of Germany and to save civilization from the curse of German
Kultur."58 An early advocate of the preparedness movement, Callahan heart-
ily endorsed the principles of the Roosevelt Non-Partisan League, a private
patriotic organization that sought to unseat Wilson in 1916 and reinstate
Theodore Roosevelt as president. The Roosevelt League presented a platform
of national honor, peace without sacrifice of national rights, and preparation
for anticipated industrial upheaval following the European war.59 Historian
Alan Dawley identifies such militant preparedness supporters as "the cream
of the Yankee Protestant establishment," who saw military readiness as the
keystone of national unity. Led by General Leonard Wood, Elihu Root, and
Roosevelt, extreme preparedness backers abandoned social justice reform,
emerging, according to Dawley, as the first American embodiment of the
twentieth-century authoritarian right.60 The Roosevelt League, frustrated
with Wilson's belated embrace of military preparedness, charged that it was
time for a president "whose creed and deed are straight Americanism." After
America entered the war, Callahan wrote that pro-interventionists should
congratulate themselves that the Wilson administration had at last adopted
Roosevelt's vigorous policy. Roosevelt, Callahan affirmed, had directed the
nation to its "true course of duty in this greatest crisis," and Callahan hoped
that the United States would demonstrate to the world "that we are ready ef-
ficiently to do our part to stay the menace of militarism made in Germany."
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He wrote to a friend that "I am sorry that we are too old to fight for we know
that we never could hope to find a nobler cause."61
Callahan's specialty in Latin American and United States diplomacy at-
tracted the attention of the Foreign Press Bureau of the Committee on Public
Information. He produced several articles for distribution in the Latin Ameri-
can press, hoping they "may prove useful in connection with the great cause
of right for which we are struggling."62 Callahan was approached by Edward
L. Bernays and Paul Kennaday, who served as chief of staff to the bureau's
director, Ernest Poole, for contributions to the CPI's news and feature service
in the Latin American republics. Kennaday outlined the content of the fea-
tures for the distinguished diplomatic historian:
Briefly, our general policy is to send news and stories to drive home
five big points: First, that we are getting ready to fight for years, if need
be; 2nd, Wilson's liberal peace terms; 3rd, we are not imperialists; 4th,
although by no means a perfect democracy, we are constantly struggling
toward greater social justice and the present crisis is bringing sweeping
changes that will make us still more democratic; 5th, the war is giving us
a broader interest in the world, especially in Latin America.63
Callahan sent a manuscript to the Foreign Press Bureau, which was later re-
leased as four short articles. These articles focused on German intrigues to
incite Mexico against the United States and to challenge the Monroe Doc-
trine. The articles were part of a national series prepared with instructions
from the Foreign Press Bureau of the CPI for distribution in Latin American
newspapers. Callahan assured the Latin American nations that United States
war aims were driven by passion for democracy and protection of the sover-
eignty and independence of "small states."64
Callahan also was the most prominent link between the war effort in
West Virginia and the National Security League, identified by one historian
as "the most extreme and vitriolic of the patriotic wartime organizations."65
The league was organized in 1914 by S. Stanwood Menken, a New York
corporate lawyer who was stranded in Europe at the outbreak of the war.
Although the League claimed not to accept contributions from any "whose
financial interests might be furthered by a programme of preparedness," a
1918-19 congressional investigation revealed that the league's contributors
were powerful leaders in northern financial and industrial circles, who
profited mightily from the war.66 Among the large contributors were Corne-
lius Vanderbilt, Mortimer Schiff, George W Perkins, Bernard Baruch, Henry
Clay Frick, Simon Guggenheim, H.H. Rogers, Charles Deering, J.E Morgan,
and John D. Rockefeller. Well-known public figures such as Elihu Root and
Alton B. Parker were recruited and advertised as honorary officers of the
organization.67
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Founded to lobby for military preparedness, the league soon expanded
its preparedness goals to promote its version of patriotic education, in-
cluding universal military training as means of "Americanizing" the youth of
the country, employing modern means of publicity and appeal.68 Robert
McElroy, the league's education director, worked closely with Guy Stanton
Ford of the CPI and secured government franking privileges for mailing
campaigns, and the league's publishing format and logo parroted the style of
the CPI. The National Board for Historical Service recommended NSL litera-
ture to school administrators and teachers. The league claimed more than
one hundred thousand members in late 1916, with 270-280 branches cover-
ing every section of the country. A league dispatch to Callahan announced
that the time had come to transcend agitation for military preparedness, by
means of "more systematic propaganda" to assist "the organization of nation-
al resources."69
With the nation at war, NSL leaders capitalized on widespread expo-
sure and acceptance of their views to redefine patriotism, using the war crisis
to promote a more rigid concept of social order and discipline than would
have been acceptable in peacetime. The league's emphasis therefore shifted
from military preparedness to regulating standards of complete national
unity of thought and action, seeking to insure conformity by eliminating dis-
sent. Thus, the governing board of the league resolved, as earlier mentioned
by the Daily Athenaeum, that educational institutions should scrutinize the
loyalty of their faculty and staff and be alert for evidence of "sympathy with
the Nation's enemies."™ As documented by George T. Blakey, preparedness
campaigns gave way to loyalty crusades, league-sponsored Americanization
programs for immigrant groups, and civic education in schools. By 1918 a
clear economic ideology pervaded league policies and statements, equating
patriotism and loyalty with support for industrial capitalism.71
NSL speakers crossed the country, speaking to local chambers of com-
merce, Rotary and Kiwanis clubs, and schools, first about preparedness and
then the league's particular brand of Amerciansim.72 The league's Committee
on Patriotism through Education was dominated by historians such as Albert
Bushnell Hart of Harvard and Robert McElroy of Princeton, who, like Calla-
han, were too old for active service and sought the "moral equivalent of
combat" in national service.73
Hart energetically sought other historians to educate the nation about
the causes and aims of the war. Within a few months of Wilson's war mes-
sage, Hart had arranged a speakers training camp at Chautauqua, New York.
The camp was attended by political leaders, businessmen, reformers, clergy-
men, and educators from around the nation, including West Virginia Super-
intendent of Schools Morris P. Shawkey; C.P. Snow, chair of publicity for the
West Virginia Council of Defense, and Attorney General E.T England, all
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representing the council. At the camp, Shawkey met with Thomas Wood
Stevens, and they made plans for the West Virginia tour of the Drawing of
the Sword pageant (see chapter 1), to "stimulate interest in the successful
prosecution of the war."74 The camp was designed to "inform and arouse" a
country that needed "clear, definite, authentic information of the situation of
the world and our own position as a belligerent power." Hart wrote that the
American people must recognize the need to organize men, resources, and
government to offset the "terrifically concentrated force of our great enemy,
Germany."75
Hart, who was instrumental in establishing the American Historical Review
and had served as president of the American Historical Association and the
American Political Science Association, capitalized on his extensive network
of political and academic contacts to promote the work of his committee.76 A
frequent visiting summer professor at WVU, it was probably Hart who drew
Callahan into the NSL sphere.77 University President Frank Trotter appointed
Callahan a WVU delegate to the league's Congress of Constructive Patriot-
ism, held in Washington on January 25-27, 1917, and Callahan served on
Hart's Committee on Patriotism through Education.78 Callahan was joined
by WVU delegates E.H. Vickers of economics and Robert A. Armstrong of
English at the congress, where the NSL hoped to set in motion the culti-
vation of "an efficient national spirit." Organizers envisioned perpetual in-
dustrial preparedness for peace and war, driven by government and private
cooperation.79
National unity demanded "educational preparedness" that extended to
even the youngest of the nation's children, since "the imagination of a little
child is very sensitive, and his memory very retentive." Educator Frederick
Windsor explained the importance of early training to delegates at the NSL
conference:
Children of the grammar school age are not too young to face the
fact that there are forces for evil in the world which look with hatred on
the ideals for which this country stands, and that loyalty to those ideals
may mean standing armed in the face of the danger of death to protect
them against assault. Education should prepare them gladly so to stand.80
Part of the National Security League's agenda was the training of
public school teachers for patriotic service, and it joined local and state
councils of defense, the NBHS, the CPI, the national Chamber of Com-
merce, the International Rotary, and scores of other private and public
bodies to cover the country with "a fine web."81 The NSL redirected much of
its early wartime energy away from ferreting out suspected disloyal teachers
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toward more systematic attempts to coordinate historical training in the
schools. The commitment of the NSL, NBHS, and CPI to classroom propa-
ganda expanded as the war lengthened.82
James M. Callahan assisted greatly in the dissemination of the NSL
agenda in West Virginia. Callahan wrote A.B. Hart that he was in "hearty
sympathy" with the goals of the league's patriotic education committee and
would be glad to help "in any way which you think desirable." In March and
April 1917, he delivered about a dozen addresses to high schools, normal
schools, and community meetings, speaking on the general subject of Amer-
ica's war goals and "the need of a larger and more active patriotism." He also
informed Hart that he would address these themes at several impending
high-school commencements.83 Callahan suggested that the NSL participate
in summer teacher meetings, college and university summer schools, and
county teacher institutes, requesting that the NSL send him a copy of Hart's
America at War, an NSL guidebook for public speakers, for use at West Vir-
ginia teacher institutes.84 Callahan repeated his suggestions in a letter to
Waldo G. Leland, secretary of the American Historical Association, telling
him that throughout West Virginia the subjects of war policy and patriotic
education had been included in numerous flag presentations and loyalty
meetings.85
The NSL organized its historians and other professors to visit summer
school classes of teacher colleges to lead workshops on patriotism and civic
education. NSL coordinators visited over 250 summer schools in forty-three
states, holding sessions lasting from a few days to several weeks. NSL lectur-
ers outlined suggestions for patriotic education to groups of teachers and
students in classroom settings. They followed up the summer training with
correspondence with teachers regarding practical application. The few
records kept on the summer sessions "concentrate on publicity and plan-
ning rather than implementation," says historian George Blakey, who con-
cludes that, although records for the summer terms are meager, "the NSL
philosophy of '100 per cent Americanism' probably filtered into an increas-
ingly large number of classrooms."86
Unfortunately, the NSL's planned summer course at West Virginia Uni-
versity in 1918 left little documentation beyond the plans and guidelines for
the course. Responding to an inquiry from Callahan, the league's educa-
tional secretary informed the professor that the NSL was well-stocked with
"inspirational speakers" for summer schools.87 English professor Waitman
Barbe, director of the West Virginia University summer school, announced
that the NSL would supply an instructor and literature for a six-week course
in teacher training. The object of the course was to train teachers to convey
the "right relation of every individual to the government" and create the in-
telligent public opinion needed for victory. NSL Educational Director Robert
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McElroy affirmed that the course, which enjoyed the support of Governor
Cornwell and State Superintendent Shawkey, would aid the university in
making every teacher a "sound and intelligent expounder of the meaning
and mission of America" in the war crisis.88
The West Virginia School Journal described NSL courses as part of a na-
tional "movement of importance," made possible by the league's connection
to tens of thousands of city, county, and state school superintendents in
every school system in the country. All educational forces in the state should
cooperate so that the NSL material would reach as many West Virginia
teachers as possible, and "through them the parents and children." In this
manner, the NSL would help West Virginia teachers disseminate its patriotic
suggestions to each community and "form the impregnable bulwark of
future Americanism."89
Director McElroy was a popular figure in West Virginia, not only in
planning the summer course at WVU, but as a scheduled featured speaker at
the annual meeting of the West Virginia Education Association at Wheeling,
November 27-28, 1918, which was canceled due to the influenza epi-
demic.90 McElroy earlier told delegates to the National Education Associ-
ation convention in Pittsburgh that America was "designed by Providence to
construct a platform of patriotism world-wide in its scope." He credited the
NSL and other preparedness advocates, the "men who roused this nation to
its danger," with glory second only to that due the American men who
fought in France.91
The patriotic mission of the nation's educators had as its immediate
goal the destruction of the German Empire, but infused was the longer-term
social and industrial reconstruction of the nation as the moral and commer-
cial leader of the world. One educator encouraged training pupils at all levels
in the spirit of loyalty, sacrifice, courage, and "national and racial solidarity,"
affirming that the nation's schoolchildren "will win or lose the Great War
after the war."92 The "New Americanism" envisioned a postwar international
state, merging religion with patriotism, allowing Americans to "serve God
and the nation at the same time. Our patriotism will take in all humanity."93
West Virginia educators realized that the war would have long-term
effects on the curricula, "even in the remotest school in the mountains."
Schools should endeavor to make children "socially efficient as never before,"
through the integration of patriotic and civic training, English skills, voca-
tional guidance, and other "character-forming activities." Florence Kellogg,
professor of education at Davis and Elkins College, advised that industrial oc-
cupations be taught from kindergarten through the eighth grade and that
prevocational courses should be provided to pupils who would soon enter in-
dustry to guarantee that they chose a type of work amenable to their capaci-
ties.94 The wartime industrial mobilization had proved the value of industrial
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education for developing efficient, loyal, and productive citizens, and educa-
tional leaders were to develop curricula to prepare boys and girls for different
vocations and industries.95 The happiness and welfare of the community de-
pended upon individuals finding the work "for which they are best suited."96
Underlying all social and vocational training was the goal of infusing the
child with "obedience to recognized authority." Most West Virginia educators
probably agreed that, in all situations, there must be a recognized voice to say
"with absolute finality, 'This shalt thou do.'"97
Most commentators declined to acknowledge, however, that instilling
absolute submission to institutional authority into "the plastic mold of
youth" could lead to manifestations of state power similar to those against
which America fought.98 One of the recurrent criticisms of Germany was the
charge that German Kultur dictated the manipulation of the individual con-
sciousness to the demands of the state. The vestment of autocratic power in
the German Empire, the German ideal that the individual works for the ser-
vice of the whole state, was organized by the "chief instrument" of educa-
tion. In the authoritarian state, said WVU education professor L.B. Hill, the
aim of the elementary school was to turn the masses of German children
into patriotic, efficient German citizens so that each individual would will-
ingly fill "his particular niche as carved out by the state."99 Hill was just one
of many who attacked the German industrial state while acknowledging its
efficiency. W A. Chamberlin wrote in The Historical Outlook (formerly History
Teacher's Magazine) that the German autocracy's influence on public opin-
ion, evolving for a century, had been achieved by "active agencies, inculcat-
ing certain leading ideas, and by repressive measures to restrict discordant
sentiments. . . .  there is consequently no public opinion in our sense of the
word. German national ideals are not shaped by the free interchange of
thought, but are moulded by the Government." The German state had suc-
ceeded in securing a "complete grasp on the public mind."100
Authoritarianism dominated Germany, Chamberlin wrote, by means
of a system of universal education through which the state coerced absolute
loyalty. Over time the state incrementally gained control of the educational
system by legislating curriculum and teaching standards. Only the state
could determine a teaching candidate's fitness and grant teaching certifi-
cates. Once appointed the teacher became a state official, part of "the large
army of the German bureaucracy." The teacher swore an oath of submission,
loyalty, and obedience to the German state and constitution:
By this cast-iron regulation of the teachers the State has complete
control of the training of its growing citizens. So long as it prescribes
the subjects of study and the methods to be pursued, it can shape
almost to a certainty the character of its people. Loyalty is one of the
principles constantly hammered into their minds. The rules for Prus-
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sian teachers emphasize thorough instruction in German national his-
tory, especially the achievements of the Hohenzollerns. Patriotism is
drummed up on anniversary days of great national victories, which are
made the occasions for speech-making and conviviality.101
For those American progressives who believed the enlightened state to
be the trustee of the public good, the directed mobilization offered a
window of opportunity.102 The great educational philosopher John Dewey,
who dreamed of the United States leading "all nations of the earth into an
organized international life," defined the war as a progressive hope. Dewey
feared that many American intellectual pacifists misunderstood the "im-
mense impetus to reorganization given by this war." He accused them of
having squandered energies by opposing American participation in a war
that was already "all but universal," imploring American reformers instead
"to form, at a plastic juncture, the conditions and objects of our entrance."103
To Dewey and many other progressives, America's participation in the war
brought a chance to shape the world's future through an international or-
ganization to outlaw war and to realize enlightened public administration of
society that overcame nationalistic interests.104
There was no guarantee, of course, that the expected recasting of po-
litical, social, and industrial relationships would make the plastic juncture
one leading to Dewey's vision of the good society. The irony, and dangers,
of the growth of statism in the name of democracy were not lost on all
American intellectuals. The war crisis fostered an unprecedented interven-
tion by the state and national governments in the regulation and mobili-
zation of resources, production, and public opinion in the United States.
Government efforts to achieve unity of thought and purpose were rhetori-
cally grounded in democratic ideals but depended on the subordination of
the individual will to strengthen the industrial state. This inconsistency was
attacked by some of Dewey's disciples, notably essayist Randolph Bourne.
Bourne and other critics, horrified by the statist and emotionalist turns the
war catalyzed in America, charged Dewey and others with "a philosophical
sellout." Even progressives, Dewey included, who applauded the opportu-
nities for beneficent statecraft wrought by the war, struggled with the
awareness that Germany itself represented the undesirable extreme of state
control at "the opposite pole to the equally undesirable extreme of laissez-
faire individualism."103
The fear of the authoritarian state, therefore, stalked progressives even
as they encouraged state intervention. "Progressive statecraft" in America did
not parallel the kind of statist authority found in Germany, but did assume
the German ideals of unity of national purpose, educational efficiency, and
military strength. Social justice progressives and the New Nationalists of the
Roosevelt preparedness school alike admired the scientific centralization of
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Germany's urban administration. It was, said Herbert Croly of The New Re-
public, a decided improvement over America's urban political machines and
"infinitely divided system of 'democratic' powers." Alan Dawley notes that
New Nationalists had an authoritarian streak and thus often admiringly re-
ferred to Theodore Roosevelt as an American Bismarck.106 Before the war,
some also praised the pragmatism of "Prussianized, paternalistic, undemo-
cratic, impossible Germany," which knew how to compel the "self-organization
of the community" for the benefit of "the administrative program, either
through encouragement or coercion. Free America needs this lesson badly."107
According to the Wheeling Intelligencer.
We may berate the autocratic rule of the Kaiser, but we cannot
escape the fact that the great advantage the German government has
had has been a thoroughly organized efficiency, in getting things done
when they were needed to be done, and we can't amble along in this
country on the very pleasant pathway of the old theory of division of
powers, so that one organ of government vetoes another and we have
difficulty in getting anywhere.108
The war fed such authoritarian impulses, and only traditions of civilian
supremacy and checks and balances, says Dawley, prevented American
nationalists from replicating some European ultranationalists' march into
state fascism. Rather than a thorough authoritarian bureaucracy, the Wilso-
nian war government constructed a "corporate-regulatory complex within
the liberal state," in which big business, the market society's most powerful
element, reinforced and expanded its dominant position in the social order.109
The mechanics of that process in West Virginia and the positioning of big
business in the state to protect its postwar interests are discussed in the fol-
lowing chapter. Subsequent chapters will carry that discussion into the po-
litical economy of the state in the early 1920s.
3
National and State War
Bureaucracies and the American
Regulatory Consensus
America's growth as an industrial and military power in the early twentieth
century was accompanied by a regulatory consensus, redefining the rela-
tionships of government, labor, and business, which matured during the
war years. This period was marked by many interrelated long-term social
and political trends, including the emergence of large corporations as the
dominant form of business organization, a decline in the autonomy of local
market relations, and the growth of regional, national, and international
market and political associations. The role of the federal government in reg-
ulating market relations expanded, complementing the spread of bureau-
cratic standards and forms of organization developed to rationalize business
and municipal government.'
Laissez-faire, corporate, and social welfare theories of social organiza-
tion, which sometimes intersected, competed to control the emerging indus-
trial order. The distinctiveness of competing social visions for America's
future was often blurred during the wartime mobilization. As the United
States martialed its industrial and human resources for war, some analysts
were alarmed about the damage to democracy that seemed possible with the
consolidation of state and industrial forces. One of the most outspoken of
these was essayist Randolph Bourne, a frequent contributor to the progres-
sive journal, The New Republic. An embittered disciple of philosopher John
Dewey, Bourne expressed contempt for intellectuals who embraced the war
effort, directing his strongest invective at Dewey and New Republic editor
Herbert Croly.2
Croly, an architect of the New Nationalism, had advocated for some
years the efficient concentration of public power in the hands of impartial
elites who would promote the public welfare and embody the national inter-
est.3 Men of special ability, said Croly, endowed with sweeping management
and regulatory powers, would guide an efficient national bureaucracy. The
nation would be freed from "Jeffersonian bondage" by the "Hamiltonian
practice of constructive national legislation."1
Croly, who edited The New Republic with Walter Weyel and Walter
Lippmann, regularly published John Dewey's defense of the war's social
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possibilities. Dewey believed that idealists and progressive reformers must
support Woodrow Wilson's war goals, define the terms of the peace, and
contribute to new economic and political institutions that would elevate the
public interest over private greed in matters of production and exchange.
Walter Lippmann agreed. Out of the horror of the war could come ideas to
possess men's souls, he believed. America would emerge from combat com-
mitted to greater democracy. "We shall turn with fresh interest to our own
tyrannies," Lippmann wrote, "to our Colorado mines, our autocratic steel
industries, our sweatshops and our slums."5
Leading educators invoked similar idealistic themes, affirming that
progressives must keep the war faithful to President Wilson's lofty aims. The
president of Clark University praised the "splendor and the glory" of Amer-
ica's mission to save Europe and the world for democracy. James M. Calla-
han wrote that the United States fought for a world in which "no brute
nation could live by swagger and threat." America sought to defend its
rights, and secure "peace with victory for freedom of the seas from national
piracy, and for the rights of small nations." To these ends, "the military spirit
of her people has slowly awakened and will sustain her just cause."6
Randolph Bourne understood the seductive appeal the war held before
progressives. Modern war, waged by a democratic republic against an auto-
cratic enemy, seemed to achieve "almost all that the most inflamed political
idealist could desire." But Bourne charged Croly, Dewey, and other pro-war
progressives with forgoing the peaceful transformation of political and social
institutions and aligning themselves with antidemocratic forces.7 Bourne
called war "the health of the State," which he defined as a "repository of force,
determiner of law, [and] arbiter of justice," distinct from the nation or coun-
try, which embodied a peoples' customs and ways of life. In a healthy country,
citizens tolerated and obeyed the government, but patriotism suggested
dominant sentiments "of peace, of tolerance, of living and letting live."8
These sentiments disappeared in wartime, however, when "the State
comes into its own" and the country is transformed into a political unit. The
moment war is declared, "the mass of the people, through some spiritual
alchemy, become convinced that they have willed and executed the deed
themselves." The people with few exceptions then permit themselves to be
regimented and coerced and "turned into a solid manufactory of destruc-
tion." All the activities of society are joined to the central purpose of con-
quest, and the state becomes the regulator of men's business, attitudes, and
opinions, demanding "100 percent Americanism among 100 percent of the
population." Academic, political, and economic leaders tailor national ideals
to war purposes. Minority or dissenting opinion becomes "a case for out-
lawry," and war orthodoxy becomes the requirement for all professions,
opinions, and occupations.9
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Bourne's warnings were outshone by the zealous light of the war to
end wars, in a process that, according to George Creel, would "weld the
people of the United States into one white-hot mass instinct with fraternity,
devotion, courage, and deathless determination."10 Woodrow Wilson's suc-
cess in casting the war in idealistic terms, fortified by the appropriate propa-
ganda machinery, built the ideological engine that drove the bureaucratic
organization of the country for war purposes. Success would depend, said
Theodore Roosevelt, on the unified use of the nation's entire social, indus-
trial, and military power. Wilson told Americans that modern wars were not
won by mere numbers, enthusiasm, or national spirit, but by the scientific
conduct of tactics and the scientific application of industrial forces.11 The
emergency demanded the mobilization of civilian populations and the na-
tional control of industry, food production, and consumption. The winning
side would exhibit "the greatest manpower, the best organized production
and consumption, the largest financial resources."12 At war's end, American
industrial mobilization had earned the admiration of its most esteemed ene-
mies, including General Paul von Hindenburg, chief of the German army's
high command. Under pressure of military necessity, said von Hindenburg,
"a ruthless autocracy was at work, and rightly." Of the Americans von Hin-
denburg commented approvingly, "They understood war."13
Much of the federal mobilization of industrial manpower and ma-
chinery was nominally overseen by the Council of National Defense, whose
director was Grosvenor B. Clarkson. The council was established in August
1916, comprised of the secretaries of war, navy, agriculture, commerce,
labor, and interior. The council relied on a Civilian Advisory Commission
to regulate relations between business, labor, and government to insure
productive harmony. Representing transportation, labor, industry, finance,
mining, merchandise, and medicine, President Wilson defined the advisory
commission's purpose as establishing direct communication and coopera-
tion "between business and scientific men and all departments of the Gov-
ernment." Advisory members were selected on a nonpartisan basis, with,
said Wilson, "efficiency being their sole objective and Americanism their
only motive." Clarkson wrote that the advisory council precipitated an un-
precedented involvement of engineers and professionals in the affairs of
government.14
Progressive ideals of public service and efficiency blended with the
single-minded pursuit of productivity in 1917 to create, in the words of his-
torian Robert Wiebe, "the America of Herbert Croly's dreams, a corporate so-
ciety led by the federal government." Seeking a systematic approach to
production and distribution, the Wilson government organized a network of
federal agencies for specific economic sectors. The 1917 Lever Food and
Fuel Control Act authorized, after the fact, Wilson and the Council of
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National Defense to regulate the production, distribution, and prices of food
and fuel. Wilson appointed Harry Garfield, president of Williams College, to
head the Fuel Administration, and Herbert Hoover to lead the Food Admin-
istration.15
One of the most powerful wartime agencies was the War Industries
Board (WIB), which became the principal coordinating body of the Ameri-
can economy. Representatives of most of the nation's major economic sec-
tors sat on the board, dominated by industrialists. The board was created in
July 1917 as an arm of the Council of National Defense, although Wilson
put it under his personal supervision in March 1918. The president selected
financier Bernard Baruch to guide the WIB, partly to appease industrialists
troubled about federal meddling with laissez-faire business practices.
Baruch and Wilson were of like mind in their belief that "cooperative com-
mittees of industry" should override the "disutility of free-wheeling compe-
tition," yet Baruch's familiarity with the leaders of industrial capitalism
assured them they had an ally directing the WIB.15
Baruch and Wilson agreed that modern America's political economy
was defined by the role of the industrial corporation and its relation to the
state. Wilson repeatedly stressed that corporate organization was the natural
and dominant mode of modern capitalism, reflecting society's modern
means of collectivizing its resources and entrepreneurial power. Corpora-
tions were the legacy of irresistible forces, said Wilson, and could therefore
not be considered immoral. Concentration of corporate power, and the
large-scale cooperative organization of business was normal and inevitable,
said Wilson, and did not threaten the personal and economic liberties of av-
erage citizens. Dissolution of large corporations would cause economic
chaos and social instability. The task of enlightened government was, there-
fore, to guarantee that corporations reflected and responded to the public
interest.17
The War Industries Board, said Grosvenor Clarkson, succeeded in es-
tablishing a uniquely American war machine to regulate resources yet re-
spect the American peoples' devotion to individualism.18 Alan Dawley notes,
however, that the implementation of American-style "war collectivism" was
less a function of the government bureaucracies themselves than of the giant
industrial and commercial corporations upon whom the administration de-
pended. Essentially, says Dawley, the WIB was a combination of industrial
leaders devising their own cooperative policies, sponsored by the state. Only
in the operation of railroads and telegraph communications did the govern-
ment assume direct control, with Secretary of the Treasury Robert McAdoo,
Wilson's son-in-law, as "the only government official who actually got to
boss corporate presidents around." McAdoo's "thorough and ruthless" ration-
alization of the nation's rail systems regulated car allocation, passenger ser-
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vice, shipping routes, and coal distribution. It initiated pay raises for rail-
road employees to insure labor stability. The Railroad Administration was
held up as a model of scientific management by progressive reformers, in-
cluding McAdoo, who applauded the efficiency of a federally controlled rail
system.19
The War Industries Board constructed a maze of commodity commit-
tees, which communicated with war service committees, or private trade
associations, to insure cooperative war production. Although defined as
strictly advisory by the WIB, the trade associations in fact set war manage-
ment policy in areas such as awarding contracts, setting prices, and determin-
ing distribution priorities. Opportunistic business leaders soon recognized
in the wartime managed economy the vast potential for a form of business
enterprise relatively free of the insecurity, inefficiency, and unpredictability of
nineteenth-century competitive market practices.20
By war's end, the Wilson government had pieced together "as complete
a military machine as the world has ever seen."21 In so doing, it helped lay the
foundation for a formal political-legal order favorable to corporate capital-
ism, with the state and the great corporations intertwined. The corporate-
regulatory complex that matured during the war left the most powerful
element in the regulated market, big business, the dominant force in postwar
America. President Wilson confided to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker
that the wartime "autocracy" would inevitably leave industrial leaders in con-
trol of the country. "They will run the nation," Wilson said.22
Wartime management required, said Robert McElroy of the National
Security League, proof that a democracy could train its people to perform
"with equal efficiency and devotion, everything which autocracy has been
able to do." Much of the responsibility for that task in West Virginia fell to
its newly inaugurated governor, John Jacob Cornwell, a Hampshire County
Democrat who took the oath of office only thirty-three days before the dec-
laration of war. Morris E Shawkey designated the election of Cornwell, who
had served in the West Virginia Senate before the governorship, as "a provi-
dential turn" in the state's history.23 Cornwell was born in 1867 near the vil-
lage of Mole Hill (now Mountain), West Virginia, in Ritchie County.
Educated as a teacher and lawyer, Cornwell also owned and operated apple
orchards in Hampshire County and invested in railroad building. As a suc-
cessful attorney and editor of the Hampshire Review in Romney West Vir-
ginia, Cornwell laid the foundation for his political career.24
Cornwell was an early advocate of military readiness, expressing his
hope that Wilson and the Congress would "do what is necessary for reason-
able and proper, but not sporadic and hysterical, preparedness, such as is ad-
vocated by extremists in both parties." He once warned that Wilson's belated
preparedness plans would fail if the president did not arouse Americans to
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the country's eminent danger. Cornwell affirmed that he had "never been
crazy about Wilson," but was with the President "heart and soul" on pre-
paredness and had "no patience with those who have neither statesmanship
nor patriotism enough to follow his lead."25
Cornwell reported that his first twenty months as governor were con-
sumed with war matters. His chief desire had been to promote the state's
economic development by advertising West Virginia's mineral and agricul-
tural resources, but these considerations were rendered secondary to the de-
mands of war.26 Cornwell called the state legislature into extraordinary
session on May 14, 1917, encouraged by reports that he would encounter
little difficulty in securing the cooperation of West Virginia's politically di-
vided legislature, in which Republican lawmakers outnumbered Democrats.
In the war crisis, partisan differences would be cast aside in all matters of
importance to the war emergency. The governor could expect the legislature
"to pass legislation to strengthen the state in dealing with any situation that
might arise as a result of the war."27
Cornwell appeared before the joint assembly of the legislature to plea
for emergency wartime legislation. The legislature promptly responded to
Cornwell's request to set aside a West Virginia law forbidding federal acqui-
sition of parcels of land over twenty-five acres, facilitating the construction
of a federal armory near Charleston. Cornwell informed the session of his
appointment of the executive board of the West Virginia Council of Defense
in conjunction with the National Defense Act, and was granted legislative
approval empowering the board with broad emergency authority for the ex-
ecutive board and advisory state councils. He welcomed extensive authority
for the executive board, urging the legislature to expand state powers to
meet any war emergency.28 Another act penalized speculation in foodstuffs
and fuel; still another granted sheriffs and county courts the power to ap-
point special deputies "for the protection of the lives and properties of the
people of West Virginia." The legislature approved a two-cent property tax
and an excise corporation tax of one-fourth of 1 percent on net corporate
earnings to supply the state defense council's war defense fund.29
National and state leaders realized that West Virginia coal, steel, farm
products, and livestock were of utmost importance to the war effort. Gover-
nor Cornwell expressed the urgency of the demand for West Virginia re-
sources when he told the West Virginia Coal Mining Institute that the motto
of every West Virginia worker must be "produce, produce, for God's sake,
produce." Not only did the country need maximum production now, said
the governor, but following the war there would likely be a demand for West
Virginia coal "greater than any of you can imagine."30
Believing that voluntary productivity must be reinforced with coercive
power, Cornwell asked for and received legislative approval for the nation's
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first compulsory work law, drafted to "prevent idleness and vagrancy in
West Virginia during the continuance of the war." The law ordered all able-
bodied West Virginia males except students, ages sixteen to sixty, to work at
least thirty-six hours weekly "in some lawful, useful, and recognized busi-
ness, profession, occupation or employment." The bill's sponsor, Republican
William S. John of Monongalia County, proclaimed that any able-bodied
men who failed to produce commodities or support for the war would be
guilty of moral neglect. John believed that a nonproducer was "a dead
weight on society and a slacker," and it was the duty of the state to "impress
upon the minds and hearts of the people the idea that failure to engage in
useful occupation is unpatriotic."31
The enactment of the compulsory work law reflected on a state level
the national consensus among preparedness advocates, consistent with pro-
gressive values that made devotion to productive work imperative, that loaf-
ing was "unfashionable."32 With the onset of war, loafing became not only
unfashionable but disloyal and, in West Virginia, illegal. The compulsory
work law was in part the legacy of a "census of idlers" that Cornwell ordered
when he took office, taken by the municipal police in West Virginia's towns
and cities. The census showed an "amazing number of idlers and unem-
ployed," prompting Cornwell to announce that idleness would be penalized.
"Public sentiment will be so aroused," said the governor, "that it will be im-
possible for the idle person to live content in any community. In this crisis,
idleness is unpatriotic."33 Cornwell credited the census of idlers with much
of the eventual success of the compulsory work law, since many loafers had
feared their inclusion in the census would get them drafted into the army.
These fears were reinforced by the compulsory work law, and, Cornwell be-
lieved, forced many "street corner loafers" into gainful employment. Corn-
well affirmed that governors in several states had inquired about the
mechanics of the law and were taking similar steps.34 By late summer 1918,
Maryland, Kansas, Minnesota, South Dakota, and New York had indeed en-
acted similar statutes, and President Wilson had asked all states to do the
same. The Council of Canada made idleness a crime on April 4, 1918.35
The work or fight law became a rallying point for West Virginia
county and local councils of defense. Local councils announced that every
citizen was expected to report enemies of the government and vagrants as
part of his or her patriotic duty.36 Our Own People, a publication of the Davis
Coal Company, suggested that any man so cowardly as to refuse to work
long hours should "be put in the front line trenches, where he could get as
close to his friends, the Huns, as it is possible." All who did not sacrifice
willingly "should be COMPELLED to so serve liberty."37 Cornwell affirmed that
"public sentiment should be invoked to drive the loafer to the field, the fac-
tory, or the mine." He successfully appealed to the West Virginia press to
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devote editorial comment for enforcement of the act.38 The Wheeling Intelli-
gencer applauded the law for guaranteeing efficient conservation of re-
sources and for making progress toward eliminating "the non-producing
consumer." Just as there "is no room for the drones in a beehive, neither can
there now be patience with the do-nothing human." The Intelligencer sug-
gested that permanent retention of the law, in peace as well as war, might
make West Virginians "more efficient and happier people." Sullivan attested
to unanimity among municipal authorities as to the law's effectiveness,
many of whom advocated that the law become permanent.39
The West Virginia Education Association also tacitly approved coercive
productivity at its 1917 meeting. The association advised school officials to
track the whereabouts not only of school-age children but of those beyond
compulsory school-age, to determine whether they were workers or loafers,
and, if employed, whether they were "legally employed?"40 A positive state
effort to guarantee the loyalty of West Virginia youth was Cornwell's estab-
lishment, at the recommendation of the U.S. secretary of labor, of the Boys'
Working Reserve, for "patriotic service in the field and factory." Sunday
school superintendents were charged with enrolling boys aged sixteen to
twenty-one in the reserve, and filing their records with the West Virginia sec-
retary of state. The West Virginia War Bulletin announced that "225 colored
boys" were the first to enroll in the Boys' Reserve.41
Oliver Chitwood wrote that the work-or-fight law was not merely a
symbolic protest against industrial slackers, but also "had teeth in it." Jus-
tices of the peace, mayors, and police judges had jurisdiction to try and
punish all offenders, who were penalized as vagrants. In addition to fines of
up to one hundred dollars, offenders were ordered by the local trial court to
work up to sixty days on some public project. Slackers included habitual
street loiterers and pool room, hotel, and depot loafers. Habitual drinkers,
gamblers, or narcotics users were also declared criminal by the law. Any
able-bodied man proven to be supported "in whole or in part by the labor of
any woman or child" was prima facie guilty of vagrancy under the law.42
Jesse Sullivan, secretary of the West Virginia Council of Defense,
issued a report in June 1918 on the first year's operation of the Idleness and
Vagrancy Act (the designation most used by state officials). Under the head-
ings "Idleness Aids the Enemy" and "Taking the Slack out of Slackers," Sulli-
van estimated 811 arrests in 143 West Virginia cities and towns (sixty
municipalities filed no report); his figures did not include arrests made by
justices of the peace. Sullivan also determined that at least 2,705 loafers,
fearing arrest, were compelled to work. He credited an opinion by Attorney
General England that the burden of proof rested upon the alleged offender
to demonstrate that he had worked the required thirty-six hours, rather than
on local authorities to prove that he had not, with securing uniform enforce-
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ment of the act. England also declared that "rich idlers," living on inherited
wealth, could be prosecuted under the law. If a man's property did not re-
quire his "personal attention, he could not use it as a subterfuge to evade the
penalties of the vagrancy law." A man with "a large amount of property,"
however, was exempt from prosecution if managing his money and property
demanded a great deal of his time.43
Sullivan scored some mayors for lax enforcement of the act, reserving
special condemnation for underzealous enforcement in some mining com-
munities. To combat this, the West Virginia Council of Defense adopted a
resolution requiring any business employing twenty or more men to submit
weekly reports with the names and addresses of their employees who failed
to work the minimum thirty-six hours, and Governor Cornwell encouraged
the posting of weekly reports of hours worked at mine entrances. The law's
coercive effect in coal communities therefore aided in the prosecution of the
war, Sullivan reported, as it discouraged miners "who are disposed to remain
idle."44
Wartime worker productivity was inextricably tied to wartime patri-
otism, and maximizing coal production required the Cornwell war adminis-
tration to cultivate the support of West Virginia's black citizens, who were
concentrated in the coal regions. Black migrants had been drawn to the
southern West Virginia coalfields in a steady stream since the 1880s, coming
for industrial employment as well as the relative political equality in the
state. Unlike other Appalachian and southern industrial areas, West Virginia
had not imposed rigid Jim Crow segregation laws; only in education and
marriage was racial integration legally barred.45 Black coal miners were cru-
cial to coal production, and Edward T. Hill, secretary of the West Virginia
Negro Bar Association, wrote Governor Cornwell that his organization was
involved in a publicity campaign "to get the miners to work regularly and
load more coal, to somewhat make up for the loss of the services of nearly
400 coal miners" who had enlisted in the armed forces.46
Hill spoke for an expanding black bourgeoisie in southern West Vir-
ginia, who, led by black women teachers, were "harbingers of the new in-
dustrial ideology" of progress, emphasizing thrift, economic development,
and individual responsibility. Even with the relative lack of legal forms of
segregation in southern West Virginia, the infusion of blacks into the coal
economy had precipitated incidents of violence and discrimination against
blacks. West Virginia blacks capitalized on their political enfranchisement in
the state to resist private and public manifestations of racial bigotry, using
their political leverage to considerable effect in the Republican party's local
machinery in the southern counties.47
Cornwell, a Democrat, held no political loyalties to the state's black
voters, and his Republican opponent in the 1916 election, Judge Ira Robinson,
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had swept most black precincts. Once in office, Cornwell embarked on a
purge of black Republican appointees to the state's bureaucracy and cut state
appropriations to black institutions. As with all other local aspects of the
wartime mobilization, however, race relations were tied to the Wilson ad-
ministration's pursuit of a unified front. Cornwell, if for no other reason
than to maintain wartime harmony with the Republican majority in the West
Virginia legislature, was therefore compelled to paper over his party's poor
relationship with West Virginia blacks.48
Nationally, the Wilson administration also sought to assuage black
suspicions of the party of white supremacy. Rumors of a German plot to
foment black insurrection engendered fears of preemptive patriotic lynching
and terrorism in black communities.49 The Committee on Public Informa-
tion worried that blacks would be particularly susceptible to German propa-
ganda because of their "illiteracy and consequent credulity." One intellectual
feared that even though blacks had adopted the rudimentary cultural stan-
dards of whites, their lack of economic and educational opportunities meant
"they have not yet reached a level where they fully appreciate American-
ism."50 Facing such widely held biases, many blacks saw wartime service as
an opportunity to advance the standing of their people. Over three hundred
thousand blacks were drafted, and black men enlisted in great numbers,
partly from national allegiance, and in part in hope that the fruits of the war
for democracy would be the fulfillment of the United States promise of
equality, rights, and fair treatment. The intellectual activist W. E.B. DuBois
wrote in the July 1918 The Crisis that while the war lasted, American blacks
should "forget our special grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoul-
der with our white fellow citizens."51
Black dreams for the transformation of Americanism into an inclusive
rather than racist ideology, however, were not well served by Woodrow
Wilson or his administration. Few sectors of the American public had less
reason to trust the idealistic nostrums of the president, and black support
for the war effort was probably more in spite of Wilson than because of him.
Wilson's devotion to Anglo-Saxon culture was grounded in his unshakable
belief in white supremacy, reinforced by his personal internalization of the
American South's traditional racial assumptions. Wilson introduced movies,
which became one of the major propaganda tools of the mobilization, to the
White House by showing The Birth of a Nation, and he strongly endorsed its
pro-Ku Klux Klan interpretation of Reconstruction as "history written with
lightning."52
Democrat Wilson had convinced some black voters of his devotion to
justice in race relations, prompting a modest swing in traditional political
loyalties among enfranchised blacks in 1912. Black faith in Wilson receded,
however, with a progression of racist actions. In addition to the Birth oj a
National and State War Bureaucracies 51
Nation incident, Wilson segregated federal office buildings and stirred race
hatred in East St. Louis, Illinois, by charging the Republican party there with
importing black voters in 1916. The president responded to criticism by an-
nouncing that if "the colored people made a mistake in voting for me, they
ought to correct it."53
John J. Cornwell's association with the party of Wilson exacerbated
his chilly relations with the state's black political base, but the state defense
council was determined to make blacks a "potent factor" in the industrial
mobilization. If blacks were to contribute to the Allies' victory as food con-
servators, soldiers, industrial workers, and buyers of Liberty Bonds, they
should be represented in the war-management bureaucracy. Consequently,
to guarantee "the complete and thorough organization of the Negroes of the
State," the state defense council formed an Auxiliary Council of Defense.
Cornwell and his colleagues recommended "the employment of a colored
man" to impress upon the state's black citizens the importance of giving
their labor and financial support to the national army.54
The executive board appointed J.C. Gilmer as secretary of the Auxil-
iary Council, at a salary of one hundred per month, less than half the
salary of Jesse Sullivan.55 The Auxiliary Council included the presiding offi-
cers of religious and fraternal organizations and "other prominent members
of the race," including ministers, physicians, businessmen, and women's
lodge and club leaders. The Auxiliary Council soon organized county
councils, "as used with so much success among the white people." The
Auxiliary Council took a stand against idleness, with each member pledg-
ing to resist "this particular nuisance in his neighborhood," and black
women and girls entered wartime industrial occupations and ran food con-
servation campaigns. Gilmer defined the main mission of the county auxili-
aries as "enlightening the masses" about the aims of the wartime agencies.
In all wartime campaigns, Gilmer credited the Auxiliary Council and its
subsidiaries with a
leading part, organizing and directing forces which awaited only to be
told what and how to do. It found a willing constituency, loyal to the
core and almost pathetic in its eagerness to give its men, its money and
its labor with the hope that it might share fully in the glory of the vic-
tory and the blessings of peace.56
As a political message to the party of Cornwell and Wilson, West Vir-
ginia blacks in the spring of 1918 joined a national campaign by the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People to protest the
screening in West Virginia of The Birth oj a Nation. The West Virginia protest
was launched when the McDowell County Auxiliary Council, led by Rev.
52 The Americanization of West Virginia
J.W Robinson and Dr. A.S. Adams, combined forces with the West Virginia
State Civic League, a black activist group founded in 1915.57 Reacting to its
pressure, the State Defense Council prohibited any showing of The Birth of a
Nation or any similar play or picture for the duration of the war. Such movies,
the council proclaimed, were "calculated to arouse hatred and prejudice be-
tween races" and therefore were likely to obstruct racial cooperation for effi-
cient war work.58
The West Virginia Council of Defense's overtures reflect its concerns
that issues of race not obstruct maximum cooperation and productivity in
West Virginia. Coal mining was by far the major occupation for black males
in the state, with blacks comprising more than 19 percent of West Virginia's
miners in 1918.59 The loyalty and productivity of all miners was a prime
concern to the Wilson administration. When the United States entered the
war, coal provided nearly three-quarters of the mechanical energy in the
country, and West Virginia miners produced 25 percent of the total.60 Coal
production in the state was stimulated by Allied purchasers prior to U.S.
entry, growing by more than 20 percent from 1915 to 1916.61 The United
States Navy almost always used southern West Virginia's high quality
smokeless coal. In the latter stages of the war, the U.S. War Department or-
dered southern West Virginia draft boards to stop drafting coal miners, and
President Wilson informed coal diggers that their patriotic duty was more to
mine coal than to fight overseas. Nonetheless, more than fifty thousand
miners nationwide enlisted, and three thousand died in combat.62
The status of coal producers illustrates the admixture of patriotic pro-
paganda, industrial production, and business promotion that characterized
the war management bureaucracy's pursuit of autarky. Coal operators and
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) spokesmen alike emphasized the
patriotic obligation of miners to produce, appropriating the idealistic pro-
nouncements of Wilson and the propagandists that the war was a fight to
establish liberty and democracy throughout the world.63 The United Mine
Workers Journal (UMWJ) pointed out that wars were no longer fought only
by armies but that "millions of men manage the machinery of destruction,"
and "every human unit in America has its burden to bear." The lives of sol-
diers were in the keeping of industrial workers, each of whom represented a
part of the fighting force. "This is labor's part in the war machine."64 UMWA
District 17 President Frank Keeney implored miners to push for maximum
production. He served as grand marshal for a massive bond drive parade in
Charleston in April 1918.65 The Department of Labor hopefully announced
that the spirit of common sacrifice that united Americans foretold employer-
employee compatibility that, if nurtured, could build a new industrial part-
nership after the war. Governor John Cornwell wrote that sporadic early
wartime unrest in some coalfields soon vanished, in the face of "public dis-
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cussion," and wage workers and labor leaders had "constituted—with a
very few exceptions—a potent army of defensive support of the men in
uniform."66
These optimistic reports gloss over the serious concerns the Wilson
and Cornwell governments had about their ability to marshal universal
labor support for war production. The Wilson government's centralized war
bureaucracy was in the formative stages in the spring and early summer of
1917, seemingly powerless to control work stoppages to protest the rising
prices that accompanied the war boom. Despite pay increases for many
workers, work stoppages over the cost of living or work hours rose from
2,036 in 1916 to 2,268 in 1917, many in vital war industries.67 Cornwell
often employed the emergency Special Police Deputies Act to intervene in
work stoppages or in "locating slackers." Labor "riots" in Gilmer County in
August 1917 and a Raleigh County strike in October of the same year
prompted the governor to send special deputies to those counties for several
weeks.68 Special deputies were requested at Gilmer by C.H. Workman of the
Executive Council of UMWA District 17, who alleged that private guards
employed by the West Virginia Coal and Coke Company were vandalizing
the homes of striking employees. But striking miners in Raleigh County may
have questioned the impartiality of the special deputies, appointed by the
county sheriff and county court and empowered to carry unlicensed
firearms, when the deputies were quartered in buildings owned by the
Raleigh Coal and Coke Company.69
To block possible industrial unrest, the State Defense Council also au-
thorized the formation of voluntary Home Guards or Home Reserves, para-
military groups of "citizens of good standing."70 Official fears of widespread
wartime labor rebellion in West Virginia, however, were baseless. Leaders of
organized labor in the state fully realized the crucial demand for worker
productivity, but some expressed concern that their traditional adversaries
in government and industry would use the war crisis to destroy the union
movement in the state. Fred Mooney, secretary-treasurer of District 17 of the
UMWA, charged the Cornwell government with using the compulsory work
law to harass the miners' union. Cornwell personally ordered Mingo County
coal operators to keep accurate records of hours worked by their miners,
and to post copies at their mines each week. He also issued a blistering mis-
sive against unproductive miners. "The slacker," said the governor, "has in-
creased the chance that the boy who worked by his side before he was called
to arms will not come back. . . . He is making it harder for the American sol-
dier to save the world from autocracy."71
In the war's first year, some West Virginia operators sought to use the
work-or-fight law to deny rights of free association to striking miners, whom
the law defined as vagrants. Mooney complained that the UMWA spent
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more money keeping alleged slackers out of jail than it did feeding strikers.
A consortium of mining companies in Kanawha and Raleigh counties used a
"slacker board," posting the productivity of working miners and the names
of strikers. If quotas per man were not filled, the offenders were fired and
lost their draft-exempt status. One miner alleged that if the company be-
lieved a worker was slacking, company guards would march him to the local
draft board and have his exemption removed.72 Justus Collins, president of
the Winding Gulf Colliery Company, periodically received "a digest of slack-
ers" from his managers. Collins wrote personally to the accused slackers, ac-
cusing them of treasonous behavior and of abandoning American soldiers.
"Every ton you fail to produce aids our enemies and you must realize this is
the case," Collins accused. "If you are not in sympathy with our country in
its desperate situation, then you should get out of it and go to Germany.
There you would get a taste of the real thing if you were a slacker."73
In the early months of the war, some nonunion or anti-union opera-
tors sought to use production demands to destroy the miners' union. Collins
believed that the West Virginia legislature, meeting to draft the emergency
wartime bills, was eager to suppress all agitation and disturbance in the
coalfields. Perhaps, he concluded, this state of affairs could be used to get
union leaders to "back off gracefully" from organizing the New River and
Winding Gulf coalfields. Collins, apparently unconcerned about possible
legislators' objections, ordered one of his superintendents to "keep a sharp
eye" on his employees, and if "anyone among them is agitating and creating
unrest, or is a sore head, discharge him summarily without further consider-
ation."74 Mine superintendent George Wolfe assured Collins that "the very
minute" a Winding Gulf miner joined the UMWA, "either in fact or in spirit,
he is promptly discharged and gotten off the job." Collins huffed at UMWA
demands at his mines for the checkoff, recognition of union committees,
"and all that sort of stuff." He advised his managers that "I think that while
the political complexion of the State is in the shape it is in, we should drive
the Union out of the State from one end to the other, as far as the coal fields
are concerned."75
This type of contentiousness, however, was anathema to the war bu-
reaucracy. Desperate to stabilize industrial relations, the Washington war
management complex made several overtures to labor. President Wilson ap-
pointed American Federation of Labor President Samuel Gompers, a loyal
Wilson supporter, to the advisory council for the Council of National De-
fense.76 Alarmed at appeals to labor by the antiwar People's Council of
America, led by Socialists and leftist intellectuals like Morris Hillquit, Re-
becca Shelly, Roger Baldwin, and Scott Nearing, and at membership gains on
the West Coast by the anarchist Industrial Workers of the World, Gompers
guided the AFL into the pro-war American Alliance for Labor and Democ-
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racy." The alliance welcomed any pro-war worker or organizer, and was
joined soon after its July 1917 formation by Socialists J.G. Phelps, Charles
Russell, William Walling, and John Spargo, who all had bolted the Socialist
party at its May convention in St. Louis when it adopted an antiwar posi-
tion. The convention featured a major address by the prominent West Vir-
ginia Socialist, Dr. Matthew Holt. Holt vigorously condemned American
participation in the war and announced that he and his wife had sent one of
their sons to South America to prevent his sacrifice in an immoral war.78
The war issue mortally divided West Virginia's vibrant Socialist party.
Holt's dramatic actions served as counterpoint to the abandonment of the
longstanding antiwar position by Walter Hilton, the influential Socialist
editor of the Wheeling Majority. Hilton explained that Americans were obliged
to support the country's commitment to the war in spite of personal objec-
tions. The Majority featured articles by the Alliance for Labor and Democracy,
agreeing that the war, however regrettable, could lead to the fulfillment of
many Socialist goals if its idealistic principles were maintained. Robert
Maisel, director of the alliance, announced that the Committee on Public In-
formation would sponsor the agency by supplying propaganda outlines and
paying salaries, rents, and other expenses.79
Samuel Gompers, like Hilton and John Dewey, embraced the notion of
the social possibilities of the war, believing it would usher in a new era that
would recognize the labor movement as an equal partner with industry and
government in postwar America. His vision of an industrial partnership
compelled Gompers to pressure the AFL to compromise on the issue of the
open shop, the AFLs primary negotiating demand, foreshadowing the crip-
pling anti-union movement after the war. Gompers won gains for many
workers by obtaining union wages, hours, and recognition from the war
government, but he secured no firm commitment for government support
or business cooperation on unionization when the war ended.80 Gompers
understood the essentially status quo posture of the government, which was
clearly stated by the Council of National Defense. The council took the posi-
tion that "during the war there should be a truce between conflicting indus-
trial interests, for the period of which each side should hold the ground it
held at the beginning of hostilities" and that any alterations would be solely
for the promotion of industrial efficiency during the war. Grosvenor Clark-
son candidly acknowledged the government's noncommittal position. When
the War Industries Board was formed to manipulate industrial resources, its
labor member, Hugh Frayne, was "not on the Board to represent labor, but
to manage it."ai
Gompers sought to administer a national labor policy through his
Committee on Labor of the Advisory Commission to the National Council of
Defense. President Wilson, however, assigned the formulation of such a
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policy to the War Labor Administration (WLA), controlled by Secretary of
Labor William B. Wilson, and integrated the Gompers committee into this
agency. The WLA soon formed the National War Labor Board (NWLB),
chaired by former president William Howard Taft and attorney Frank P.
Walsh, to serve as a court of last resort in labor-management disputes. The
NWLB recognized the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively,
forbade strikes and lockouts, and preserved the union shop and union con-
ditions where they existed. The board, however, had no statutory power and
assumed no responsibility for protecting labor's rights after the war.82 The
NWLB plainly stated that it stood for securing maximum production for the
employer, and for protecting workers' economic welfare and right to organi-
zation "while the war for human liberty everywhere is being waged" [emphasis
added].83
Although this ostensible federal neutrality boded ill for the UMWA in
southern West Virginia after the war, American coal miners were justifiably
encouraged by the actions of President Wilson's Fuel Administration in its
pursuit of labor loyalty. The Fuel Administration, given broad authority by
the Lever Act over the price and distribution of coal, brought the UMWA
and the coal industry to the table to negotiate the Washington Agreement in
October 1917. To be in effect for the duration of the war, or until April 1,
1920, whichever came first, the agreement granted wage increases to miners
in return for a no-strike pledge. Southern West Virginia operators consented
to the Washington Agreement in part because they feared government
seizure of their operations, and reluctantly agreed, according to Justus
Collins, to "arrange some kind of a working agreement with the Govern-
ment along lines that will be fair."84
The Washington Agreement prohibited the firing of miners for union
membership, thus encouraging the rapid advance of unionism in areas
under tight company control, such as southern West Virginia.85 With federal
protection, Districts 17 and 29 of the UMWA grew dramatically during the
war years. Many West Virginia miners won the checkoff and the union shop,
including those in the northern West Virginia district. District 17 president
Frank Keeney, assisted by Fred Mooney and local organizers, seized the
moment to invade the industry in radically anti-union McDowell County,
with plans to organize Logan and Mingo counties as well.86 Coal operator
William D. Ord complained about the "evident determination" of the Fuel
Administration and some politicians "to organize labor in nonunion fields."
The UMWA, Ord said, was exploiting "under cloak of war" the patriotic
spirit of the coal operators, who, to preserve industrial peace, could not
resist when the union sent "secret agents" into non-union fields. Ord wrote
that union gains would leave coal operators' property "worth only a fraction
of its present value" at war's end.87
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In addition to UMWA gains, anti-union operators also were cool to the
Fuel Administration's power to fix prices. Governor Cornwell noted that
West Virginia coal operators resented any interference in pricing, and some
sought exemption from the wartime controls, or delayed coal shipments,
hoping for a price increase. This irritated the governor, who although a friend
to the industry (he had asked Secretary of Labor Wilson to order UMWA or-
ganizers out of West Virginia, prior to the Washington Agreement) nonethe-
less was determined to keep coal production and distribution flowing.88
West Virginia operators upset by UMWA wartime advances, however,
were not without sources of comfort. Once the crisis of the war passed and
the federal government retreated into its neutral stance on labor-manage-
ment issues, the industry would be free to enforce the proscriptions against
unionism inherent in the U.S. Supreme Court's December 10, 1917 decision
in Hitchman Coal and Coke vs. Mitchell89 Hitchman, which had been in the
courts since 1907, grew from the claims of coal operators that the UMWA
was an illegal combination in restraint of trade, with union contracts interfer-
ing with the property and contractual rights of the operators. Federal District
Judge Alston Dayton of West Virginia had issued injunctions against the
union, prohibiting it from organizing in some districts. Dayton's history of
intransigence on labor rights frustrated some industrial and political leaders
who believed the judge contributed to unstable industrial relations. In the
ten-year controversy over Hitchman, Dayton had survived impeachment pro-
ceedings by the United States House of Representatives, ably served by his
attorney John J. Cornwell. The Supreme Court finally vindicated Dayton,
ruling in 1917 that the so-called yellow-dog contract used by employers, for-
bidding union membership by their workers, was legal. The working man
was "free to join the union," said the court, but the employer was free to deny
employment to any worker who exercised that freedom.90 Overshadowed by
the compulsory truce between the miners and the industrialists during the
war, Hitchman was unleashed with a vengeance against the UMWA when the
war for democracy ended (see chapters 5 and 6).
The coal operators had other friends in powerful positions. While the
UMWA realized temporary membership gains during the war, coal operators
redoubled their practice of combining to protect their interests. In northern
West Virginia, for example, the Fairmont Coal Club organized to promote
harmony among the region's coal operators. The club included representa-
tives from practically every coal producer in the Fairmont field and would
meet weekly to exchange ideas and discuss policy.91 The coal executives, said
the Fairmont Times, had "relegated personal desires and ambitions to the
background while their country is in such dire need of their assistance."
A. Brooks Fleming, Jr., production manager of the northern West Virginia
section of the Fuel Administration, was active in the formation of the club.92
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Fleming was a director of the Consolidation Coal Company and an as-
sistant to the company's president. Son of the eighth governor of West Vir-
ginia, Fleming also served as a director of the Northern West Virginia Coal
Operators Association, the Fairmont Land and Building Corporation, the
National Bank of Fairmont, and many other corporate enterprises. As fuel
administrator, Fleming's duty was to forward information and recommenda-
tions on coal production to the U.S. fuel administrator in Washington.
Fleming and other West Virginia fuel managers often fielded charges by
West Virginia miners that some state operators were engaging in "less than
patriotic practices" when they sought to circumvent federally sponsored
wage agreements and some raised company store prices to offset wage in-
creases.93 Suggestions of conflict of interest were refuted, however, by West
Virginia's chief fuel administrator, J. Walter Barnes, who assured the public
that the regional and county fuel administrators were "all men of high grade,
and patriotic motives, and have willingly given their time to carry on the
work of the Administration, and deserve thanks for their earnest labor and
helpful advice."94
At the core of the rapid wartime expansion of America's regulatory
consensus were the long-term, market-oriented principles with which polit-
ical, industrial, and conservative union leaders viewed the world. Accumu-
lation and reinvestment of capital, accomplished by the rational
organization and productivity of modern industrial culture, would lead to
sustained economic growth and distribution of services. To guarantee this,
law, statecraft, and personal relations must conform to the dictates of the
market and capitalist property relations. Economic activity thus dominated
social and political spheres, and business became, says economic historian
Martin Sklar, "activity that presupposes and is permeated by a complex
mode of consciousness" that determined values, behavior, and status rela-
tionships. The Wilson administration's regulatory complex definitively es-
tablished corporate capitalism as the most powerful element in American
society, overpowering socialist and social-democratic movements.95 Accord-
ing to George Creel, the war occurred at a crucial juncture for America's
social and political organization, when oppositional voices to the business
culture were "interpreting America from a class or sectional or selfish stand-
point." If war had to come, Creel implied, at least it had come at the right
moment for the preservation of American corporate ideals.96
John J. Cornwell and the war management bureaucracy in West Vir-
ginia were conscious of the market opportunities for West Virginia coal in
the postwar world. As the governor instructed West Virginia mines to sus-
pend operations to engage in a day of patriotic celebrations to begin the
Third Liberty Loan campaign, he arranged to confer with coal associations at
a special meeting in Charleston. The purpose of the meeting was to devise
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strategies for extending West Virginia's coal exports into South America. It
would be shortsighted, the governor said, to wait until the war was over
before making plans.97 Earlier, the executive board of the West Virginia
Council of Defense had warmed to the idea of the patriotic value of making
a propaganda film for the West Virginia coal industry. Roughly $21,000 had
been subscribed by some of the state's coal operators to produce such a film,
illustrating the development of the coal industry and the mining conditions
in West Virginia.98 Informed by the producers, the Gentry Film Company of
Charleston, that the movie would have "a patriotic feature illustrating how
the coal industry is essential to the winning of the war," the executive board
authorized the needed $4,000 from the war fund so that the picture could
be exhibited in moviehouses nationwide and overseas.99
The rationalist ideals for the corporate model of industrial and social
organization were well broadcast by the industrial, political, and educational
elites in West Virginia. Editor and legislator Hugh Isaac Shott advocated the
"science of man-power," which had to be coordinated "to continue our
growth in industrial, agricultural, mining and manufacturing enterprises in
time of universal demand. . . .  The future greatness of our people will be
measured by their ability and facility to adopt themselves to the new era that
is dawning." Shott noted that "the time-honored system of work and wages,
the established measurement of enterprise and reward are shifting, the basis
of power is changing." America would realize the full measure of its power
only if its people were committed to "unifying the man-power we have at
home and making it efficient and potent to reorganize along the lines that
advancing civilization demands." If the country failed, "some other nation
will outstrip us in everything that goes to make a people prosperous and
contented."100
4
Postwar Strategies for Promoting
Industrial Americanization,
Antiradicalism, and Habits of Industry
War management leaders often spoke of the importance of coordinated ef-
forts to seize the trade, manufacturing, and commercial opportunities pre-
sented by the World War. Governor Cornwell's call to West Virginia coal
operators to confer about expanding the state's coal markets into South
America suggests that the governor had not lost sight of his primary goal at
inauguration, that of promoting West Virginia's mineral and agricultural re-
sources. Cornwell accurately contended that the country's war program had
to a great extent depended on West Virginia's coal, gas, and oil resources,
and he was determined that that status be maintained. The spirit of wartime
unity should continue permanently, without "lapsing into partisan schemes
and partisan wrangles." In such an environment, the state would "come into
its own," and its people would be "finer and happier."1 The integration of
West Virginia coal into South American markets would, Cornwell hoped,
generate favorable reciprocal trade in products such as leather, candy ingre-
dients, cocaine, platinum, and tin from Latin American producers. These
raw materials ideally would be processed in new West Virginia manufacto-
ries, allowing the state to play dynamic roles as both exporter of raw materi-
als and manufacturer of finished goods in the world's postwar commercial
reorganization.2
Cornwell shared in the hope that the United States would use its
wealth and resources to "guide the footsteps of all nations." But the fulfill-
ment of the nation's destiny would be played out in the context of a struggle
for industrial supremacy equal in intensity to the war itself. In this struggle,
many influential Americans believed the survival of the fittest applied. In the
competition for world markets, victory would depend upon the commercial
and industrial education provided for future generations. No nation could
compete in the economic struggle whose citizens were "shiftless, inefficient,
and inadequately trained and educated." A leading spokesman for the Na-
tional Security League voiced the conviction of most corporate elites that
business and professional men, as leaders of public opinion, should influ-
ence educational institutions to train young men and women "to market our
products" worldwide.3
60
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Unity of purpose was considered as essential to the impending com-
mercial competition as it had been to the war. Historian John Higham writes
that the all-encompassing nature of the Great War spawned an emotional
climate wherein even slight wavering of purpose or lack of enthusiasm ap-
peared intolerable to the cause. Only single-minded dedication to national
objectives could insure that other loyalties would not conflict with the will
of the nation.4 The collective pursuit of common aims, manufactured and
reinforced by the war management networks, was consistent with traditional
American ideals of freedom as defined by Woodrow Wilson. Wilson defined
individual freedom in terms of a piston in a well-tuned engine, which would
run smoothly "not because it is left alone or isolated, but because it has been
associated most skillfully and carefully with the other parts of the great
structure."5 Such an operational view of freedom and obligation, which
formed the core of "one hundred per cent Americanism," equated freedom
with conformity and treated as suspect any deviation from the existing social
order.6
The ideals of the freedom of conformity had contributed by war's end
to an apparent understanding in elite educational, political, and industrial
circles that the world was a base and dangerous place, divided between
good and evil. This dichotomous ideological premise is generally more
closely associated with the post-World War II Cold War consensus, pitting
"Free World ideals" versus "Marxist delusions," with the attendant destiny
of the United States to disseminate free-market economic principles to the
rest of the world.7 When President Harry S. Truman said in 1947, however,
that at that moment in history, "nearly every nation must choose between
alternative ways of life," he was updating the sentiments of World War I
military and civilian leaders.8 Woodrow Wilson's interior secretary, Frank-
lin K. Lane, likened the war to a holy struggle between the forces of Christ
and barbarism. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker announced that the
World War demanded that mankind choose between militaristic autocracy
and democratic justice.9 The continuing postwar world struggle required
that Americans accept the "kinds of discipline and control" necessary to
fight for world democracy.10 A War Department spokesman told NEA dele-
gates that a major task of education was "to assimilate the peoples of other
nations" by instilling in them a democratic vision.11 Albert Bushnell Hart
believed that Americans should be somehow induced to understand their
universal democratic mission, and apply wartime organizational skills to
"any great national purpose."12
Organizing postwar society politically and socially for sustained com-
mercial and industrial expansion required a fusion of emotional commitment
to mundane principles of order, productivity, and efficiency. Accepting his-
torian Alan Dawley's observation, as I do, that the war's corporate regulatory
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complex left business as the most powerful influence in American society, it
is reasonable to define representatives of industrial capitalism as dominant
arbiters of social norms and values. It is then important to address how
business interests sought to identify their principles as American and shape
the contours of public discourse and education. It is important to investigate
how they went about transforming a set of ideological assumptions and eco-
nomic practices into accepted cultural values that were beyond the realm of
meaningful debate. The task was essentially to equate loyalty to the nation
with obedience to one's employer, or, in a broader sense, to corporate capi-
talism. Workers were therefore often informed, as in the journal of the Con-
solidation Coal Company, that "Obedience helps make men truly great."13
The postwar campaign by business interests and organizations to mold
public opinion was "a class movement, built upon the concept that the em-
ployers' interests are those of society, including its working class mem-
bers."14 This movement used methods of persuasion perfected during the
Great War, entailing the conscious manipulation of the language and sym-
bols of that conflict, patriotism, and nationalism generally. This manipula-
tion exalted specific values and beliefs in processes of "mobilization of bias,"
a modern expression meaning that institutional rules and procedures oper-
ate systematically to benefit certain persons or groups at the expense of
others, leaving the dominant groups in "a preferred position to defend and
promote their vested interests."15
Business interests were not alone in appropriating the words and ico-
nography of Americanism. Historian Gary Gerstle has shown that a preoccu-
pation with being "American" compelled all groups interested in social or
political power—including capitalists, unionists, and ethnic and religious
groups—to articulate their programs in the language of Americanism. But
business organizations were arguably the most successful, and had ready
access to the means to disseminate a nationalist, conservative ideology of
Americanization. Pro-business Americanization infiltrated industrial rela-
tions, educational institutions, and modern channels of mass media, such as
movies, radio, and national magazines. The combination of these forces re-
sulted in a pervasive national emphasis on pledging loyalty to American in-
stitutions and defining appropriate American behavior.16
Just as in the war effort, public education played a critical role in the
transmission of national, corporate, and state goals to the public. Recog-
nizing this, Consolidation Coal told its employees that whoever wished to
promote the company's interest should use the schoolroom as a forum.
Teachers were particularly well-positioned to "create a sentiment" for co-
operation and business success.17 Their experience in the war mobilization
could also be applied to casting out "the rabble, the anarchists, the distur-
bers of industrial peace," such as "I.WWs., Socialists, Bolshevists, or Union
Postwar Strategies 63
of Russian Workers" sympathizers. These agitators should be "informed
upon whenever and wherever they are known to exist. . . .  Law and order
must prevail in our land." School and Society encouraged teachers to watch
their pupils for "incipient signs of disloyalty." In like spirit, West Virginia
School Journal asked less than two months after the Armistice if teachers dis-
played "signs of Bolshevism in your school?" If so, the editors mused, Russia
needed "a few thousand good school teachers." Loyal teachers, however,
understood that "the true patriots and real soldiers recognize that the best
way to serve the country now is to go to work with all of one's might at the
routine duties of daily life."18
It was largely the postwar Red Scare that provided the emotional
tinder to spark the transfer of passion from the Hun to less tangible, but per-
haps even more fearful, suspected new threats to American security. The
Bolshevik triumph in Russia inspired later European revolutionary out-
breaks, and a February 1919 general strike in Seattle raised alarms that the
virus of revolutionary radicalism had emigrated to the United States.19 The
premature withdrawal of Bolshevik Russia from the World War, and civil
war between the Bolshevik Red Army and White forces in Siberia, had
prompted the 1918 Siberian intervention by some twenty-two thousand
United States and Allied forces, the first American attempt to contain com-
munism.20 These developments—together with the formation of the Third
International, or Comintern, in March 1919, urging the world's workers to
form workers' Soviets—vested "even the most innocuous events" with the
aura of class revolution. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's raids against
suspected radicals and grassroots vigilante action against proponents of
tainted ideas bespoke a widespread intolerance and uncertainty in the U.S.,
with anti-German and anti-radical impulses so "interlocked and continu-
ous," says John Higham, "that no date marks the end of one or the begin-
ning of the other."21
Higham suggests that the Red Scare can be explained by the psychic
gratification provided to millions of Americans by the war's common pur-
pose. They simply transferred their missionary zeal to a new common adver-
sary, reinvigorating the wartime "clamor for absolute loyalty." William Tuttle,
analyzing the racial violence of 1919 in the context of international turmoil,
calls the Red Scare an extension of the wartime cult of patriotism, character-
ized by an atmosphere of violence and a definable enemy. The flames of in-
stability were also fanned by the rapid demobilization of American military
forces at war's end. As government agencies terminated war orders, the army
issued discharges at the rate of fifteen thousand per day. American industries
were cutting back, shutting down, or retooling for peacetime production
just as veterans glutted the labor market; the result was an unprecedented
wave of strikes and lockouts, including the Seattle strike and the bitterly
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divisive steel strike of 1919. Fears of a proletarian revolt evoked responses
similar to those directed against real or imagined German sympathizers
during the war.22
Shortly after America entered the war, the Wheeling Intelligencer pre-
dicted that when peace came, the nation's voracious demand for labor
would cease, requiring adjustments by workers accustomed to inflated
wages. Foreshadowing a persistent theme in postwar years, the Intelligencer
encouraged labor to exercise rigorous personal economy, so as to be "better
prepared for the let down that is sure to prevail." It was, of course, impera-
tive for postwar stability that labor exercise a "just recognition of the rights
of capital."23 The worries of the Intelligencer notwithstanding, United Mine
Workers of America leadership and most members had no quarrel with the
"just rights of capital" nor with the government's hope that the war had ush-
ered in a new era of industrial peace, based on mutual employer-employee
understanding that would build "a new world after the war."24 Within days
after the Armistice, the United Mine Workers Journal cautioned that every
loyal American should "sit steady in the boat," that the time required "safe
and sane leadership for labor in America."25
A gap between perception and reality appears, however, in the U.S.
Labor Department's homiletic reduction of miners' concerns to big-ticket
consumer items. "It is better," said the department, "for the workman to have
a fur coat and automobile than not. . . .  Large production will mean plenty
for all, provided there is the tolerance and respect on both sides that will
lead to industrial peace."26 Such pronouncements trivialized the differences
between West Virginia miners and their bosses, which led to industrial war-
fare in the state from 1919 to 1921 and the crippling of the United Mine
Workers in West Virginia for over a decade thereafter. When southern West
Virginia miners struck for union recognition in 1920, the stakes were con-
siderably higher than a fur coat or a Model T.
Addressing the miners' pursuit of industrial justice, labor historian
David Corbin attributes their solidarity largely to the government's effort to
market the war. The rhetoric of sacrifice and commitment for democratic
principles, says Corbin, awakened class consciousness in the miners, lead-
ing to their political education.27 The miners' struggle for unionization in
Logan and Mingo counties culminated in the "Miners March" from Kanawha
County to Mingo County in the late summer of 1921. Along the route of the
march, the militant miners enjoyed the help and support of many citizens
not directly connected with the miners' economic concerns who sensed that
the march raised questions of liberty and oppression rather than simply con-
cerns of material comfort. Historian Ronald L. Lewis therefore contends that
the march transcended labor/management conflict to encompass a "much
broader struggle for democratic ideals, a conflict between freedom and tyr-
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anny, an effort to break the all-pervasive power of the coal companies, which
owned two-thirds of all privately owned property in the state."28 Corbin and
Lewis, then, place the mass strikes of 1919—21, during an unprecedented
period of industrial unrest, in the context not of material comfort but of a
militant commitment by American workers to the ideal of freedom.29 As
such, the industrial struggle in West Virginia illuminates the ideological
struggle, symbolized by miners and their bosses, to capture the meaning of
true "American Ideals" in the volatile postwar climate.
Many influential West Virginians were troubled by the radical possi-
bilities of the rhetoric of democracy. Josiah Keeley of Kayford, president of
the West Virginia Coal Mining Institute, worried that coal miners who had
fought the Hun or produced mightily for war purposes might take the lan-
guage of democratic liberation too seriously, like the Boston worker who
later declared, "We fought for democracy and got 23 cents an hour."30
Having made the world safe for democracy, Keeley suspected that workers
would turn their minds "to their old enemy, capital." If militant workers, es-
pecially those with military training, were to "take the idea of an actual
emancipation so literally," isolated coal camps, devoid of effective civil au-
thority, would become "fertile grounds for disorder."31 Robert Armstrong, an
English professor at West Virginia University, feared that the rhetoric of de-
mocracy would so arouse the hopes of the masses that power might devolve
to "the hands of the selfish and vicious." Democracy then would be "not a
blessing, but a curse. Democracy is a blessing only when it brings the rule of
justice and righteousness."32
Others harbored similar fears. Colonel George S. Wallace, former state
adjutant general and West Virginia's first director of Selective Service, later
served with the provost marshal's staff in France. Wallace, a Virginia native,
claimed in 1919 that he had changed from being a Virginian, "a Provincial,
if you please—to Nationalist, and I have nothing in common with, and no
sympathy for, the man who does not speak NATION." Wallace's greatest fear
was a reaction against the idea of a permanent national army, and he sought
a "broad military policy that will be democratic, nationwide, and under
Federal control."33 He expressed these sentiments to Clarksburg native Guy
D. Goff, with whom he had served in France. Goff's chief concern was do-
mestic labor conditions. Writing to Wallace at the peak of the 1919 steel
strike, Goff could not abide workers' complaints at a time when labor was
well paid and had never "enjoyed as many comforts from its earnings as it
did during the late war." Goff charged "socialism, slackerism, and union-
laborism" with precipitating a "demoralization of character" by promoting
wage equalization over piece-work payments and thereby encouraging like
rewards for "the good, the bad and the indifferent." Only with a return to
piece work, said Goff, would "the worker be taught efficiency. In no other
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way can the slacker and the drone be eliminated, and the waste of this great
war supplied."34
Keely, Armstrong, Wallace, and Goff expressed guidelines for social or-
ganization consistent with those voiced earlier at the National Security
League's Congress of Constructive Patriotism. In an address to that con-
gress, H.H. Wheaton of the United States Bureau of Education affirmed that
government, education, industry, and civic organizations should join forces
to form a united front to "Americanize America" under the rubric of "Indus-
trial Americanization." Wheaton announced that the ideals of industrial
Americanization were embodied in the slogan "America First," meaning
"America efficient," "America before social and industrial justice," and
"America for humanity." Finally, industrial Americanization meant "alle-
giance to a common plan, to a common country."35 John J. Cornwell, Morris
E Shawkey, and Jesse Sullivan attended one of several national Americaniza-
tion conferences, sponsored by Wheaton's Bureau of Education, in April
1918, joining delegates from nearly all state councils of defense, commercial
and industrial leaders, and educators.36
Industrial Americanization included assumptions that economic and
social health depended on favorable working and living conditions, merit
pay increases, and rewards for efficiency for industrial workers. Employer
responsibility for proper housing and plant conditions in industrial commu-
nities would reduce turnover and guarantee employee loyalty. Efficient pro-
duction, standardization of the working force, and plant organization, all
key elements of the industrial mechanism, were to be the responsibility of
professional engineers, described as the "most important factor" in the in-
dustrial equation. These experts in plant management, employee training,
housing, and industrial organization, or "social engineers," as described by
Wheaton, "hold the key in industry to successful Americanization."37
Industrial Americanization as defined in the postwar era therefore
embraced the principles of scientific management, promoted by Frederick
Winslow Taylor early in the twentieth century. Driving Taylor's philosophy
was the dictum, "In the past the man has been first; in the future the
system must be first."38 "Taylorism" influenced the war managers of the
regulatory consensus, who then sought to expand the unity and efficiency
of the mobilization to the postwar social and economic order. The reor-
ganization of work and social relations that accompanied the expansion of
industrial capitalism gave rise to Taylor's theories of efficient industrial or-
ganization and control, which proponents believed would "reconcile labor
and capital under a 'government of facts and law.'"39 Taylor envisioned the
application of his principles of industrial efficiency to society in general,
including home and farm management, churches, universities, and govern-
ment agencies.40
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Scientific management's social application would extend factory con-
trol over "ever-wider ranges of external variables." One enthusiast pro-
claimed "our plain duty and opportunity to build up our economic and
social order on scientific principles."41 The scientific reorganization of the
factory, the corporation, the government bureau, and the school would, in
Taylor's words, benefit the "whole people."42 Once workers had undergone a
"complete mental revolution," which secured their acceptance of the scien-
tific method in the workplace, business would enjoy a rise in profits, labor a
rise in wages, and consumers access to more goods. Taylor's use of daily per-
formance slips, standardized tasks, and unit time studies would lead workers
through evolutionary stages of industrial efficiency, finally reaching optimal
production. Complete efficiency of the workplace, said Taylor, meant that
each worker would have to adapt to new standards, covering details of job
performance "which in the past have been left to his individual judgement."
Especially in routine work, workers' capabilities should be barely equal to
the job's requirements. Workers' contentment would reign when their scien-
tifically determined abilities yielded the largest possible financial return.43
David Montgomery writes that while many corporate leaders were
somewhat skeptical of the claims of universal social application in Taylor's
theories, most generally agreed with the New Republic's conclusion that "Mr.
Taylor and his followers have made a major contribution to civilization,"
and incorporated the basic thrust of scientific management into their ideals
of organization.44 Taylor's emphasis on management of industry by neutral
experts was well-matched to New Republic-style progressvism, which sought
to eliminate the deficiencies of American industrial society without revolu-
tionizing the social institutions and values the progressives held dear.45 The
tenets of Taylorism were woven throughout the fabric of American progres-
sivism, perhaps most explicitly in the presumption of neutrality and "exact
knowledge" based on the reorganization of "facts." The facts that drove the
engine of Taylorism were politically charged, however, based on value judg-
ments assuming that managers, business leaders, and economic elites knew
what was best for all social classes, and that some people were justly em-
powered to control the work and social experiences of others.46
Taylor forecast a well-ordered factory system overseen by a benign manage-
ment hierarchy, where the interests of the company and the worker were
identical. Likewise, Walter Lippmann of the New Republic, a leading intellect
of progressive social engineering, envisioned the impartial management of
society by "a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the lo-
cality." This class would guide the mass of American citizens, most of whom
were "mentally children or barbarians," unqualified to envision the nation's
common interests. Political decisions were the concern of a few decision-
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makers, whose "exact and objective" verdicts would serve the common
social goals of material well-being and political freedom.47 Madison Grant's
influential 1916 racial exegesis spoke in similar terms, when Grant declared
that a true republic represented the interests of the whole community only
when governance was left to "those best qualified by antecedents, character
and education, in short, of experts."48
To its proponents, Lippmann's elitist concept of social management
was democratic, since responsible leaders or experts would so inform the
masses as to guide them to reasonable judgments. Lippmann employed the
expression "manufacture of consent" to describe the guidance of ordinary
citizens by dispensers of relevant facts.49 Through educative processes demo-
cratic in form if not in substance, the masses would internalize presupposi-
tions about social organization compatible with the experts' vision. Edward
L. Bernays used a similar expression, the "engineering of consent," which
was borrowed by historian William Graebner for his 1987 analysis of de-
mocracy and authority in twentieth-century America.50 In terms of public
policy, Bernays identified Lippmann's leadership class as "an invisible
government," an enlightened minority to whom Bernays attributed the
progress, development, and public good of the nation. The public, said Ber-
nays, could only understand and act upon new ideas through the "active
energy of the intelligent few."51 Graebner points out that Bernays sought to
integrate the profession of public relations into a general social theory and
shared with Lippmann a critique of democracy that sought to establish an
intelligent social consensus by using group process techniques generated by
the social sciences. Bernays and Lippmann each emphasized the role of lead-
ership, using terminology that obscured the distinction between persuasion
and coercion. Bernays made this point succinctly when he said, "Advocacy
of what we believe in is education. The advocacy of what we don't believe in
is propaganda."52
These comments imply that the intertwined social and industrial mis-
sions of scientific management rested upon a structure of domination and
control. In mass industry, management science extended the managers' con-
trol over worker autonomy, using avowedly neutral facts to make hierarchi-
cal power appear objective and rational and reducing adult workers to
factors of production.53 At an earlier stage of human development, business,
political, and educational institutions also sought to apply Lippmann's
ideals of the specialized class and Bernays's intelligent few. These interlock-
ing sectors combined forces to insure that each American child, in order to
develop "along the line of its special capacity," learn "habits of industry." If
children absorbed "grit, persistency, pluck, determination, fearlessness" in
the formative years, the nation would benefit from the predictable develop-
ment of the future skilled producer.54
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These views shaped educational opinion and policy at state and local
levels. Joseph E Marsh, secretary of the West Virginia Board of Education,
told state teachers gathered in 1919 that it was their chief professional duty
to attend to the vocational needs of the "ninety-six in each hundred who
must do the main work of the world." He later insisted that West Virginia
boys and girls must "be taught to view the world as it is and plan to enter
upon some work suited to their training and talents that needs to be done,"
and that the state must also "use profitably the idle hours and brains of our
army of young workers."55 Denning the nation's children as the capital of
civilization, the West Virginia Board of Education identified the duty of
schools to train them to "contribute intelligently to the fundamental needs
of human welfare: production, exchange, and wise consumption."55 True
Americanism, said West Virginia Superintendent of Schools Morris P. Shaw-
key, was grounded in order and efficiency. "No agency can do its part in this
great work," said Shawkey, "better than the public schools."57
These statements reveal a common desire among professionals such as
Shawkey and Marsh to regulate social and industrial relations on the basis of
values common to middle-class men and women. Shawkey and Marsh were
educators but shared social, political, and economic assumptions with a
wide range of white-collar workers comprising a self-conscious social class,
who "interpreted the job of industrializing the land as their mission" and
sought to transmit their values and influence to the larger population.58 The
middle-class individual required a reliable institutional system, based on
"the partitioning of space and the scheduling of time." In a well-ordered en-
vironment, one was limited only by his lack of ambition and determination.
The ambitious citizen who took full advantage of opportunities could expect
an ever-rising standard of material consumption, which would continue to
rise for his children. At the core of the middle-class ideology was the convic-
tion that economic growth and social progress would flourish only with the
preservation of "obedience to the law, order, and conventions necessary for
stable civilization."59
Those who considered themselves middle-class absorbed corporate
standards for the development of a continental economy.60 Modern educators
such as Shawkey and Marsh tailored their principles to fit the production de-
mands of American capitalist expansion and investment in anticipated post-
war markets. In so doing, they implicitly agreed to shape laws, customs, and
the people's thinking to the requirements of corporate capitalism. Woodrow
Wilson described this accommodation in evolutionary terms, noting that
laws originally applied to the business of individuals must be adjusted to
business done by "great combinations," to assist the country's material devel-
opment. Domestic and foreign corporate expansion eventually marginalized
many middle-class businesses, relegating them to subordinate, peripheral
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economic roles, but in the postwar years, progressive educators and other
professionals supported the belief that large-scale corporate-industrial capi-
talism, with its required regimentation, was indispensable to the nation's de-
velopment.61 The canon of rationalization of the shop floor and the classroom
was therefore cast onto the domestic and international political economy,
avowedly to benefit the whole people.
Morris P Shawkey believed that educational leaders were positioned to
match West Virginia's impending commercial development, which had been
enhanced by wartime productivity, with educational progress. Shawkey
agreed with West Virginia's rural school supervisor, L.F. Hanifan, that the effi-
ciency displayed by the schools in "carrying forward the program of the
Government" for war purposes could be as effective in peace as in war.62 As
superintendent of schools, Shawkey steered the postwar centralization of
educational administration, resulting in a structure of unified control that
state educational leaders had long advocated. In 1919 the legislature abol-
ished the state board of regents, the state board of education, the state book
commission, and the state vocational board in favor of a seven-member bi-
partisan state board of education, with the superintendent elected by popular
vote and the six other officers appointed by the governor.63 Shawkey wrote
that the 1919 school code assigned all educational affairs of the state, from
the kindergarten to the state university, to the new West Virginia State Board
of Education. The board had authority over teacher training in private and
denominational as well as public institutions, established standards for
courses of study, and had broad powers to determine and direct educational
policy in the state. In twelve years as state school superintendent, Shawkey,
says James Morton Callahan, brought to West Virginia schools a "master
mind for organization" and directed the educational energies of the people in
a manner that "inspired confidence and forward looking everywhere."64
Centralization in West Virginia reflected broader national trends
toward consolidation and collective corporate practices in education, part of
what Shawkey's biographer describes as a general movement toward con-
centration of school power in state hands.65 In the prewar decades school
boards, especially in urban areas, became battlegrounds between elite domi-
nation and competing community-based Socialist, populist, and ethnic
reform groups. In these struggles, school boards often became the "domin-
ion" of businessmen and professionals, and boards of education behaved
much like corporate boards of directors, delegating blanket authority to rec-
ognized experts such as superintendents. When war came, the Wilson ad-
ministration, patriotic organizations, and many pro-war Americans viewed
public schools as instruments of national defense and preparedness. Educa-
tional historian William J. Reese demonstrates that the hysteria of the war
years mortally wounded many nonelite or antiwar challengers to business
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domination of school systems. Patriotic citizens exercised a "blatant abuse of
power" by using school facilities and personnel to chill free speech, abolish
training in foreign languages, and conduct "an aggressive witch hunt for
German sympathizers" among teaching staffs.66
School systems emerged from the war crisis as more than ever the
object of class-determined administrative reforms wrought by the powerful
influence of businessmen, industrialists, and their professional allies on
local and state school boards or in school administration.67 Shawkey could
report by 1928 that the modifications of recent years had left West Virginia
with "a good school organization. The system is fairly well centralized." He
contended that although centralization might appear undemocratic, "the
policy has resulted in greater economy and higher efficiency, which means
more to the people than the mere forms of democracy"68
In 1907, early in his professional career, Shawkey had founded The
Educator, a privately owned and published journal of educational affairs,
published at Charleston. The purpose of the journal was to reach "the
masses and the teachers" with suitable news, editorials, and discussion.
From this forum, Shawkey successfully campaigned for the state superinten-
dent's office. The Educator merged with another private educational journal,
The School Journal, in 1915, with publication of The School Journal and Educa-
tor at Morgantown. The journal remained a private operation until 1921-22,
after Shawkey had left the superintendence when it was renamed the West
Virginia School Journal (herein WVSJ from 1915 on), and became an affiliated
publication of the West Virginia Department of Education. Edited at this
point by Superintendent George M. Ford and state board of education secre-
tary Joseph F Marsh, the WVSJ was acquired as the official publication of the
West Virginia Education Association of teachers in 1923.m
From the merger in 1915 until 1921, Shawkey shared editorial duties
on the School Journal with Dr. Robert A. Armstrong and managing editor Dr.
Waitman Barbe. Barbe, former managing editor (1889-95) of the Parkers-
burg Daily State Journal, was one of West Virginia's leading academic propa-
gandists during the war years. A graduate of Harvard and Oxford and an
accomplished poet as well as teacher, Barbe directed the West Virginia Uni-
versity summer school from 1910 until shortly before his death in 1925, and
he was president of the West Virginia Education Association in 1917-18.
Hailed as a "distinguished educator and literary man" and as "one of nature's
noblemen," Barbe wrote "Stars of Gold," praised as "one of the best poems
produced as a result of the World War," which he introduced in Commence-
ment Hall at WVU on March 6, 1919, and read on many public occasions
later. In 1924, the West Virginia Review noted that Barbe reached "heights
sublime and exquisite when he lauds the boys who left their halls of learning
and took their places in the ranks, never to return again."70
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Barbe often applied his poetic and oratorical talents to the state and
national "educational readjustment" that marked the early postwar years. He
told delegates to the 1919 West Virginia Education Association meeting at
Fairmont that a great campaign was under way in West Virginia, led by
Shawkey and his assistants, whom Barbe described as "leaders in the cause
of civic righteousness." The goal of the educational campaign, carried on in
every schoolhouse, was a "truer and more intelligent Americanism." Barbe
offered thanks that John Cornwell, endowed with fearless Americanism, oc-
cupied the governor's office rather than "a spineless politician or a tainted
Bolshevist." He expressed similar confidence in Shawkey and the state board
of education. "Who can over-estimate the power that lies in the hands of
these seven excellent men under the new Code? All power is theirs; may
theirs likewise be all wisdom. We are in the hands of our leaders."71
Anticipating Walter Lippmann, Barbe declared that of one hundred
million Americans, only a few, "by the proper development of native gifts,"
were qualified to "lead the rest of us in the multifarious paths of progress."
He cautioned, however, that native ability would bring wise leadership only
if the gifted themselves were properly educated. He warned that "sinister
and diabolic" men such as Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of
Labor, John L. Lewis of the UMWA, and William Haywood of the Industrial
Workers of the World were gifted leaders, but their actions threatened "to
wreck our Constitution." Their words instilled false knowledge and purpose
in the ignorant masses, who "follow where the keen and conscienceless
leaders go." The intentions of such false prophets must be conquered by
leaders driven by "Christian education." Only such great men, said Barbe,
could "lead and guide the wavering, struggling masses of mankind up the
rough mountain of life."72
Barbe's vocations as professor and poet did not detract him from a
conviction that the natural and industrial resources of West Virginia must be
exploited by workers with practical industrial education. Only then would
"our crude material" contribute to "the higher things of civilization as well as
to individual wealth."73 Barbe probably did not intend that schoolchildren,
rather than gas, coal, and oil, be identified as "crude material" for the indus-
trial system, but the irony of the metaphor is unavoidable.
Another commentator on the goals of education in West Virginia
noted the factor of production role for schoolchildren and elaborated on
Woodrow Wilson's piston analogy of human potential in a 1919 WVSJ
column. Philip M. Conley—later editor of West Virginia Review, historian of
the West Virginia coal industry, and managing director of the American Con-
stitutional Association (see chapters 6-8)—wrote that the "business of a
school" was to train children that happiness and contentment were the re-
wards of hard work. Conley told teachers that each child required individual
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treatment, just as the parts of an automobile required special treatment
when in need of adjustment. To successfully run a car, Conley wrote, "you
must learn the function of each lever."71
Educators' belief in the virtues of industrial education, such as thrift,
sobriety, hard work, and obedience, were well-suited to the industrialists'
desire for close ties between education and the demands of the market."
Only with systematic training would the rank and file "outputs" of the
schools prove reliable, resourceful, industrious citizens.76 Employers agreed
with educators that preparing boys and girls for industrial and commercial
work in school would adapt them to the market environment. It was the
task of the school, said Phil Conley, to shape "the attitude of the boy toward
his future work." An industrial welfare director remarked that since "pro-
duction is the big word in most industrial establishments," future workers
must be trained to "produce the goods." Schools must help the nascent in-
dustrial worker attain the right mental traits "to adjust himself to his work."
Industrial training in school should emphasize accuracy rather than speed,
"but if quick thinking can be stimulated in school work it will pave the way
for the final development of the future skilled producer."77 Even kinder-
garten children should learn industry, loyalty, patriotism, and other social
virtues essential to American "political and social industrial democracy."78
Many West Virginia business leaders looked approvingly on the emerg-
ing modern standards for American industrial leadership as described at the
1921 session of the West Virginia Coal Mining Institute, an association of coal
operators, directors, and managers. The participants agreed that industrial
leaders must personally solve problems of productivity, efficiency, and labor
militancy. They should assume control much as the anonymous mine superin-
tendent who read the newspaper to his men, in order to "place the true inter-
pretation on the news." Working hand-in-hand with the public school system,
"the men in responsible positions will be expected to be the interpreters."79
Throughout America, the interpreters from business, industry, and
education organized the educational state to guide the nation's youth toward
their social destiny.80 Joseph Marsh proclaimed that West Virginia schools,
under the guidance of a committee of educators, had joined a nationwide
movement to "point our boys and girls to the gateway leading to their most
appropriate avenue of service." To the 95 percent of West Virginia students
who were not destined for professional occupations, teachers imparted
"more drill on the facts needed to back up our theories and practices in
government and in life."81 Marsh's statements echo those of educator G.E
Arps in School and Society. National integrity, said Arps, demanded that every
youth be habituated, from early childhood, to profitable employment. No
capable hand or brain should avoid sharing in the nation's work, or America
would falter "in the international struggle for supremacy."82
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The organization of the educational state was built on a political as well
as an economic foundation. Alternative visions to the politics of capitalism
were overwhelmed in the postwar era, and the struggle for commercial domi-
nance compelled powerful policymakers at state and national levels to inter-
pret "industrial Americanization" not only as a model for social organization
but as the antidote to Bolshevism, or any other un-American doctrines. The
National Security League propelled its type of authoritarian Americanization
into the Red Scare. "The battle to make the country safe is not won," a league
spokesman announced. "The enemy but wears a different guise."83
The crusade to withstand radicalism infused West Virginia educators
with renewed zeal. F.R. Yoke told elementary school teachers at the 1919
WVEA meeting that as captains in the world's greatest army, that of twenty-
two million schoolchildren, they must "get ready for the front" of service to
the nation. Above all, the teacher should teach that law and order must be su-
preme and inculcate in their students "a loathing for that thing which is the
antithesis of law and order—Bolshevism." At the same meeting, educator E.E
Scaggs raised a persistent nagging obstacle to the efficient organization of the
public for postwar commercial advancement, a problem brought into sharper
focus by the war and the consequent suspicion of alien political doctrines.
For years, Skaggs declared, America had been collecting an "undigested
mass" of foreign-born immigrants, too many of whom retained their language
and customs and "associated only with their own class." With the outbreak of
the World War, "we found a dangerous element in our midst, who had no
sympathy with our Government, our institutions, and our ideals, and only
the most drastic laws prevented them from doing much harm."84
Skaggs's address to the WVEA revealed the ambivalence with which
many middle-class Americans regarded the nation's ethnic populations.
While Skaggs voiced suspicion of the approximately sixty thousand foreign-
born in West Virginia, he also asked whether America had truly been a land
of liberty, equality, and justice for its immigrants. He endorsed unified com-
pulsory education for all Americans, warning that insufficient national train-
ing in English, safety, health, and the ideals of American institutions would
result in drastic episodes such as the 1919 steel strike85 (see chapter 5,
below).
Skaggs's ambivalence about the immigrant population was not un-
common. Pre-World War commentary on immigrant populations in the state
often reflected the racially biased, paternalistic yet generally benign attitudes
toward the foreign-born typical of progressive ideals of Americanization.
Prewar programs to socialize immigrants, however interventionist in cul-
tural terms, were designed to provide passage out of poverty and into roles
as loyal, industrious domestic and industrial operatives. Patriotic and volun-
tary associations such as the Daughters of the American Revolution and the
Young Men's Christian Association assumed the formidable job of schooling
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immigrants in behavior and principles deemed appropriate by middle-class
Americanizers.86 The West Virginia's Woman's Christian Temperance Union
affirmed that large-scale Americanization, combining the efforts of the
WCTU, universities, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and other in-
stitutions, must be carried to the factory and the home. To eliminate foreign
"colonies" through teaching of "American ideas," a "large army of tactful,
well-trained women" should train immigrant women in their homes, and
join with others to educate industrial workers in the workplace. To dedi-
cated Americanizers, the benevolent purposes of their crusade was grounded
in the middle-class principle that the social forces that were reshaping
America must be controlled through legislation and education. Leading
Americanizer Frances Kellor summarized their mission when she declared
that nation building would entail "a deliberate formative process," not a
haphazard arrangement.87
Early West Virginia Americanizers taught that since foreign immi-
grants came with no concept of responsible self-government, it was the obli-
gation of the "most purely Anglo-Saxon element" in "the Appalachian strain"
to steer immigrants toward responsible American citizenship. Coal and rail-
road baron Thomas Nelson Page told the 1910 meeting of the West Virginia
Mining Association, held in Washington, that while the foreign-born popu-
lation in the Appalachians was minimal, foreigners would be forever a "dis-
organizing element" unless assimilated by the indigenous people of the
region, "who are of pure American blood." Page told the assembled coal men
that they were responsible for "fusing [immigrants] into your own kind, and
of uplifting them."88
Americanizers agreed that the amalgamation of immigrants into the
"American race" was crucial to stability and order, especially since "it would
appear that the foreigners violate law more than our own people." West Vir-
ginia Tax Commissioner Frederick O. Blue contended in 1916 that from the
"mass of ignorance and prejudice" germinating in "these outlanders" grew
the ranks of the Industrial Workers of the World and kindred radical organi-
zations. Blue argued that the foreigner must understand he would be ac-
cepted if he respected the law and agreed to conform to American ideals and
American institutions. If, however, he embraced the ideals and institutions
of other nations, "then there is no place for him in America." Blue warned
that the immigrants' exaggerated ideas of liberty upon arriving in America
would cause them to interpret liberty as license, leading to irresponsible be-
havior and loss of respect for law and authority. To avoid the chaos of law-
lessness, Americanizers sought to implant in immigrants and their children,
Anglo-Saxon ideals of government, law, and order.89
Internalized elite assumptions about Anglo-Saxon superiority surfaced
more virulently among Americanizers during the war crisis, interwoven with
the anti-radicalism that earned into the postwar Red Scare. The generally
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humane values that guided the early Americanization movement were over-
whelmed by more coercive impulses that had always shaped its ambiguity.
The war, says historian Otis Graham, resolved the ambiguity as the con-
formist tendencies of 100 percent Americanism dominated the "permissive,
humanitarian side," turning Americanization in a reactionary direction.90
Americanizers never completely abandoned humanitarian sympathy for
aliens. Their sentiments, however, underwent "subtle but profound" changes,
as Americanization merged with the preparedness, mobilization, and 100 per-
cent Americanism crusades that shaped the political culture of the postwar
era. By threat and rhetoric, 100 percent Americanizers launched a "frontal as-
sault" on foreign influences in American life, rooted in "unquestioning rever-
ence for existing American institutions," culminating in the restrictive
immigration legislation passed by Congress in 1921 and 1924.91
The equation between radicalism and nativist hysteria, which accom-
panied the Americanization shift, says John Higham, grew partly from a tra-
ditional American assumption that militant discontent was a thoroughly
foreign importation, that, as Frederick Blue stated, "there is no need for a
man to be anarchistic to succeed here." This assumption was often articu-
lated during the war, as when Hungarian miners in West Virginia were as-
sured that they would not be interned or fired if they demonstrated their
good will by working steadily and quietly for American war aims.92 The Na-
tional Security League warned, however, that immigrant workers' passivity
did not necessarily indicate loyalty among ethnic groups. True Americaniza-
tion must reach the "hordes of children" of immigrant parents who have
"never in their lives felt the thrill of patriotism . . . and who bring us the di-
vided allegiance of the hyphenated American. Such parents are little likely
to inspire their children with that love of country which leads men to lay
down their lives gladly in its defense." After the war, the league continued its
militant Americanization drive, demanding that every good American must
protect national security, law, liberty, and progress. Before 1917, the league
announced, "Americanization work was philanthropy. Now it is a plain busi-
ness of citizenship."93
Soon after the war, more than eleven hundred businesses, the Federal
Bureau of Education, the Department of the Interior, the Federal Bureau of
Naturalization, and a network of community-based organizations carried on
Americanization programs.94 Frances Kellor was perhaps the most ambi-
tious architect of Americanization. To break up immigrants' identification
with their native ethnic groups, she enlisted corporate supporters in the
Inter-Racial Council, whose major Americanization tactic entailed seizing
control of the foreign-language press.95 Kellor sought not to abolish the
foreign-language press but to make it pro-American and thereby to facilitate
the assimilation process of immigrant groups. Proper use of foreign Ian-
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guage newspapers would "get the right ideas about American business and
American life and American opportunities before these people" and under-
cut the appeal of political and economic radicalism. Her corporate support-
ers secured for Kellor the presidency of the American Association of
Foreign Language Newspapers, which handled all advertising in the ethnic
papers. "We have taken over the Association," Kellor reported to the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers (NAM). "We want to sell you industrial
Americanization as a business proposition." Kellor maintained that if seven-
tenths of the advertising in foreign-language papers could be made "Ameri-
can instead of foreign, we will begin to get, without any suggestion on our
part, pro-American editorials and pro-American news." Kellor told an ap-
preciative NAM audience that this was a "perfectly practical pro-American
way of reaching the foreign-language group."96
Control of advertising revenues enabled the Inter-Racial Council to in-
undate foreign-language editorials and news stories with antiradical propa-
ganda. Other propaganda bureaus, such as the America First Publicity
Association, filled the country's English newspapers with the litany of in-
dustrial Americanization. The Huntington Herald-Dispatch often carried the
association's half- or full-page advertisements, including one in 1920 an-
nouncing that "incoming masses" must be "sterilized in accordance with
Uncle Sam's new formula" or face deportation. American labor especially
must be protected from "the contaminating influence of Bolshevism and its
vicious kin." The true American workman would reject the unscrupulous
agitation that accompanied such doctrines, which endangered "the first real
opportunity to win the markets of the world for American industry."97
In West Virginia, women's clubs, civic groups, trade associations, local
boards of education, and patriotic societies joined with the educational es-
tablishment in promoting "100 per cent Americanism." Josiah Keeley, presi-
dent of the West Virginia Coal Mining Institute, summarized the sentiments
of most Americanizers when he declared that Americanizing the foreign-
born was not sufficient. Trouble in the coal industry, said Keeley, was largely
the result of foreigners "following a very few un-American Americans." He
emphasized that the task ahead "was to Americanize some of our very un-
American Americans." As far as foreigners were concerned, another coal op-
erator claimed, "we need to give the foreigner an American outlook, to let
him gradually absorb Americanism without knowing it," to be "inoculated"
with "our Americanization.""8
The inoculation process required a cooperative effort between busi-
ness, industry, government, and the school system. Morris P. Shawkey
agreed that no agency was better suited to the teaching of true patriotism
than the schools but that other civic agencies should join educators in teach-
ing the ideals of Americanism. Shawkey emphasized the contribution of
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wartime mobilization tactics to strategies of Americanization, noting that the
"many war campaigns have trained us well in methods of getting action in
any cause of general importance." He pledged the support of West Virginia
educators in the national Bureau of Education's national Americanization
campaign. Shawkey issued a program and song book for West Virginia's
1919 teacher training institutes, subtitled "All of West Virginia 100% Ameri-
can," in which he warned that the nation's deficiencies, including the pres-
ence of internal foreign colonies and lack of respect for authority, might
escalate dangerously unless teachers could "make America safe by the effec-
tive teaching of true Americanism." Therefore, the 1919 summer teacher in-
stitutes would focus on the West Virginia campaign for Americanism and
industrial Americanization."
Shawkey's plans for the Americanization training of West Virginia
teachers reflected nationwide attempts by school administrators, industrial-
ists, and legislators to combat the domestic uncertainties of the postwar order.
Lawmakers across the country anxiously approved sweeping laws to resist the
perceived threats of Bolshevism and other ideologies at odds with industrial
capitalism. The scope of "Bolshevism," however, broadened to include practi-
cally all social criticism, and business and educational organizations collabo-
rated to resist perceived subversive ideas of all kinds.100 In postwar America,
dissent in all forms, says Otis Graham, was considered revolutionary and in-
tolerable, and the climate of "credulous complacency" which fed reaction per-
sisted into the 1920s.101 Elite Americanizers took note of the success of the
wartime federal sedition laws, which had succeeded in destroying antiwar
and antidraft resistance, as well as the strength of Socialist antiwar political
candidates, in some regions of the country102 The middle-class Americanizers
were determined to head off any burgeoning Americanization movement
"from the bottom up." Acculturation based on the institutions of a maturing
working class, emphasizing interethnic cooperation to achieve workers' soli-
darity, was alarming to the orderly vision of the industrial Americanizers.
Working-class consciousness, articulated on the shop floor, through inde-
pendent labor unions or radical political organizations, threatened to arm
workers with alternatives to the pyramidal social structure accepted as natu-
ral by most employers, civic organizations, and governments. It represented
an intolerable deviation from middle-class Americanism.103
West Virginia joined several other states in legislative attempts to criminal-
ize dissent, the most prominent example in the immediate postwar period
being the 1919 flag bill. Within a few days after the outbreak of the Febru-
ary general strike in Seattle, Monongalia County delegate William S. John,
author of the wartime Compulsory Work Law, sponsored a bill to promote
the state's and nation's ideals, institutions, and government and "prohibit
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the teaching of doctrines and display of flags antagonistic to the form or
spirit of their constitutions and laws." The bill proscribed "unlawful meth-
ods of terrorism" for economic or political purposes, or for "the overthrow
of organized society." The act forbade the display of any red or black flag or
"any other flag, emblem, device or sign of any nature whatever" that implied
opposition to the government, institutions, or ideals of West Virginia or the
United States. Any person violating these provisions, or speaking, printing,
or communicating in any fashion sympathies antagonistic to American
ideals and institutions "now or hereafter existing" under the U.S. and West
Virginia constitutions, would be guilty of a misdemeanor. A first conviction
could bring a fine of one hundred to five hundred dollars and/or one year in
the county jail. A second offense was treated as a felony and could bring a
term of one to five years in the state penitentiary.104
The wave of legislation to compel social and political conformity was
supplementary, however, to the omnipresent public relations ventures by the
specialized classes to protect their interests. John Higham accurately points
out that the postwar Americanization movement, even among many of the
most vigilant 100 per cent Americanizers, was primarily "a venture in per-
suasion," in which "the force of law was ancillary to that of propaganda."
Frances Kellor understood this when she sought control of the foreign lan-
guage press.105 The Committee on Public Information had demonstrated the
importance of coordinating propaganda and flooding channels of communi-
cation with facts that amounted to officially approved information, and, as
Shawkey implied earlier, these lessons were not lost on policymakers.106
As labor-management struggles rent the West Virginia coal industry in
1919-21, many of the state's political, business, educational, and civic
leaders mobilized to insure that their vision of a well-ordered industrial
system in the state would prevail. The Americanization of West Virginia
merged with national campaigns to disable organized labor, implement
management-dominated programs of "welfare capitalism," and create a na-
tional consciousness, founded on law and order, the sanctity of private prop-
erty, preindustrial ideals of individual contracts, and nationalistic economic
expansionism. In this struggle, just as in the wartime campaigns, the battle
for hearts and minds depended on the successful manipulation of informa-
tion. First in the context of industrial conflict and then with strategies for
the universal application of their ideological model, West Virginia's indus-
trial Americanizers embraced that struggle.
5
The Political Culture of the
Red Scare in West Virginia,
1919-1921
The February 1919 general strike in Seattle was begun by thirty-five thou-
sand shipyard workers over wages and cost-of-living issues. They sought
and received support from the Seattle Central Labor Council. Soon more
than one hundred Industrial Workers of the World and American Federation
of Labor union locals joined in a citywide strike. The mayor of Seattle, Ole
Hanson, described the peaceful five-day general strike as "the weapon of rev-
olution, all the more dangerous because quiet." Hanson deputized twenty-
four hundred men, and the United States government sent nearly a thousand
sailors and marines to put down the strike, which was followed by raids and
arrests of Seattle Socialists and IWW members.1
The Seattle strike was one major event in a national postwar wave of
labor unrest involving more than four million American workers. Boston's
police struck for union recognition. Massachusetts textile workers went out.
Railroad workers promoted government ownership of the railroads under a
comprehensive proposal drafted by attorney Glenn Plumb.2 In September
1919, more than two thousand UMWA delegates met in Cleveland and, with
acting president John L. Lewis's reluctant acquiescence, passed a resolution
for nationalization of the coal industry. At the Cleveland convention, facing
left-radical insurgents and pressure from rank-and-file miners caught be-
tween rising consumer prices and wages frozen at October 1917 levels by
the Washington Agreement, Lewis authorized a strike for November 1,
which was settled only with the direct intervention of Woodrow Wilson.3
Shortly after the UMWA Cleveland convention, more than three hundred
thousand AFL steelworkers went on strike to organize the steel industry. The
strike was directed by twenty-four craft unions forming the National Com-
mittee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers, guided by former IWW
member and future American Communist party leader, William Z. Foster.4
The steel strike resumed the bitter conflict, which had been suspended
during the war, between employers and workers over employees' rights to
collective bargaining. Although they usually acknowledged a worker's indi-
vidual right to union membership in the abstract, industrialists in coal and
steel embraced the preindustrial fiction that individual contracts between
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worker and employer remained the natural basis for labor-management rela-
tions. Industry's nonrecognition of unions as bargaining agents, the core of
the open-shop doctrine, clashed violently in the postwar era with labor's
conviction that collective bargaining should be a basic guarantee of employ-
ment.5 Alarmed by the advances toward collective bargaining under the
trusteeship of the War Labor Policies Board, industrial leaders like Judge
Elbert Gary of United States Steel, now free of wartime restraints, were deter-
mined to roll back the union movement. Refusing even to meet with leaders
of the steelworkers union, Gary explained that "it has been my policy, and
the policy of our corporation, not to deal with union labor leaders. . . . we do
not believe in contracting with unions." Gary, according to labor historian
David Brody, was irrevocably committed to the employer's right not to deal
with unions, regardless of the wishes of his employees.6
Brody notes that the steel industry, beneficiary of five years of war
profits, could have indefinitely withstood even a total shutdown of produc-
tion. In conference with Henry Clay Frick of U.S. Steel, John D. Rockefeller
learned that the corporation was prepared to close down every one of its
mills if necessary to break the strike, and to follow this strategy "at any cost."
The steel strikers' organizing efforts, incapable of exerting sufficient eco-
nomic pressure to break down management's resolve to save the open shop,
were doomed once steelmakers perfected a means to crush the strike. The
major strategy hit upon by the steelmakers was to attack the patriotic loyalty
of the strikers, making the steel strike a focal point of the postwar Red Scare.
U.S. Steel's company publications defined the strike as one of Americanism
vs. Bolshevism, and the company advised its employees to "Keep America
busy, and prosperous, and American. Go back to work." Judge Gary ac-
knowledged that U.S. Steel often employed "secret-service men to ascertain
facts and conditions," and other companies also revealed their use of under-
cover agents. Strikers, compelled to defend their own Americanism, surely
agreed with the claim of one steelworker that by industry standards, a man
could not be "a loyal American unless he is a scab . . . unless you give up all
the rights your country gives you and obey your employer."7
The influence of political radicalism on the strike organization, while
far short of the darkly apocalyptic vision of some industrialists, helped Gary
and other steel magnates cast mass unionism as a threat to property and
order. William Z. Foster's IWW past was proof enough to many that the
strikers were infested with revolutionary radicalism. Foster's prominence as
a strike leader alienated much of the conservative AFL leadership, but his or-
ganizing and mobilization skills were invaluable, and the goals of the strike
were consistent with AFL trade-union principles. Samuel Gompers had ad-
vised against the strike but was overruled by younger, more militant union
activists. Once the strike began, Gompers and other conservatives were
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compelled to defend Foster or turn him out and tacitly acknowledge that
charges of his un-Americanism were true. West Virginia steelmaker E.T. Weir
concluded that Gompers's tolerance of Foster proved that the old leader "has
lost his grip and that the AFL is in the hands of the extremely radical ele-
ment."8 Weir, president of Weirton Steel Company, told Governor John J.
Cornwell that the steel strike was an attempted revolution, carried out by
radical socialists who "see it as a great opportunity to overthrow law and
order." Weir claimed that the strike was directed by foreigners in disregard of
"all legitimate authority." It was time, Weir said, that all "law-abiding, intelli-
gent people of this country stand together" and prove to the radical element
that Americans would not tolerate any Bolshevism or anarchy.9
Cornwell followed developments in the steel strike with foreboding,
worried as was Weir by rumors that thousands of striking steel workers,
across the Ohio River from Weirton in Steubenville, Ohio, planned to march
into West Virginia and shut down the Weirton Steel works. Weir contended
that the entire city of Steubenville and the sheriff of Jefferson County, Ohio,
were dominated by radical strikers.10 Cornwell was not comforted by Frank
Wilson, the Steubenville district secretary of the National Committee for Or-
ganizing Iron and Steel Workers. Wilson described the committee's mission
to organize Weirton Steel as peaceful in intent, but he advised Cornwell to
send investigators to Weirton to apprise the conditions of workers at Weir's
plants. "This company has set up a monarchy," said Wilson, "such as we be-
lieve exists in no part of the U.S. except in Hancock County, West Vir-
ginia."11 Cornwell wired Ohio Governor James M. Cox, requesting that his
Democratic neighbor look into the potential "invasion" by Ohio strikers.
"Any such effort," Cornwell warned, "will be regarded as an attack on the
sovereignty of West Virginia." Cox wired the West Virginia governor that he
was taking precautions against foreign-dominated mob action, confiden-
tially assuring Cornwell that he was ordering a regiment of Ohio National
Guardsmen to stand at the ready.12 Sheriff A.S. Cooper of Hancock County
wired Cornwell that Weir's plants, which briefly suspended production,
would go back on line in spite of "danger of interference largely by foreign
elements." Cooper requested that Cornwell send at least fifteen to twenty
state police to Weirton to discourage militant overtures by Steubenville radi-
cals. Cox's intervention, through the agency of the president of the Ohio
Federation of Labor, halted the planned demonstration in Weirton.13
Although the march to Weirton never materialized, it was for just such
an exigency that Cornwell had endured a bitter struggle with organized
labor to create the West Virginia Department of Public Safety, or State Police,
during a special 1919 legislative session. Signed on March 31, 1919, by
Cornwell after lengthy debate, the legislation authorized a state police force
of three companies of sixty men each. The superintendent was to be ap-
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pointed by the governor, charged with preserving the peace, protecting
property, and preventing crime anywhere in the state. Troopers were given
absolute authority to command the assistance of local law enforcement offi-
cials and able-bodied citizens in situations deemed by the governor to be
dangerous to public safety.14
Supporters of the state police legislation, commonly called the Con-
stabulary bill, warned that West Virginia would become a popular refuge for
Bolshevists and anarchists without such systematic police protection. Corn-
well won the approval of some pro-labor legislators by arguing that a state
police would eliminate the hated private mine-guard system by insuring that
coal companies would have no excuse to employ the guards. He also ap-
pealed to states' rights sentiments, claiming that a competent state police
force would reduce the state's dependence on federal troops to settle indus-
trial disputes.15 Adopting a common middle-class theme, the governor re-
peatedly asserted that only those who expected to violate laws or "overthrow
constituted authority" would have any reason to fear state policemen. He as-
sured West Virginians that the state police force was created "by the people's
Legislature" solely to protect life and property, and to make West Virginia "a
safer and more decent place for you to live and raise a family."'6
Business and industrial leaders throughout the state were "solidly
behind" Cornwell's plans for a state police, concurring with one supporter
who wrote the governor that the "very considerable element of I.WW and
Bolsheviki" in West Virginia, "composed chiefly of foreigners who are igno-
rant and lawless, must be held in check" by a state police force.17 Officials of
the Rotary Club of Elkins, the Creditmen's Association, and Chamber of
Commerce of Huntington; the Bluefield Chamber of Commerce; nineteen
prominent Parkersburg businessmen and the Board of Commerce; the
Smokeless Coal Operators' Association; the Grafton Knights of Pythias; the
West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company; the Raleigh Coal and Coke Com-
pany; the Fayette Smokeless Fuel Company, and the Ephraim Creek Coal
and Coke Company18 represented "enlightened public opinion" and "the
sober, decent, law abiding people who are with you."19 Cornwell singled out
an attorney for the Davis Coal and Coke Company, who sat in the West Vir-
ginia legislature, as an important legislative ally not only for the Constabu-
lary Bill, but "in all other matters of constructive Legislation."20 Supporters
of the state police measure concluded that the character of the opposition to
the bill, comprised as it was of certain organizations who reputedly deni-
grated law and order, proved the need for the law.21 To the bill's supporters,
then, the opposition of unprincipled groups served as one of the bill's
strongest recommendations.22
Such broad accusations essentially labeled most of West Virginia's
labor unionists and union supporters as lawless, even as pro-Constabulary
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stalwarts proclaimed their individual support for the rights of organized
labor." John L. Lewis later spoke officially for the United Mine Workers
when he described state constabularies as strikebreaking institutions and
constabulary laws as dangerous usurpations of municipal police authority
by a centralized state body. After the West Virginia constabulary was mobi-
lized, Lewis scorned Cornwell's "siren song," which promoted the state
police as "a panacea for all ills."24 Lewis's, however, was only the most
prominent voice of labor that was futilely raised against the constabulary.
WM. Rogers, president of the West Virginia Federation of Labor, denounced
the pervasive business assault against labor's loyalty that accompanied the
Constabulary bill debate. "Labor is loyal to the core," Rogers said. "We
expect to carry the Stars and Stripes to the very end." But local law enforce-
ment authorities were sufficient in the state, said Rogers, and, flirting with a
theme that rankled West Virginia industrialists, urged labor to elect its own
representatives to the legislature to obstruct repressive legislation.25
A small sampling of the resolutions of labor organizations regarding
the Constabulary bill suggests labor's fear of the potential marriage of state
police authority to private industrial interests. The fifty members of Fairmont
Local 929 of the Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers, under the slogan
"Right is Might," protested the Constabulary bill "for reasons too numerous
to mention."26 One UMWA local worried that the state police force would es-
tablish a state-sponsored "Baldwin thug system."27 Not comforted by Corn-
well's insistence that the state force would run the private mine guard system
out of business, mine workers declared that in states with a constabulary,
"they always take sides against the laboring man. We think it would be a bad
weapon to put in the hands of some employers."28 Nearly three hundred
members of Wheeling Local 20 of the International Association of Bridge,
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers unanimously opposed the Con-
stabulary bill.29 Some state newspapers also questioned the prudence of a
permanent police force, on other grounds. The Morgantown Post decried the
expense of a permanent state police force, advocating instead the rejuvena-
tion of the prewar state militia for police emergencies. The Charleston
Gazette, media outlet for Cornwell's intraparty rival WE. Chilton, contended
that the public perception of the constabulary was that of a repressive force,
which had "never worked well with our stock of people."30
Much of the opposition to the Constabulary bill was infused with the
rhetoric of class warfare, which further steeled the conviction of Cornwell
and his allies, like West Virginia penitentiary Warden J.Z. Terrell, who knew
"of no State in the union that needs some kind of protection worse at this
particular time than West Virginia." The state was dotted with communities,
said the warden, where employees openly contended that business should
be run solely for the interest of the employees.31 State police supporters
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bristled at suggestions that their alleged well-regulated keepers of order
would be no less than a "permanent military organization of armed, uni-
formed and equipped soldiers" whose task was to remind West Virginia
workers to "keep on grinding out dividends for the men who are the eco-
nomic masters of the State." Even labor organizations conceding Corn well's
professed impartiality predicted that in the hands of a less fair-minded suc-
cessor the state police would be an instrument for breaking strikes and
"crushing the rights of the workers of this State."32
The Constabulary bill struggle also exposed fratricidal tension in West
Virginia's UMWA akin to that which dogged Lewis nationally. At the peak of
the public debate over the bill, more than twenty UMWA locals in the state,
acting independently of district authorities, bombarded Cornwell's office
with resolutions of their conviction that a corporate/state conspiracy in West
Virginia sought to crush organized labor by legislative and police power.
They portrayed the Constabulary bill as an instrument of harassment and in-
timidation, and a manifestation of class rule.33 The model for the "incendiary
proclamations" was a resolution by Ramage Local 2901 in Boone County,
under the leadership of Acting Secretary C.C. Lusk, which scored the Red
Flag Bill (see chapter 4) and the Constabulary bill as "un-American class leg-
islation resurrected from the feudal days of the dim past."34
The Ramage resolution was replicated by many locals in District 17
and District 29, when Ramage activists urged UMWA members to resist leg-
islation that would lead to American institutions "being Russianized by a
Prussian law." If peaceful protest was ignored by the legislators and courts of
West Virginia, the "ruling class" stood forewarned that "labor by the might
of its arm, stands fourteen to one and that our only means of warfare either
offensive or defensive is the strike." If the state persisted in using class legis-
lation and police action to deny labor's rights of freedom of speech and as-
sembly, "we will not for a single moment hesitate to meet our enemies upon
the battlefields" and through "the crash of systems purchase again our birth
right of blood and freedom."35
Although the UMWA leadership in West Virginia strongly opposed the
Constabulary and Red Flag laws, the break with union discipline repre-
sented by the Ramage initiative prompted an angry response from District
17 President Frank Keeney and Secretary Fred Mooney. A special conven-
tion of District 17, called to protest the Constabulary bill, had adjourned on
February 11 with specific instructions from Keeney and Mooney for mem-
bers to "be careful what they sign or endorse." Upon the widespread adop-
tion of the Ramage resolution, with its "open declaration of violence,"
Keeney and Mooney charged the renegade locals with usurpation of power
by not consulting with the district leadership. Mooney and Keeney sought
and received retractions of the resolution from some of the locals, assuring
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its drafters that they could not count on protection from the United Mine
Workers of America. It was the duty of District 17 miners, said the officers,
to "eliminate from their organization that element that is preaching their dif-
ferent 'ism's,' and forever give them to understand that they will not be per-
mitted to destroy our organization."36 Mineworker H.E. Peters cautioned
union men to avoid actions that might be interpreted by the public or the
press as disloyal. Such documents as the Ramage resolution "breathed a feel-
ing" he was certain did not exist among most mine workers.37
Organizational constraints aside, from the standpoint of many workers
skeptical of the good intentions of the state, the Ramage resolution invoked
principles of a type of Americanism consistent with the recent omnipresent
wartime calls to resist autocracy. The maverick locals' resolution announced
that just as West Virginia miners had faced German militarism, they would
face industrial autocracy with "righteous protest," if necessary "amid the
roar of the cannon and the groans of the dying."38 Members of Blooming
Rose, West Virginia, UMWA Local 1952 informed state legislators that they
had just fought for democracy, and had no intention of bowing to a law that
suggested Prussianism. "We feel President Willson [sic] 14 points covers us
and appeal to them."39 Wheeling Division 103 of the American Association
of Street and Electric Railway Employees took a similar stance, calling for
the establishment of locally based emergency state militia rather than a per-
manent police force. "We are true Americans," they announced, thirty-five of
whom had fought for the nation against "that with which we are now threat-
ened: militarism."40
These expressions of working-class Americanism, which contradicted
the conformist and hierarchical tenets of industrial Americanization, articu-
lated the belief of some workers that legislation apparently so heavily
weighted in industry's favor infringed on basic democratic rights.41 Workers
militantly opposed to the Constabulary bill recalled colonial currents of re-
sistance to illegitimate authority, which held in reserve the threat or use of
violence as a tactic of social, economic, and political protest. Historian
Richard Maxwell Brown identifies the late pre-Revolutionary South Carolina
Regulator movement as the prototype for trans-Appalachian vigilante move-
ments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, based on the preindustrial
era's ideology of popular sovereignty and marked by extralegal actions, pe-
titions to representatives, and frequently violent actions.12 The formation of
local resistance groups willing to use force against oppressive actions by
distant governments was a revered American tradition.43 During the indus-
trial crisis in West Virginia late in 1919, Cornwell even invoked this tradi-
tion to elevate state authority, beseeching local law enforcement officials to
form "Committees of Public Aid and Safety" comprised of law abiding citi-
zens "to protect and preserve public order," and to resist radicals "of native
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as well as foreign birth, who will rejoice at an opportunity to plunge the
country into Anarchy."44
Nineteenth and early twentieth-century American political insurgents
of all kinds commonly promoted their causes with pleas to return to the Rev-
olutionary principles of popular rights against state oppression.45 The coun-
try's most powerful labor federation of the early industrial corporate era, the
Knights of Labor, combined elements of antiauthoritarian libertarianism with
faith in the republican possibilities of the enlightened state. The Knights' De-
claration of Principles warned against the "aggressiveness of great capitalists
and corporations," which, if unchecked by the voluntary organization of all
workers, would render the state the primary obstacle to a humane and coop-
erative social order.46 The egalitarian Americanism espoused by the Knights,
and by socialists and other insurgents, however, clashed with the prevailing
middle-class concept of Americanism, which exalted order and individual
property rights over radical industrial democracy. Such progressive ideals of
Americanism sanctified progress, science, technology, efficiency, law and
order, and scientific management of work and society. These, in turn, coa-
lesced with reactionary, or nationalistic, Americanism, which envisioned hi-
erarchical social organization based on white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant virtue
and discipline. Together, the progressive and nationalistic impulses formed a
powerful alliance against noncapitalist, anti-elitist alternatives for industrial
America, and cast them as disloyal.47 As the appropriation of the state by po-
litical capitalists became more evident, it was usually those who militantly
envisioned a revolutionary redistribution of social and economic power who
most faithfully cleaved to fundamentally conservative "Regulator" checks
against centralized police authority. Local 1808 of Elkridge, which bitterly
condemned the Constabulary law, instructed Governor Cornwell that "The
posse comitatus [has] always proven competently handling outbreak [sic] of
violence, always caused directly or indirectly by the methods and tactics of
the employers class."48
Cornwell was alarmed at the militancy sparked by the Constabulary
bill, avowedly mystified by suspicions that the state police bill and the Red
Flag bill were "aimed at the trade unionists." He repeatedly insisted to labor
leaders that the legislation was directed at any disloyal person or any crimi-
nal, including disreputable coal operators, manufacturers, and lawyers. The
governor was distressed that trade unionists would fear laws conceived only
to punish lawbreakers and subversives. To Cornwell, there were but two
classes of people, "those who obey the laws and those who break the laws—
the good and the bad." By opposing the Constabulary bill, loyal unionists
were "undertaking to put on shoes that were not meant for them."49 Corn-
well's conciliatory tone with some of labor's representatives was cast aside
in his correspondence with political allies. In these instances, Cornwell
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designated any opposition to the state police law as an "attempt to destroy
our Government and wreck the whole industrial and social system in this
country."50
Corn well affirmed that the state police, made up of a small, well-
trained corps of officers and reserves, would be free of political pressures by
virtue of their appointment by circuit court judges, whose integrity would
automatically insure that the selection of the police force would not be influ-
enced by "sinister motives." Comwell told the legislature that "a proper
force of discreet, high-class men . . .  furnishing protection against law-
breakers of all classes," was the duty of municipal, county, and state author-
ity in any orderly society.51 He desired to cooperate with union labor
whenever possible but would not allow radicals to make West Virginia their
headquarters.52 Corn well had long encouraged labor to be organized and
managed according to business principles, warning that unions must never
resort to "anarchic methods" when threatened by injustice, but should
appeal to enlightened public opinion. Labor must never forget that an em-
ployer was entitled to the loyalty of his employees and that workers would
lose the trust of the public and business if they allowed the "spirit of Bolshe-
vism or I.W.W 'ism" to infect their unions. To demonstrate his empathy, he
often noted that "it was not so long ago that I was carrying a dinner pail,
none too full, for a dollar a day."53
That claim was disingenuous in light of the fact that for the quarter-
century before he became governor, Cornwell had been a teacher, news-
paper editor, railroad investor, bank president, timber company executive,
and corporate retainer in Hampshire County for the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad.54 Cornwell's political and economic thought was thus firmly
guided by the middle-class assumption, as explained by Martin Sklar, that
large-scale corporate capitalism was the natural product of social evolution
and that society would best be served by a legal and institutional environ-
ment favorable to the continued growth of industrial capitalism.55 Cornwell
often proclaimed that he was neither a progressive nor a reactionary, but
"merely a democrat." He even claimed, apparently seriously, that his early
work as a laborer made him "in no sense a capitalist."56 He sought to protect
capitalism, however, and he understood the stabilizing influence of progres-
sive legislation. He consequently supported mine safety reforms, woman's
suffrage, and eight-hour day, child labor, and workman's compensation
laws. Cornwell was not, says one historian, opposed to measures that
would ameliorate the hardships of labor. He simply opposed labor's exer-
cise of political power.57
Legislative adjustments to modern industrial growth were consistent
with Cornwell's embrace of elite bipartisanship in government, and he
firmly believed in the control of industrial reform by business interests.58
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Corporate recognition of the wisdom of pro-capitalist industrial reforms an-
tedated the World War and later formed the basis for the 1920s practice of
welfare capitalism. The alleged "organic" expansion of industrial capitalism
had faced ideological and social challenges during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, results of the rapid corporate reorganization of the
American economy.59 Even John J. Cornwell, acknowledging the political if
not the ideological validity of socialism, had deliberately courted West Vir-
ginia Socialists to win the governor's office in 1916, offering to this active
political minority a sympathetic hearing from a Democratic reform adminis-
tration in Charleston. Socialist strongholds in Fayette, Tucker, and Green-
brier counties backed Cornwell, and he lobbied hard for Socialist votes in
heavily industrial Ohio County. Socialist voters looking for a reasonable al-
ternative to certain defeat for any gubernatorial Socialist party candidate de-
livered several thousand votes to Cornwell, who won the election over
liberal Republican Ira E. Robinson by less than three thousand votes.60
By 1919 Cornwell had foregone even rhetorical tolerance of socialist
theory, linking it inextricably with the other "strange experiment," Bolshe-
vism.61 Cornwell joined like-minded political, business, and intellectual
leaders in a conscious movement to insure public acceptance of corporate
capitalism as the inevitable form of business enterprise and allocation of
wealth.62 The governor told Wetzel County teachers that advocacy of
schemes, like the nationalization of railroads, and other "Socialistic talk" was
foreign to American ideals, and propagators of such heretical dogma were
pushing "the Russian doctrine or even worse." By the time of the Seattle
strike, Cornwell's perception of disloyalty encompassed all proponents of
public ownership of industries who, he affirmed, inflicted unrest and agita-
tion "as dangerous and threatening as any day during our war experience."
Sanity and patriotism were his prescription for resisting the tendency
toward communism, as found in such schemes as the Plumb Plan for gov-
ernment ownership of railroads. "Such un-American, revolutionary and dis-
honest doctrines" might lead gullible people to embark "on a campaign of
pillage and murder in their effort to 'politely kick out' the owners of mills
and factories and farms." He appealed to teachers to guide their pupils away
from alien doctrines "promoted by the lazy and shiftless who want the ben-
efits of someone else's labor." Teachers were engaged in a war to protect loyal
citizens who owned their own homes and firesides and were "not willing to
communize their little heritage" by jeopardizing the sanctity of private prop-
erty. It was their duty, "dealing with young and plastic minds," to "see that
the American ideas and ideals are implanted there."63
The plan presented by attorney Glenn E. Plumb was the focus of
postwar debate over whether railroads should be retained and operated
by the government or permanently returned to private management. The
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Plumb Plan recommended that administration of the railroad industry
be placed "in the hands of the men who have invested in that industry the
great, creative human effort-labor in all its manifestations."64 Plumb pro-
posed a government corporation managed by a board of directors repre-
senting railroad employees, railroad officials, public consumers, and the
president of the United States. Profits would be allocated equally to em-
ployees and to operators, with much of the corporate profit channeled into
investment and improvement of rail properties. The plan, says David Mont-
gomery, complemented coal miners' demands for nationalization of the coal
industry and served as a model for social reformers within the American
Federation of Labor.65
Galvanized by an address by Plumb, UMWA delegates endorsed the
Plumb Plan at the union's 1919 Cleveland convention. They approved for-
mation of an alliance with railroad workers. Describing coal resources as the
birthright of the American people, the Cleveland delegates also approved a
resolution to nationalize the mining industry, recommending federal admin-
istration and equal representation on boards of authority for mine workers
to determine wage, hour, working-condition, and grievance policies. At
Cleveland, acting UMWA president John L. Lewis, engaged in a power
struggle with Frank Farrington of Illinois and radical Kansan Alex Howat,
joined forces with Farrington to crush Howat's attempt to seat an insurgent
"One Big Union" faction from Illinois. Despite the marginalization of Howat,
Lewis still faced two thousand union militants at Cleveland who had no par-
ticular loyalty to him. Unenthusiastic about nationalization, Lewis sought to
deflect the UMWA policy committee's endorsement for public ownership of
the industry, but given the activist climate at the convention and the precari-
ousness of his leadership position, Lewis could not afford to reject nationali-
zation at that point.66
John J. Cornwell's renunciation of the Plumb Plan escalated after the
UMWA Cleveland convention, as he combined the steel strike and the na-
tionalization campaigns into an intricate strategy by labor leaders to "starve
and choke the country into submission." In a widely reported address to the
National Paint, Oil, and Varnish Association at White Sulphur Springs, West
Virginia, the governor warned that labor's militant actions "strike at the very
roots of our form of government and at the very foundation of organized so-
ciety." Plans were in place, said Cornwell, to organize every industry so that
labor unions would have absolute control of the country. The union strategy
included affiliations with policemen and firemen, "so when the crucial
moment comes the custodians of the public peace will no longer be the
guardian of the public, but will be under orders from the labor leaders." If
the "weird, fantastic, Bolshevistic theory" of nationalization was not
checked, it would spread to all industries, projecting the misguided notion
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that the United States government represented the interests of capitalists
above those of the whole people.67 The Plumb Plan was "Socialism run mad,"
said the governor, and it would lead to "Russia reproduced here on Ameri-
can soil."68 Cornwell denied that he implicated all of organized labor in his
sweeping charges, but one labor leader asked that if this were the case, why
did the governor not direct the state's police powers against unlawful acts
"rather than conduct a propaganda which now needs explanation and which
has been construed as a reflection on organized labor."69
In the view of Cornwell and his class, illegitimacy of social and eco-
nomic alternatives to industrial capitalism elevated predominant values and
institutional procedures that consistently favored some persons and groups
at the expense of others, leaving the beneficiaries in a dominant position to
promote their interests under protection of law.70 Business and political lead-
ers did not presume that the "rules of the game" were tilted in their favor but
that natural economic laws rewarded virtue and punished vice. Successful
capitalist enterprises were derived not from an imbalance of power between
business and labor, but from the genius of modern entrepreneurs.71 Corn-
well embodied this middle-class view, having grown up in modest circum-
stances, supported and educated himself, acquired a fortune "by his own
industry and ingenuity," and internalized "a philosophy of labor that was
idealistic and elevating." His business and political success had freed him
from physical labor, but he praised labor's "new dignity," which it had ac-
quired by demonstrating its loyalty during the war.72 Such unconscious con-
descension reflected the predisposition of successful capitalists who
identified "the people" as the "better citizens," vested with "natural and
patent superiority," which qualified them for leadership. Moreover, the as-
siduous extension of political, social, and economic control by capitalists
and corporations was seen by their representatives as politically neutral.73
C.C. Lusk, who drew Cornwell's attention as secretary of Ramage
UMWA Local 2901 during the Constabulary bill controversy, recognized the
contradiction in business and political elites' claims to public-minded neu-
trality in the industrial struggles of 1919. While attesting to his union's
desire to trust and support the state's chief executive, Lusk told Cornwell
that the governor lived in "an industrial and political atmosphere" that led
Cornwell and "those like you situated," to suspect as disloyal "the men and
women that feed the world, clothe the world and that gives [sic] the world
drink." Lusk concluded that this suspicion was "the result of class reasoning
and is the cause of class hatred," meaning "the rich nor their retainers do not
want a reconstruction or change." Lusk suggested that this class identity em-
anated from a "social, religious or even psychological standpoint."71
Lusk's analysis of elite class consciousness does much to clarify Corn-
well's rather remarkable contention that circuit judges, in appointing state
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policemen, would not be influenced by political considerations. If agitated
by Lusk's observations, Cornwell probably took heart from the sentiments
of coal operator Justus Collins, who congratulated him when the Constabu-
lary bill became law. "Every decent man in the state should take his hat off
to you. The others don't matter," wrote Collins, who also recommended that
the new state police use a pair of "French type 75s which are light field
guns" for mob control. If facing "overwhelming odds, the two pieces would
be more effective than several hundred trained infantrymen." Cornwell
thanked Collins but was "inclined to believe that a machine gun would be
more advantageous, as it could be handled more easily."75
Beliefs held by elites about the natural and proper organization of
American society no longer accommodated the indigenous "Socialist Alter-
native" articulated by Eugene Debs and other prewar radicals, promoting a
cooperative commonwealth rather than private enterprise, as trustee of "the
sources of wealth and the means of life."76 After the war, such doctrines were
assiduously expelled from the narrowing public discourse, and anarchists
and socialists were generally described as lacking the capacity for patriot-
ism. Educator Waitman Barbe identified critics of capitalism as "men and
women without a country." "Glance at the list of our most notorious Reds,"
Barbe said, "and you will see, I think, that here lies the secret of their strange
aberrations. There are no Sons or Daughters of the American Revolution
among them." The National Association of Manufacturers labeled Socialism
as not only un-American but un-Christian, since "the whole appeal of the
Christian religion is to individual impulse and to individual responsibility."77
Such attitudes permeated the volatile industrial climate in the fall of
1919. Governor Cornwell had divided the world into "the good and the
bad," and it was from that perspective that he viewed the labor-management
conflict that rent his state. Frank Keeney's pledge to organize miners of the
Guyan field in Logan County, concurrent with the early September steel
strike and the impending UMWA national strike, convinced Cornwell that
West Virginia was on the verge of industrial revolution. Cornwell rushed to
address some four thousand miners at Lens Creek when armed Kanawha
miners shut down their own mines and mobilized near Marmet to march
into Logan County, in response to reported killings and beatings of District
17 organizers by private Logan County mine guards.78 Cornwell reportedly
displayed considerable personal courage, and his own and some other ac-
counts suggest that his eloquent and fair-minded appeal to investigate the
miners' complaints changed their minds. Other reports credit District 17
President Frank Keeney with persuading the miners to return to their homes
and point out that the march was only abandoned when Cornwell warned
the miners that unless they disbanded, he had arranged for federal troops
under General Leonard Wood to forcibly disperse them.79
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Cornwell appointed a commission to study the alleged intimidation of
UMWA organizers, but Frank Keeney refused to cooperate when the focus
of the investigation was shifted to fixing blame for the aborted march.80
Keeney's wariness was not unfounded. Justus Collins volunteered informa-
tion for Cornwell's investigation, which the governor gratefully received,
"concerning the miners who started the march to Logan County on the night
of August 30." Collins told Cornwell he knew enough about the unions that
such a demonstration had to be "ordered, financed, and directed by their of-
ficials." Collins went beyond indictments of local UMWA leaders to charge
the old craft unionist Samuel Gompers, who, "in a larger way, is today under-
taking to terrorize, coerce, and subdue by force and intimidation the whole
country."81
As the steel strike and labor-management divisiveness in West Virginia
widened, Cornwell was convinced that his stand against labor radicalism,
especially his nationally distributed White Sulphur comments, had put him
in harm's way, particularly from certain UMWA leaders who "feared I might
influence the rank and file of the mine workers against the leaders and offi-
cers of the Union." Cornwell had been warned during the Constabulary
fight that "some of these dinks might assassinate you in the dark"; he now
dictated a letter to his secretary in which he predicted his death for refusing
to "permit them to unionize the Guyan Coal Fields by force and in defiance
of law." Cornwell insisted that believers in law and order must assert them-
selves or "not only our Government but civilization itself is doomed." He
was willing to die if his sacrifice would "help stay the tide of Bolshevism and
Anarchy."82
No assassination attempt materialized, and when the UMWA refused
the Wilson administration's proposed 14 percent wage increase, a national
coal strike, deemed illegal by Wilson under terms of the Lever Act and the
Washington Agreement, was scheduled for November I.83 Cornwell ap-
pealed to Keeney, linking his hope that West Virginia miners would not go
on strike to the "same loyalty and patriotism they manifested during the
war." "The people," Cornwell declared, expected that loyal miners would
reject the strike call. Keeney responded that the coal operators' prices had
gone up 184 percent since 1916, while union wages had risen 63 percent.
Because of cost of living increases and the operators' "arbitrary stand"
against union recognition, miners were forced to carry out the strike policy
approved at the UMWA Cleveland convention. Cornwell had already alerted
Leonard Wood to have federal troops at the ready to send to West Virginia.
Officers of the West Virginia Coal Association pressured the governor to
secure federal troops to combat radical strikers. Cornwell complied, and
some nineteen hundred federals were brought in, many in the southern
open-shop fields.84
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Cornwell also instructed West Virginia mayors and law enforcement
officers to organize "A Committee of Public Safety, composed of patriotic,
courageous and public spirited citizens, men who can be trusted and whose
loyalty to the government and its institutions is beyond question." Cornwell
feared the strike would be used by "the criminal and radical element" to
foment industrial revolution. "We are not fighting a strike," the governor
warned. "We are combatting an attempt at revolution, and governmental
authority can only win by the moral support of the good people every-
where."83 State police duties during the strike consisted largely of surveil-
lance of suspected IWW agitators in the northern panhandle and protection
of some northern open-shop mines. Undercover agents J.N. Crincefield and
CM. Jones reported to the state police that "5% of the men are radicals" in
Whipple and Scarboro in District 29. They asked workers in the strike zone
if they knew of UMW agitators who were intimidating miners who opposed
the strike. Some miners signed affidavits providing the names and addresses
of union activists.86 Surveillance extended south into strongholds of the
open shop and yellow-dog contract. F.S. Monahan of the Lick Fork Coal
Company confidentially informed Cornwell that most of his miners were
uninterested in the strike issues until "aggravated by Socialists, I.WW, etc."
The men lost "their own good judgment" when "carried away by the stormy
words of the Country Wreckers. This does not exempt District Officials and
National Officials."87
Cornwell believed that most West Virginians, unlike radical agitators,
were liberty-loving and law-abiding, and would make any sacrifice to pre-
serve public order. He was worried, however, that the state's citizens were
unaware of the magnitude of the danger that radical elements posed to or-
ganized society. When Ohio County Sheriff Howard Hastings remarked that
there were no revolutionaries among Wheeling's union men, Cornwell in-
formed the sheriff that his personal investigations had revealed the pres-
ence of Bolshevik and IWW elements in Ohio County. They were engaged
in "active, open propaganda in the Wheeling district," and as governor,
Cornwell intended to cooperate with the federal government in breaking
the unlawful strike such radicals were directing. "It is unnecessary to say,"
the governor said, "that I think the attitude of all public officials should be
the same."88
In addition to soliciting federal military aid to put down the coal
strike, Cornwell occasionally sought federal undercover assistance against
suspected radicals to supplement his network of personal informants. Acting
on a request from Cornwell, U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in-
structed agents of the Bureau of Investigation (BI) to investigate suspected
radicals in Tucker County.89 Cornwell informed Palmer of IWW locals at
Grant Town in Marion County and Wendel in Taylor County, led by alien ag-
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itators who "should have been deported long ago." Palmer sent BI agents to
arrest "all alien radicals."90 Cornwell also pleaded with Postmaster General
A.S. Burleson to purge from the U.S. mail all publications which, for exam-
ple, carried statements by VI. Lenin. "Can't we start a campaign to prevent
the use of government machinery to articulate propaganda to overthrow the
Government?"91 The Bureau of Investigation also forwarded to Federal Mar-
shal C.E. Smith, an officer with Consolidation Coal in Fairmont, a list of
West Virginia subscribers to the Italian anarchist publication Cronaca Sover-
siva, described by the Justice Department as the country's most dangerous
newspaper. The list included the name of Consolidation employee Guiseppe
Cavalieri of Worthington, and the BI suggested that Consolidation's com-
pany police "keep an eye on" Cavalieri, as it was "a good idea to watch every
one of this stripe."92
While he courted and applauded federal censorship, Cornwell also
understood the value of the propaganda model employed by the wartime
Committee on Public Information. He realized the importance of relying
primarily on the cultivation of public opinion to attract popular support for
his increasingly strident antilabor positions. He believed, for example, that
organized labor in West Virginia, under the populist guise of "fighting cor-
porations," had built an alliance of West Virginia legislators from agricul-
tural and industrial areas to threaten the Constabulary bill. The fact that the
bill became law was exceptional, Cornwell insisted, since labor leaders
"have had their way absolutely in Washington as well as Charleston." The
governor thus concurred with the National Association of Manufacturers,
which cried that in Congress and in "every state legislature, the insidious
and artful minds of the labor trust leaders are represented in bills of socialis-
tic and dangerous character." Cornwell favored state and national industrial
disputes laws to outlaw strikes and believed that public awareness of labor's
resistance to the state police legislation would help "bring the American
people to their senses" about such attempts to "destroy our Government."93
Cornwell joined many other business spokesmen in issuing dire pre-
dictions about the domination of legislation and the manipulation of public
opinion by labor's radicals. The public was insufficiently organized, a writer
for Coal Age complained, to oppose effectively labor's organized minority,
who had expelled the AFL's "conservative, sane leaders" from positions of au-
thority. Moreover, labor organizations had ignored legislation to "safeguard
the public against the aggression and extortion of combinations," and they
should waive the right to strike in return for the creation of proper commit-
tees of experts to determine wages and adjust disputes.94 The industrialists'
position was that workers combined in restraint of trade when they went on
strike, or threatened to strike. The "labor trusts must be suppressed," then,
because their actions "injure the public."95 To expel radicalism and protect
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the public, Governor Cornwell recognized that industrial dispute legislation,
while important, would be insufficient to recapture the national "unity of
thought and purpose" that resulted in the Allied victory over German autoc-
racy. Cornwell agreed with the National Association of Manufacturers that
only a properly educated public could secure the unity needed to back up
proper industrial legislation. The governor cautioned businessmen that
guileless workingmen, without time to read and analyze important public
issues in depth, would become ever more dependent for information and
social philosophy on their union officials, many of whom had a facility for
portraying industrial problems in terms of "idealistic and socialistic theo-
ries." Radicalism must be met openly, systematically, and immediately. To
defeat radicalism, Cornwell declared, "Counter propaganda is imperative."96
Organized business efforts at counter propaganda in West Virginia took
form in the context of the UMWA struggle to organize the southern West Vir-
ginia coalfields. Miners in Mingo and Logan counties refused to comply with
a federal injunction prohibiting the November 1919 strike, and thirteen
thousand unorganized miners in these counties continued to strike after the
ambiguous federally negotiated agreement to suspend the national coal
strike in December. Thousands of miners who joined the UMWA were fired
and expelled from company housing, under the coal operators' authority
from the Hitchman decision (see chapter 3), and were forced to move with
their families into tent colonies. The crisis degenerated into warfare between
miners and company gunmen, with the UMWA determined to organize
Mingo and Logan as a wedge into the rest of southern West Virginia and east-
ern Kentucky. Mingo County coal operators groused that the new state police
were being overly neutral in their tolerance of strike agitation, in too literal
compliance with the terms of the Constabulary Act. Cornwell expressed his
hope that those provisions might be changed in the future, and he later
turned to federal intervention in an effort to guarantee coal production in the
region. The Matewan Massacre of May 19, 1920, in which local union sup-
porters and Baldwin-Felts agents engaged in a deadly gun battle, prompted
further federal action. Cornwell dispatched state police to the Matewan
strike zone, where unionists enjoyed safe haven provided by local police
chief Sid Hatfield. The incongruity of a pro-union law enforcement officer in
the rabidly open-shop Mingo fields infuriated the autocratic Mingo-Logan
operators. The acquittal of Hatfield and eighteen codefendants, charged with
murder of Baldwin-Felts guards, by a pro-union Mingo County jury further
embittered the region's operators. Hatfield was assassinated by Baldwin-Felts
agents on August 1, 1921, having been called to neighboring McDowell
County to answer strike-related sabotage charges. His death contributed to
the mobilization of thousands of West Virginia miners for the march to Blair
Mountain late in August.97
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As the coal strike had spread throughout the southern West Virginia
fields, businessmen mobilized to protect their interests and generate public
opinion in their favor. In February 1920, editor Wightman Roberts of the
West Virginia Mining News called upon responsible business leaders to "resist
and offset the aggressions of organized minorities—the labor unions and
their false leaders." Roberts proposed forming an "American Federation of
Business Men," a propaganda body to disseminate the principles of the
United States Constitution and destroy closed-shop unionism. Quoting
Cornwell, Roberts pledged that individual ownership and property rights
"would not be sacrificed to the terrorists of organized labor." He called for
an organizational meeting of the American Federation of Business Men at
Charleston's Kanawha Hotel on March 4, 1920."8
Cornwell supported Roberts's plan and agreed to address the inau-
gural meeting of the organization, attended by about 150 businessmen, who
bypassed Roberts's name for the group in favor of the American Constitu-
tional Association (ACA).99 The mission statement of the ACA included the
organization's goal to "inculcate in the minds of our people, both native and
foreign-born, the true spirit of Americanism." Officers and directors of the
organization included Cornwell, E.W. Oglebay, Edwin M. Keatley, Robert
Archer, Phil Conley, William McKell, Dr. I.C. White, and Howard M. Gore.100
Cornwell described the ACA as a "defensive and offensive alliance of
business men" determined to crush the Plumb Plan and UMWA designs to
nationalize the coal industry. The governor expressed his hope that the
ACA would be an important factor not only in the interests of business
"but in the interests of the whole people, and the American government."
Roberts was elected assistant secretary of the ACA, with businessman
Edwin Keatley, who later became speaker of the West Virginia House of
Delegates, as secretary. The officers pleaded with Cornwell to be ACA presi-
dent; after initially declining, Cornwell accepted the presidency, partly be-
cause of Keatley's participation.101
Shortly after the founding of the ACA, Mingo County coal operators
restated their position not to negotiate with the UMWA concerning the or-
ganization of the Williamson field, plainly stating their belief that "no useful
purpose could be served by any meeting with the miners." Instead, the op-
erators embarked on a campaign of counter propaganda to offset UMWA ac-
tivities in Mingo County. To present their case, the operators procured space
in Mingo County newspapers, emphasizing their roles as owners of $30
million to $40 million in property, whose taxes supported public institu-
tions, schools, and roads, and who provided employment for five thousand
workmen.102 The Logan Banner later endorsed similar public relations tac-
tics, claiming the cure for southern West Virginia's "labor troubles" was "in-
formation from the printed page instead of from the whispered rumor."
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Newspapers must do their part so that workers would no longer be fooled
by agitators. "The isolation of the mountain hollows," the Banner intoned,
would be overcome only by "the light of information through the medium
of the newspapers." Only then would "the disorder of southern West Vir-
ginia be ended and the law reign in every mountain valley"103
Newspapers, however, were just one of many important avenues for
the promulgation of anti-union propaganda by the ACA and its allies. Like
the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the ACA denned itself
primarily as an educational organization, making a studied effort to impress
the public with the merit of its anti-union principles, employing various
channels such as schools, churches, the press, and agencies of state and pri-
vate industry.104 The ACA insisted that America must "adopt a systematic
plan of teaching love of country through schools, churches, industries and
homes. . . . in books and patriotism, loyal Americans must offset radical
doctrines."103 The ACA became an important vehicle for organizing and
transmitting propaganda at the intersection of several interrelated move-
ments, each affirming the moral and social authority of business, including
welfare capitalism, the open-shop movement, and the polemical foundation
underlying these movements, known as the American Plan. The ACA in
West Virginia assumed the task of educating and mobilizing the public with
the goal of imparting to these class-conscious business strategies the recti-
tude of democracy, freedom, and liberty. Committed to disseminating their
particular type of Americanism by all available means, ACA activists envi-
sioned a broad business coalition to apprise the public, most of whom "don't
believe the danger of radicals." "Call me alarmist," an ACA officer wrote to
Corn well, "but . . . conditions are not what they were ten years ago; there is
not the regard for law and law enforcement that prevailed when I was a
boy."106 The statewide goals of the ACA and its allies were ingredients of a
broad national movement in the early 1920s, when a concerted effort was
launched to destroy independent labor unionism.
6
Welfare Capitalism, the American
Plan-Open-shop Movement, and the
Triumph of Business Unionism
By May 1921 the American Constitutional Association claimed one thousand
members and enjoyed the support of the West Virginia Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation and the major coal operators' associations.1 Speakers from the organi-
zation's speakers bureau, led by the ACAs indefatigable managing director,
Phil Conley, addressed meetings of the WVMA, county bar associations,
Rotary Clubs, and meetings of county school superintendents.2 Although the
reputation of the National Security League had been tarnished when con-
gressional hearings unearthed its war profiteering and authoritarian im-
pulses, the ACA welcomed the national orientation of the NSL, and the two
joined forces to sponsor patriotic demonstrations.3 Conley informed the
ACA Executive Committee that he and the American Legion's director of
Americanization work in West Virginia had formulated plans to coordinate
the Americanization programs of associations statewide, including the West
Virginia Federation of Women's Clubs, the Daughters of the American Revo-
lution, the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, the
Chamber of Commerce, Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, and the State Federation
of Labor.4
The ACA's occasional tepid rhetorical overtures to organized labor in-
evitably receded, however, since the mission of the organization fundamen-
tally contradicted that of the United Mine Workers and other independent
unions in West Virginia. The ACA was pledged to protect the competitive
interests of nonunion southern West Virginia coal operators, who were de-
termined to undersell coal produced in the unionized Central Competitive
Field. The UMWA foresaw the organization of southern West Virginia as as-
suring wage protection for its members nationwide. The ACA picked up
the anti-union gauntlet thrown down by United States Steel's successful re-
sistance to the 1919 organizing strike and became a forceful advocate in
West Virginia for the open-shop doctrine promoted by U.S. Steel President
Elbert H. Gary.5
The determination of southern West Virginia operators to roll back
union advances and prevent new inroads was reinforced by helpful judicial
and legislative initiatives. The greatest of these was the 1917 U.S. Supreme
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Court Hitchman decision, which made union membership punishable by loss
of employment under terms of individually negotiated yellow-dog contracts
and allowed the broad issuance of court injunctions to prohibit union activ-
ity. Open-shop advocates also benefitted from the long-established expertise
of the National Association of Manufacturers, which had led the organized
efforts to smash American unionism since the early twentieth century.6 The
organizing principles of these tactics were incorporated into a national coali-
tion of businessmen and industrial capitalists under a "well-financed and
militant drive to reduce the power of labor organizations," which adopted
the slogan "American Plan." Formalized at a January 1921 conference of state
manufacturers' associations in Chicago, the American Plan ideology argued
that each worker should determine his own terms of employment with his
employer, free of interference from business agencies or unions. The Ameri-
can Plan movement used the latest methods for shaping public opinion, says
historian of American labor Philip Taft, conducting an aggressive campaign
that contributed to a drastic decline in trade union membership nationally
by 1923.7
While antiradical demagoguery, coercive labor contracts, and injunc-
tions comprised important elements of the business assault against union-
ism, nationally and in West Virginia, coal operators and their supporters
also embraced the doctrine of "welfare capitalism" on a wide scale. Op-
erators' efforts to defuse working-class militance included sponsorship of
mine safety programs, employment of social workers, economic support for
public school systems, and support for religious, social, and fraternal activ-
ities.8 The West Virginia Coal Operators Association, affirming that consci-
entious coal operators wanted "to secure good men, reliable workmen,"
lauded expenditures by state coal men to make their company towns at-
tractive and comfortable, where children would learn to be good citizens of
the state and nation. Some companies paid for YMCA buildings and hired
their recreation directors. Companies built and maintained baseball dia-
monds and provided uniforms and equipment for company teams.9 Lun-
dale Coal Company of Lundale, West Virginia, in Logan County, provided a
"dance hall for white people and one for colored and baseball teams and
playgrounds for both classes."10
Companies spent thousands of dollars on schools, nurses, churches,
Sunday Schools, "and other factors necessary to the right sort of community
life."11 Lundale Coal built three churches for its employees, including a
Catholic, a Protestant, "and a church for the colored people."12 Ministers
were frequently paid in whole or in part by the companies, since the coal
men believed proper religious training aided their search for the best class of
workmen. It was seen as good business for a coal company to support reli-
gious and community activities.13 E.D. Knight, chief engineer of the Cabin
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Creek Consolidated Coal Company of Kayford, West Virginia, praised the
"value of the 'indirect approach' to mine problems" achieved by a minister
and school teacher in his community. Operators dismissed accusations that
providing churches and paying ministers' salaries allowed them to control
religion in company towns. Perhaps some operators were greatly concerned
about "the theological views of their employees. We have not found any
[such operators]."14
Welfare capitalism is described by a recent sympathetic account of
company towns as "contentment sociology," a term used by the Stonega
Coke and Coal Company of southwestern Virginia. Contentment sociology
was built on the belief that a satisfied working class would be stable and
productive, even if miners sacrificed much of their personal control over the
job." Benevolence, however, ideally would create more than contentment
among the workers; it could also be a profit-making enterprise. J.G. Bradley,
president of the West Virginia Coal Association, told delegates to the 1922
West Virginia Coal Mining Institute that operators providing amenities
should realize a return on the additional costs, since the people of the com-
munity would be willing to pay on a per use basis.16
A 1920 article in Coal Age emphasized the importance of welfare
work not only for contented workmen but for future workers, who needed
education to "so train their minds that they can understand economic con-
ditions," insuring that "their relations with this company or some other
when they will go to work will be on a higher plane than that of their
fathers." Coal Age recounted the personal arrangement of one Pennsylvania
coal company president with the local board of education. Although the
company did not pay teachers, the president selected the teachers, insisting
primarily on their "high moral view-point."17 An official for Consolidation
Coal in Jenkins, Kentucky, explained that most mining companies tried to
secure the most progressive teachers. Unless company officials took an in-
terest in the selection of teachers, unconcerned board of education mem-
bers would send their worst teachers to the mining towns.18 Depending on
business fortunes, Winding Gulf coal tycoon Justus Collins supplemented
teacher salaries. Collins once loaned money to the board of education for
high school construction at Winding Gulf, even though some businessmen
feared that an inappropriate high school education might turn youngsters
away from industrial work rather than toward it.19 Coal company executives
rejected charges of undue company influence in the classroom, however,
claiming it was impossible to "put a great deal of propaganda into the
teaching of the three R's." On company control over selection of teaching
personnel, "it is probably true, but we do not believe that this is an undesir-
able situation. On the contrary, we feel that this tends toward securing
more competent teachers."20
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Welfare capitalism was a prime ingredient in the recipe for employer
control over production, efforts to thwart unionism, and the creation of an
obedient, content, and thrifty working class. Business leaders agreed that
proper education was the primary source of worker contentment and sta-
bility, from which miners and their families could acquire appropriate "habits
of industry."21 Comprehensive education transcended the classroom, some-
times extending to management control of lending library reading material,
but more pervasively infusing workers' communities with the companies'
own propaganda generated by employee magazines. The first such publica-
tions appeared in 1907 and proliferated dramatically between 1915 and
1920, when over four hundred companies published monthly or bimonthly
journals. Designed to convince employees that the company was concerned
about their individual happiness, goals, and successes, employee magazines
sought to bind worker to employer in a consciousness of cooperation, trust,
and affirmation of probusiness views of industrial relations.22 Readers learned
that happy men and women knew that "work is not drudgery, it is a pleasure.
We do the best work we are able to do not because we receive more pay for it,
but because it is our duty and we love to do our duty." One editor frankly
stated that the employee magazines represented a necessary and "continuous
campaign of thought direction" waged to guarantee "the greatest degree of
loyalty and efficiency."23
The ideological currents of industrial Americanization, scientific man-
agement, anti-unionism, and the American Plan are well-defined in one of
the most prominent coal industry employee magazines, the Consolidation
Coal Company Mutual Monthly. Consolidation's Employment Relationship
Department, described in a promotional article as "particularly active as re-
gards publicity matters," published about eleven thousand copies of the
magazine monthly, featuring biographical sketches of the company's promi-
nent men, gardening tips, baseball scores, and stories about all activities
sponsored by the Employment Relationship Department.24 Under the mast-
head "Employer and Employed: Our Own Interests Being Identical, We
Work Together for Our Common Good," the Consolidation journal shifted
its wartime focus (see chapter 1) from patriotic production to whip the Hun
to patriotic production to eliminate "those who would destroy our liberties
and government." Americans who stood for law and order and against anar-
chy and destruction would join forces to "rid our country of these menaces
to civilization."25 True Americanism demanded "expression in our work, in
our recreation and in our religion," and carried an obligation of "aggressive
loyalty . . . to help crush every power that opposes the principles of Ameri-
canism." Patriotic loyalty was embodied in the American Plan, where labor
and capital became "brothers in reality," each working for the others' best in-
terests, and where workers settled their individual disputes in consultation
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with reasonable employers, provided strikes and lockouts were abolished by
law and grievances were "not instigated by outside influences."26
Consolidation's journal easily transferred the propaganda of wartime
mobilization to postwar domestic industrial affairs. A column called "Human
Relations" warned that America was engaged in a life-and-death struggle in
which the American people must "furnish antidotes for the poisons that
have been injected by fanatical radicals." Many seemed oblivious, however,
to the magnitude of the threatened social upheaval. Society's welfare de-
pended on "organized effort on the part of sound thinkers who have the
welfare of all humanity at heart." "We must act in unison to defeat the
united effort of civilization's enemy or suffer what poor deluded Russia is
suffering today."27
As the Consolidation journal sounded the alarm against radicalism, it
advised its readers as to how to prove their loyalty to the principles of true
Americanism. One must obey all laws, rejecting false prophets who attacked
the ideals and laws of the republic. Chiefly, any American citizen, native or
foreign-born, could prove they were worthy by displaying the accepted habits
of industry. "Your love for America will be measured by how true you are to
your daily tasks," the magazine stated. "Busy people are invariably more con-
tented than loafers. Industry always breeds content," and discontent vanished
in the face of accomplishment "in some line of habitual endeavor."28 The mag-
azine was an aggressive promoter of the American Plan, describing its open-
shop principle as conservator of personal freedom, liberating workers from
the grasp of union agitators so they could negotiate directly with their em-
ployers, individually or in company dominated committees, with each work-
ing man free of the dictatorship of "paid hirelings to do his thinking for him."
UMWA intentions to unionize all the nation's coal miners was attacked as un-
American, particularly union demands for the mandatory checkoff of union
dues from a worker's wages. Such practices were an insult to a workman's
honesty and intelligence, and the American Plan would guarantee labor dig-
nity and "freedom from rule of organization politics."29 No "real man" would
tolerate the checkoff or mandatory union membership. He would agree that
compensation for work performed was a matter to be decided between em-
ployer and employed, free from outsiders' influence. Finally, the American
Plan was firmly grounded in the belief that every man had a right to work for
whomever he saw fit, and "every employer has the right to employ such men
as he sees fit to employ"30
West Virginia coal operators expertly manipulated the pre-industrial
mystique of individual contract, bolstered by their sweeping powers under
Hitchman to require nonmembership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment.31 A boon to marginal operations in the nonunion sectors of
competitive industries, Hitchman had demonstrated to employers how potent
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the combination of yellow-dog contracts and labor injunctions could be.
Supreme Court Justice Mahlon Pitney's 1917 majority opinion interpreted
the use of yellow-dogs as a property right, which could be defended by in-
junctions to block outside interference. Pitney recognized the rights of em-
ployees to form unions, but employers also had the right to run nonunion
mines, a right violated by the organizational efforts of the UMWA. Broad
court injunctions virtually outlawed the UMWA in parts of West Virginia and
led to bitter strikes in the hosiery industry in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and
Indiana.32 Failure to abide by the terms of yellow-dog contracts, which were
widely used in the Mingo and Logan fields, subjected the employee to dis-
missal. Terms usually went beyond membership in the UMWA or IWW to in-
clude any action interpreted by the employer as giving aid to any labor
organization. Claiming that Hitchman made it impossible for the union to
protect miners in unorganized fields, the UMWA sought to turn the tables on
operators' flag-waving by labeling yellow-dogs as violations of workers' con-
stitutional rights of assembly.33
The UMWA described the yellow-dog contract as the means used by
some employers to "smash labor unions and reduce working people to the
old-time level."34 Naturally, anti-union coal operators saw this element of the
American Plan differently. Individual contracts between loyal employees and
benevolent companies, which recognized the business benefits of fair treat-
ment, would reinstitute "earlier and simpler forms of industrial organiza-
tion." Developments in modern industry, including the infusion of foreigners
into the American industrial system, had undermined the traditional "cordial
relationship," where the employee easily identified himself with the interests
of the employer.35 Coal Age lamented that "we have drawn away from the old
habits," when the "workman called round in the evening" to talk with his
boss. The modern journal of the coal industry recommended restoration of
the "old personal touch."36
These were effective if transparent tactics. The UMWA recognized the
threat to its existence posed by the American Plan, including coal operators'
determination to use saturation propaganda to "disabuse" the public mind
of "widespread misconceptions which have been carefully implanted in it"
about the alleged avarice of coal companies.37 (UMWJ) editor Ellis Searles
charged that "un-American" nonunion operators in West Virginia spent mil-
lions of propaganda dollars to protect their influence on public policy and
law enforcement.38 A letter to the UMWJ warned that since "most of the big
papers are controlled by capitalists," the public constantly heard that union
workers were radical and unpatriotic.39 Searles attributed the American
Plan-open-shop movement to a "gigantic conspiracy" to reestablish archaic
industrial practices, and defended union discipline as industry's great stabi-
lizer, necessary to any organization.40
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The systematic propaganda campaigns to paint organized labor as dis-
loyal put unions on the defensive. John L. Lewis was obliged to announce
that "Coal miners are Americans" and that the UMWA was "an American in-
stitution that believes in and upholds American ideals."41 Lewis also courted
industrialists receptive to the idea that conservative unionism was good busi-
ness. Disciplined and well-paid union workers meant greater productivity
and profits, and Lewis ridiculed "those old mossback employers who live in
the past," lacking the vision to see that labor-industry partnership would
mean "more automobiles, more general education, more modern plumbing,
more gramophones and bigger real wages."42 Lewis earlier singled out Judge
Gary, contending that the steel baron regarded his corporation as more pow-
erful than the U.S. government. Lewis concluded that he hoped Gary repre-
sented "the old-time autocratic type of employer that is rapidly passing from
the scene."43 Ironically, even as the American Plan-open-shop movement
sought to destroy unionism, Lewis was able to seed alliances with many
national-minded industrialists who had long steered for the broad, smooth
gulf between the swirling waters of radical anticapitalist workers and radical
"anarchists" in the business community who most stridently pushed the
open-shop campaign.41
Lewis's probusiness outlook and personal antiradicalism allowed him
to consolidate his authority in the early 1920s by weakening his left opposi-
tion in the UMWA, at a time when union solidarity would appear to have
been most critical. As put by Lewis biographers Dubofsky and Van Tine,
Lewis's personal power in the union rose in the 1920s in proportion to the
UMWAs decline in strength and influence. Lewis's "anti-red hysteria," played
out in the pages of the UMWJ, won him the confidence of many businessmen
and Republican politicians and allowed him to impugn the loyalty and un-
dermine the political power of his more radical union opponents. By 1924
Lewis had neutralized insurgency within the union, and UMWJ editor Searles
had "closed the columns" of the journal to activists who tried to keep nation-
alization of the coal industry, never a desirable objective to Lewis, alive.45 The
most accomplished of these dissidents, District 2 President John Brophy, was
compelled to seek out the minimally distributed journals of the battered
American radical left, such as Labor Age, to publish his arguments. One of
Brophy's articles promoted "The Miners' American Plan," based on public
ownership of the industry. Brophy's American Plan also adhered to basic
union principles that institutionalized the right to strike and warned that any
proposal to deny this right and collective bargaining to labor "is the begin-
ning of slavery for the mining community."46
Brophy's was a consistent but muted call to the UMWA rank and file
to reinvigorate radical criticism of the inequities of industrial capitalism. Al-
though Lewis faced occasional internal challenges, his power was such that
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he always emerged stronger rather than weaker. Lewis's successes permitted
him to steadily divert the flow of union authority away from the locals to the
national, and he embarked on his design for union-industry cooperation, or
"business unionism," as broader social objectives for the UMWA, embraced
by Brophy and other insurgents, were undercut.47 In a curious twist, the re-
actionary American Plan-open-shop movement and John L. Lewis struck an
unspoken bargain, and crushed the vestiges of a noncapitalist model for
American industry.
As Lewis formulated capitalist-based strategies to devalue or discredit
social radicalism, nationalization, and working-class consciousness, business
leaders cultivated capitalist-based strategies to secure their dominance of
American political, social, and economic thought. Deviating from the rhetoric
of industrial partnership, Coal Age proudly announced the self-conscious
promotion of middle-class interests. National, state, and regional engineers
meeting in Washington in June 1920 developed a sense of "engineering har-
mony" based on "publicity, class consciousness, co-operation and public ser-
vice." The engineers agreed that they should serve "two distinct national
functions," welfare work and professional activity. Professional activity de-
manded the "development of class consciousness of a professional type
among engineers," requiring them to participate in "public service and the
politico-economic life of the nation."48
Although business and industrial leaders perpetually intoned that
America's greatness rested on "the abolition of class and caste," their own
class identity, resting on internal assumptions about their personal values,
was strong.49 This surface contradiction was easily reconciled. It reflected
the major structural changes in American society that accompanied modern
industrialization in the early twentieth century. Social relations became pri-
marily dependent on the production and exchange of goods and services,
and one's value to society was identified with his productivity and contribu-
tion to sustained economic growth. The increasing division of industrial
labor heightened class distinctions based on ownership or nonownership of
property. For public consumption, the class-consciousness of owners or
managers who succeeded in business or property accumulation was defined
in terms of values and belief systems. Antimarket, or noncompetitive, values
or beliefs were defined as "irrationalism" or ideology. In this context, "busi-
ness" was not simply economic activity but a system of deliberate ideas and
ideals geared toward the shape of society, law, politics, and moral standards.
The ascendance of business as arbiter of values constructed a social hierar-
chy based on capital and labor as interdependent yet separate factors of pro-
duction, with some individuals as superiors and some as subordinates. In a
capitalist society, since the normative beliefs of capitalists determine the
purposes and goals of social and political systems, capitalists became what
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classical theorists called a dominant or "ruling" class. Historian Martin Sklar
points out that in recent years, social scientists have cast this term aside in
favor of a less direct term, "hegemonic." As many historians and contempo-
rary analysts of the emergence of industrial capitalism have demonstrated
(chapters 3, 4, and 5), national values were to be shaped by those experts
deemed qualified for public leadership. When industrial policies based on
accepted elite values evoked widespread opposition or resistance, the whole
people were then denned in a limited sense, as the "better citizens" or the
"thinking" members of society.50
This reasoning permitted open-shop groups like the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers (NAM) to identify employers' interests as those of all
society, deserving protection from outside interference. It also permitted the
NAM and its open-shop allies to promote their own class interests while at-
tacking labor-sponsored "class legislation," such as measures prohibiting in-
junctions in labor disputes, protecting picketers, and shortening workdays.
Such class-favoring special legislation, in the view of open-shop advocates,
impeded natural liberty and threatened the property rights of employers.51
Coal miners' demands for a six-hour day and five-day week, for instance,
coupled with doubletime pay for Sundays and holidays, would amount to
an "indirect wage increase" and a "limitation on production." Coal execu-
tives interpreted such measures as "un-American. We regard them as an at-
tempt to make of the miners a favored class." Union organizers, on the other
hand, invested their demands for higher wages, shorter hours, and good
working conditions with the rhetoric of patriotism, speaking of an "Ameri-
can standard" of material and social security.52
Cognizant that the desired sustained industrial expansion would per-
petuate a system where "only a few are naturally adapted to professional
life," businessmen implemented strategies to guarantee the internalization of
professional class values by the masses.53 Former CPI strategist Roger Babson
wrote that no anticapitalist "ism" would "help you or me in our own individ-
ual struggle." Disengenuously, Babson lamented that the saddest feature of
unionism was "the false doctrine that labor no longer has any hope of devel-
oping into the employer class." He chastised the wage earner's attitude that
he would remain a wage earner, voiced in UMWA leader John Mitchell's
statement that the worker "has given up hope" of becoming a capitalist, and
"asks that the reward for his work be given him as the workirigman." This
was simply not so, said Babson, and conscientious workers had great oppor-
tunities to advance, if only they would "develop themselves so as to assume
greater responsibilities." Babson then suggested the political dimensions of
working class consciousness. It would be disastrous, he maintained, if the
wage worker believed "he is always going to remain just as he is with no
hope of further development." If workers believe "they are doomed ever after
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to remain in their present position without hope of advancement, they will
try to get everything possible for their class to obtain."54
To avoid the danger of this kind of obstructionism among their
workers, employers were obliged to equip them with appropriate social and
industrial attitudes. Nonunion West Virginia coal operators, for example, in
order to upset the designs of "the predatory union leader" who "stands as the
enemy of society in general," were advised to use their own educational ad-
vantages to educate their miners, who are "deprived of perspective." The
miner's "vision is more restricted, but he is quite willing to be shown" that he
and his fellows suffer "when he fails to do his allotted part" in maintaining
production. When workers came to appreciate "natural forces and economic
laws," labor would "give all it can for a dollar" rather than giving as "little ser-
vice as it can for a dollar." When labor understood the natural processes of
the market, it would "welcome a co-operative alliance with the employer's
brains."55 In such a partnership, advancement would be swift for the ambi-
tious, responsible worker. Moreover, educational and social opportunities
flourished in orderly company towns, where the "arm of the law has been
strengthened." Welfare capitalism had finally brought the world to the doors
of West Virginia's "mountain people, who for generations were shut off by
barriers of isolation. Unlimited opportunities are afforded the native moun-
tain men and the foreign employes to advance to responsible positions, and
to become mine owners."56
Class conflict in the southern West Virginia coalfields erupted vio-
lently in the Miners' March (see chapter 5) of late summer 1921. The march,
capping the volatile early postwar readjustment, reaffirmed businessmen's
resolve to make their values universal. Foremost among the "American
Ideals" promoted by the American Constitutional Association was "Adequate
Reward for Labor." Appropriate compensation was determined by "the de-
velopment and expansion of business interests," which would provide the
new consumer goods that would afford "inexhaustible opportunities for
labor."57 Property rights were also inviolate, and Americans could be secure
in the knowledge that even a wealthy man "may not acquire a cottage be-
longing to the poorest man except by the full consent and legal conveyance
by the owner."58 The fundamental ideal of "Equality of Opportunity" was ar-
ticulated by Edwin M. Keatley, who succeeded Cornwell as president of the
ACA in 1922. In America, said Keatley, even the "man without a cent who is
capable, is given the opportunity to forge ahead of the procession. . . .  And
to attempt a goal usually means success." Success, he continued, "depends
entirely upon the individual."59 Keatley, a New York native who came to
West Virginia as a young man to manage properties for the J.E Morgan Com-
pany, likewise voiced another basic principle of orderly social organization.
"Children properly reared," he wrote, "early learn submission to authority."60
Welfare Capitalism 109
ACA members foresaw a daunting task ahead in their goal to instill "in
the minds of our people, both native and foreign-born, the true spirit of
Americanism."61 True, the American Ideals professed by the Association tran-
scended ideology to enter the realm of "fundamental truths," each of them "a
clear statement substantiated by the doctrines of Christ." Certainly, if Christ
had "formed a Government while on earth," it would have anticipated the
forms of American democracy.62 The ACA warned, however, that anticapital-
ist radicalism was not exclusively of alien origin, but homegrown. Indeed,
Bolshevism had originated on American soil, conceived by radical labor or-
ganizer William "Big Bill" Haywood of the Industrial Workers of the World.63
The ACA charged forty-five organizations, with a million members and a
central directorate, with being "either extremely radical or mildly radical."
These organizations conducted secret meetings, attended by working men
who often worked a full day in "factories and shops, and then spend four to
six hours in the evening, without pay, distributing literature of a radical
nature."64 The American Constitutional Association stood as the "official or-
ganization" in West Virginia to oppose "all Reds, all Bolsheviks, I.WW.'s and
other Government-destroying agencies."65 It was the duty of loyal Americans
to assist in exposing the propaganda of these agents.66 It was the mission of
the ACA, as a purely patriotic organization, to use information and educa-
tion "to inculcate, not to drive, in the minds—not the passions of our
people" its brand of Americanism.67 The organization promised to distribute
"our propaganda in the open, above board, where everybody can see what
we are doing."68
The ACA's melding of the open-shop campaign with antiradicalism,
following the lead of steelmakers who had defeated the 1919 strike, engaged
powerful corporate allies in West Virginia. Some of the country's largest coal
companies—including Consolidation, Island Creek, and subsidiaries of U.S.
Steel-expanded their development of southern West Virginia coal properties
in the immediate postwar years, attempting to avoid high union wages and
regulation of production. These tactics succeeded in capturing markets from
the unionized producers of the Central Competitive Field, markets the West
Virginia operators were determined to protect.69 Cornwell personally so-
licited support for the ACA from Consolidation's Clarence Watson, telling
him that good results could be obtained by the ACA "if the business people
will cooperate in pushing it along."70 The association's most conspicuous cor-
porate supporter was Judge Gary of U.S. Steel, national spokesman for the
American Plan-open-shop drive. In the first decade of the twentieth century,
Gary and William Edenborn of U.S. Steel had entered into partnership with a
Greenbrier County banker to purchase the holdings of the Flat Top Coal
Land Association. They soon acquired 80 percent of the Pocahontas coal-
field, leasing it to coal companies. One of Gary's most prominent lessees was
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a subsidiary of U.S. Steel, the U.S. Coal and Coke Company. U.S. Steel there-
fore had a direct interest in keeping production costs down in the Pocahon-
tas field, as it secured its coal and coke supplies through its southern West
Virginia operations."
Gary concurred with the ACA that if the American people would
only "study the facts," they would understand that individuals could realize
the full benefits of American opportunities "only through the principles of
the open shop as distinguished from the dominance and arbitrary control
of the union labor leaders." Disregarding the fact of the yellow-dog con-
tract, Gary proclaimed that the open shop guaranteed freedom to employ-
ees to enter into any "line of employment, at any place and time, upon
terms and conditions voluntarily agreed upon between the employee and
the employer."72 He was convinced that the great majority of employers and
workers believed that labor unions benefitted only union leaders.73
Judge Gary responded generously to an appeal from Edwin M. Keatley
to support the ACAs campaign. Acting through a Wheeling intermediary,
Keatley secured a $5,000 donation from Gary to the ACA, and Gary required
all U.S. Steel subsidiaries in West Virginia to endorse the association.74 Keat-
ley informed Cornwell late in 1920, eight months after the founding of the
ACA, that the association had secured several thousand dollars in pledges for
its work in 1921. Most pledges came from large employers who contributed
one dollar per employee.75
The anti-union campaign in West Virginia, in keeping with the nation-
wide American Plan strategy, targeted entrenched union strongholds as well
as unorganized coal-producing regions. The American Plan Review, a newslet-
ter issued from Wheeling, included in the "ten commandments of the Ameri-
can Plan" the obligation of employers to "protect all employes in the
American right to earn a livelihood" in exchange for maximum loyalty from
all workers. Employers would allow employees to submit grievances to their
bosses, and all complaints would be adjusted fairly by the company "without
assistance or interference from outsiders." The review invoked a declaration
from the United States Chamber of Commerce that capital represented the
will of the majority, while labor promoted the tyranny of the unionized mi-
nority over the public interest. Moreover, capital believed in the force and
right of law, while labor had "no faith in the law and advocates employing, in
its stead, force, violence, and strikes."76 In June 1921, American Plan-open-
shop businessmen in Wheeling launched an open-shop battle between
building trades unions and construction companies, who announced their
intentions to hire and place workers without regard to union or nonunion
status. Contractors initiated the open-shop strategy to break a two-month
strike in the Wheeling construction trades by union workers who refused to
accept 20 percent wage reductions when their union contracts had expired.77
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The United States Chamber of Commerce, lining up with the rigorously
open-shop National Association of Manufacturers, drew the lines for the na-
tional open-shop drive with its announcement in the summer of 1920 that
"American business men are preparing to take a definite and united stand on
the labor question." The Chamber registered the votes of more than thirteen
hundred trade organization representatives nationwide on principles of in-
dustrial relations, including "the right of an employer to deal with his own
men without the interference of outside agents." The Chamber's directors
stated their belief that the right of open-shop operation "is an essential part
of the individual right of contract possessed by each of the parties."78 Na-
tionally, member Chambers endorsed the open-shop principles 1,665 to 4,
and for good measure the Bluefield, West Virginia, Chamber of Commerce
circulated a resolution deploring the efforts of John L. Lewis to unionize
coalfields in the Pocahontas district.79
The vote by Chamber members represented the Chamber's abandon-
ment of neutrality on industrial struggles. The Chamber's shift helped unify
employers' groups throughout the nation, who swiftly joined ranks to put
labor on the defensive. The Socialist Review interpreted the Chamber's vote as
a watershed in a well-organized plot by the nation's businessmen and organi-
zations, dating back to the 1919 actions of the Associated Industries of Seat-
tle, whose propaganda model was imitated by other open-shop groups. The
Associated Employers of Indianapolis distributed 1.5 million pieces of open-
shop literature across the nation, offering tactical advice to open-shop orga-
nizers.80 The National Association of Manufacturers, which had kept the
open-shop ideals before the public since 1903, sported an Open-Shop De-
partment, whose functions the NAM defined as purely educational. One of
its most effective strategies was to publish the Open Shop Encyclopedia for De-
baters, and to send speakers to address college assemblies on the virtues of
breaking unions.81 The moral force of the presidency was behind the NAM's
open-shop principles, as Warren G. Harding announced that it was "the right
of every free American to labor without any other's leave."82
Soon after the American Plan organizational meeting was convened by
Gary in Chicago in January 1921, job printing shops in Salt Lake City an-
nounced they would operate under the plan's open-shop tenets.83 Builders
in Albany and Troy, New York, endorsed the American Plan that summer.
Chicago meatpacking firms followed suit shortly after, prompting a strike by
the packers' employees. Fourteen independent packers in St. Louis also
adopted the American Plan, as did the Texas and Pacific Coal Company.84
The Chicago Association of Commerce, the Illinois Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation, and others formed a "Citizens' Committee" to help enforce an open-
shop decision by Federal Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, pledging to
raise $3 million to import nonunion tradesmen to Chicago if necessary.85
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The Williamson, West Virginia, Coal Operators' Association claimed the pre-
rogative to operate open-shop mines "as a matter of law and right" and
blasted the organizing practices and complete unionization goals of the
UMWA as being inimical to "fundamental freedom and the American Gov-
ernment" and "contrary to public policy."86
Organized resistance to the American Plan-open-shop was broad but
fragmentary, scattered, and poorly funded. Power struggles and a fiscal crisis
within the miners' union hindered a unified oppositional front. The UMWA
spent $8 million between 1920 and 1922 to organize southern West Vir-
ginia, only to be turned back by the vigilance of the operators and their
business and political allies.87 The Miners' March of August-September 1921
briefly galvanized national attention on the West Virginia miners' struggle,
but the ensuing trials of nearly six hundred march participants further de-
pleted meager union resources. Even though John L. Lewis assisted in the
defense of union activist and march organizer Bill Blizzard at Blizzard's trea-
son trial in 1922, Lewis angrily condemned the officers of District 17 for
trying "to shoot the union into West Virginia."88 In October 1922 the UMWA
abandoned the Mingo County strike and desperately attempted to resist the
rollback of union contracts in the Kanawha, New River, and Fairmont fields.
Lewis later insisted that wage rates be maintained in these fields, despite a
disastrous depression in coal sales and prices after 1923. When Frank
Keeney and Fred Mooney protested this policy, Lewis removed them in favor
of a more compliant subordinate, Percy Tetlow, a common Lewis tactic to
undermine the independence of his officers.89
Such internecine battles undercut a unified front against the American
Plan movement, but beleaguered unionists mustered moral support from
various sources. The executive committee of the Methodist Federation of
Social Service charged open-shop advocates with hypocritically mouthing
the rights of workers to join unions while they maneuvered to fire or black-
list unionists. The American Plan, said the committee, denied fundamental
rights of labor to organize and would lead to "chaos, anarchy, and warfare in
our industrial life, and intolerably delay the development of constitutional
democracy in industry." The Federal Council of Churches of Christ also re-
jected the American Plan, prompting angry criticism from the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers.90 The Nation charged nonunion New River coal
operators in West Virginia with using hunger, evictions, injunctions, and
blacklists to deny their employees fundamental rights of voluntary associ-
ation and collective bargaining, and union operators with attempting to
divide and conquer the UMWA with district agreements for "essentially a
national industry." The intellectual liberal journal predicted that if the union
were crushed, the coal fields would fall into anarchy, with the miners "help-
less before a despotism which in the past has dominated every department
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of their lives."91 AFL President Samuel Gompers also warned of the destabi-
lizing effects on business if collective bargaining rights were withheld,
claiming that the country would careen into Sovietism and Bolshevism if
unions were destroyed. Fred Mooney, while he still enjoyed Lewis's good
graces, accused the "labor-hating fakers" of the National Coal Association of
secretly conspiring with communists to destroy the confidence of rank-and-
file workers in responsible labor leaders.92
One of the dreams of many open-shop advocates was to make strikes
illegal and to submit disputes to industrial courts. This short-lived adjunct
to the American Plan-open-shop movement flourished in Kansas, where re-
current miner walkouts directed by the charismatic Lewis rival Alex Howat
fueled the region's antiradical hysteria. Kansas instituted a law, later de-
clared unconstitutional, that effectively outlawed strikes and established
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes, a development that was "an anath-
ema to the entire American labor movement."93 On at least one occasion the
Kansas court of industrial relations turned the tables on infuriated anti-
union forces in the state, ruling that employers could not inflict capricious
or arbitrary layoffs on their workers with each business downturn. De-
lighted with this particular decision, the UMWJ pointed out, however, that
the court was created to compel the state's miners to work whether they
were treated fairly or not.94
Governor Cornwell had long advocated an industrial-court law for
West Virginia, without success.95 Cornwell left office, to become general
counsel for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, early in 1921. He was suc-
ceeded by an equally firm supporter of business interests, Republican
Ephraim E Morgan, an opponent of labor radicalism and the League of Na-
tions, who enjoyed a Republican majority in the legislature.96 Nevertheless,
the legislature declined to approve an industrial court law in 1921.97 In
1923, however, Senator William J. McClaren of Welch sponsored Senate Bill
337 to create a West Virginia Court of Industrial Relations, with the judges
of the court to be appointed by the governor. The West Virginia proposal,
said the UMW], made the Kansas industrial court "look like a plugged
nickel, when it comes to destroying the rights of workers." Section 14 of the
McClaren bill recognized the right to collective bargaining by unions or as-
sociations of workers incorporated by state law, an allowance rendered vir-
tually meaningless by the provisions of Section 9, which established the
principle of the individual contract, and by Sections 15 and 17. Section 15
defined picketing, boycotting, advertising, and union propaganda as unlaw-
ful conspiracy, if the court decided these actions injured any corporation or
business. Section 17 made strikes illegal, forbidding any person to "conspire
with other persons to quit their employment or to induce others to quit
their employment" for purposes of interfering with business or industrial
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operations.98 By proposing to institutionalize the employer's right to negoti-
ate individual contracts and to deny labor's right to strike, the West Virginia
bill confirmed what the AFL had long stated. AFL Vice President Matthew
Woll affirmed that denying the right to strike offset any right to collective
bargaining. "To assert that you have the right of collective bargaining, and
cannot strike," said Woll, "is simply a contradiction."99
Despite Governor Morgan's hopes, the industrial-court bill stalled in
the legislature. It is likely that some industrialists and businessmen, regard-
less of their desires to cripple unionism, were wary of provisions that gave
the judges jurisdiction to regulate working and living conditions, hours of
labor, and even to standardize wages. Such powers vested in a state regula-
tory body, while in keeping with the structural changes in corporate capital-
ism, might very well elicit opposition from independent business anarchists
who rejected the corporate liberalism of nationally oriented or progressive
industrialists.100 Perhaps some were aware that the Kansas law, although de-
cisively favorable to industry, had still once been used to muzzle arbitrary
layoffs and firings. Organized labor in West Virginia, although reeling from
the southern coal strike, perhaps mobilized enough opposition generated
by the state's trades assemblies to block the bill. Morgan's election, after all,
had not implied a popular mandate for the governor. He had defeated a
labor-supported nonpartisan candidate in the 1920 election, Samuel B.
Montgomery, who probably drew most of his votes away from the Democ-
ratic candidate, Arthur B. Koontz. Together Montgomery and Koontz out-
polled the victorious Morgan.101 The failure of the industrial court plan
suggests that even with the temptations of the antistrike provisions, open-
shop businessmen were cool to the idea of a state body that, at least in
theory, could intrude on the prerogatives of unregulated free enterprise as
well as labor organizing.
Whatever the degree of tactical contentiousness between anti-unionists
that can be read into the West Virginia industrial-court fizzle, however, the
American Plan-open-shop crusade expanded its struggle for the hearts and
minds of the public. That struggle reached beyond the mass industries and
trades into other sectors. W.C. Ruediger of George Washington University
wrote late in 1918 that efforts by the American Federation of Labor to orga-
nize schoolteachers would lead to "consciousness of class, and that of the
Bolshevik variety." Teachers above all others must be "free from all predeter-
mined class alliances." Otherwise, they could not shape the "wholesome
mental development of all the children of all the people." Class-conscious
teachers would sacrifice the trust of lawyers, doctors, ministers, and business
owners and managers, who wanted their children educated in schools where
impartiality prevailed. Professional consciousness among teachers was ac-
ceptable, but teacher affiliation with "labor unionism" was undemocratic.
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Ruediger feared that unionized teachers would turn the public schools into
"schools for labor unionists."102
A respondent suggested that Ruediger denigrated workers' conscious-
ness but fully approved of class identity among owners, managers, bankers,
and lawyers, the respectable elements who sought to dominate society's
manners, intellectual interests, and morals through the subsidized press and
class-conscious journals. To Ruediger's critic, unionization among teachers
merely showed their solidarity with common people.103 The American Feder-
ation of Labor agreed, and suggested that teachers should be independent of
boards of education, which had "no proprietary right in the schools." The
UMW] encouraged teachers not to limit their organizations to professional
meeting societies but to "learn to wield the big stick" against arbitrary
bosses.104
Union sentiments among teachers sent shock waves through the
American educational establishment. As industrialists geared up for the
1919 steel strike, local teachers' associations in nearly one hundred commu-
nities joined the American Teachers' Federation, which was affiliated with
the AFL, demanding competitive wages and joining in the growing activism
among workers nationwide. School boards were disturbed by the movement
to organize teachers, who arguably had a legal right to unionize but not,
from the elites' perspective, to put their class interest above the public good.
Administrators and board members claimed that school boards were not pri-
vate bosses of teachers, but representatives of the people, and coercive
action against them by teachers was undemocratic.105
Rumblings of teachers' unions running concurrently with industrial
unionism's call for nationalization of major industries prompted editor
Waitman Barbe of the West Virginia School Journal initially to analyze the
controversy in abstract terms of individual freedom. True, it was through
selfless collective effort that America and the Allies had unified to defeat
German autocracy. But the victory of 1918 would produce a progressive civ-
ilization only when individuals were free, unburdened by intrusive institu-
tions, to "develop the best that is in them." Human development, said Barbe,
was not a collective but an individual process. His argument took on more
concrete open-shop tones when he applauded the decision of the Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, school board to dismiss teachers who had joined the AFL.
Teachers must understand, said Barbe, that they were public servants, with
"legal and moral obligations which a day laborer does not have." Unions
were special interests, and union teachers might therefore be compelled to
represent only part of the public. Echoing Pennsylvania's superintendent of
public instruction, Dr. Thomas E. Finegan, Barbe concurred that fundamen-
tal Americanism demanded that teachers be free to "explain, without preju-
dice, the philosophy of American life, government and institutions." They
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must not favor the interests of one group of citizens against the interests of
another group or of the whole community.106
Shortly after Barbe's opinion appeared in the WVSJ, the Morgantown
Board of Education adopted an anti-union policy for the district's teachers.
The board issued a standing order that it opposed organized political action
by teachers.107 The issue of union representation for teachers soon disap-
peared from the WVSJ. A 1923 column by Walter Barnes praised teachers for
developing a unified state education association as an expression of profes-
sional consciousness. The WVSJ, however, was by that time the organ of
the association, whose members had abandoned, if indeed they ever seriously
considered, a flirtation with the power of collective bargaining. Barnes's invo-
cation, like Barbe's rhetoric, sanctified individual over collective action.
Power rested in the personal "ideals of vigor and virility," through which the
WVEA could "breed a sterner, stronger, more aggressive race of teachers."108
Although the American Plan-open-shop campaign never achieved the
ideal of its most radical proponents, that being the complete rollback and
destruction of trade unionism and collective bargaining, it did nonetheless
achieve enduring results. David Montgomery suggests that the recession of
labor militance in the 1920s resulted from interdependent business organi-
zation, state repression, economic depression from 1920 to 1922, and the
isolation of the left wing of the workers' movement by conservative union-
ism. The American Plan movement might even be interpreted as only mod-
erately successful if national union membership is the indicator. Although
AFL membership declined by at least one-third between 1920 and 1923, the
federation was still larger than in prewar years.109 In West Virginia, however,
the open-shop movement enjoyed a great victory. Kanawha operators re-
fused to contract with their union employees, and between 1922 and 1925
they evicted ten thousand union miners and forty thousand family members
from company housing. Northern West Virginia operators abrogated union
contracts, began open-shop operations, and obtained Hitchman injunctions
to keep UMWA organizers out of the Fairmont field. Under pressure from
increased production in West Virginia's open-shop fields, many Central
Competitive Field operators imposed open-shop operations as well.110
While the quantitative results of the American Plan-open-shop move-
ment were mixed, it was ultimately successful in forcing organized labor
from even moderately oppositional stances on such issues as nationalization
of industries and an independent labor party. The trade unions of the 1920s
had adapted to an undemocratic America, whose economic structure would
soon collapse.111 Much of labor's conservatism persisted even with the tu-
multuous and divisive resurgence of organized labor in the 1930s, and with
its ascendance during World War II. Labor's renaissance and growth, though
effecting a dramatic and significant adjustment of economic power, occurred
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within the context of the mutual rejection by victorious labor, business, and
political leaders of noncapitalist, or "un-American," solutions to the nation's
economic and social crises. The triumph of business unionism as the orga-
nizing principle of the UMWA and other major unions is a significant indi-
cator of the thorough marginalization of political and economic alternatives
to American industrial capitalism.112
The business-friendly climate of the UMWA under John L. Lewis was
well established by 1923. Lewis had steered the UMWA away from national-
ization in his resolve to adapt the union leadership's longstanding suspicion
of government intervention in business to modern industrial relations. The
UMW] claimed with certainty "that neither miners nor operators desire gov-
ernmental control or regulation of the coal business."113 By late 1924 Lewis's
courting of union coal operators led some of them to ask Lewis to administer
a proposed owners' association. Lewis demurred, choosing instead to parlay
his dominance of the UMWA into the successful promotion of a seemingly
deferential William Green to the AFL presidently, succeeding Gompers, who
died in December 1924. Lewis ruled the UMWA, had negotiated wage in-
creases for union miners in the Jacksonville Agreement, and enjoyed an ami-
able if not especially influential relationship with the Calvin Coolidge
administration. He was recognized by financiers, industrialists, and conserv-
ative politicians, according to Dubofsky and Van Tine, as the foremost Ameri-
can labor leader who understood the value of harmonious labor-management
relations.114 When AFL delegates refused to endorse the idea of an American
labor political party, the UMWJ praised the decision. The interests of the
working masses would presumably be served by a nonpartisan policy to
make government more responsive to their needs through the "progressive
enlightenment" of the existing economic and political structure.115
In the early 1920s, John L. Lewis and much of the business commu-
nity in West Virginia differed over the rightful place of collective bargaining
and organized labor in the United States. Despite this, their differences did
not extend to disagreement over the fundamental soundness of con-
sumerism, economic expansionism, and free market capitalism as the appro-
priate model for the organization of American society. Union policy,
adjusting to determined business assaults, therefore pushed to the margins
the populist currents that ran through much of the labor unrest of the early
postwar era, including the nationalization debates and the 1921 southern
West Virginia miners' rebellion. The growth-oriented business unionism of
Lewis and the hierarchical standards of industrial Americanization pro-
moted by groups like the ACA did not become fully integrated until decades
later, after another world conflict. Not until after the Great Depression,
when labor militancy forced the federal government to endorse collective
bargaining as public policy, and the crisis of the Second World War, did the
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adversarial bureaucratization of modern labor relations mature and atrophy.
The American Plan-open-shop campaign of the early 1920s, therefore, rep-
resented a formative preliminary conflict to the dominant business/union
consensus of the Cold War era. The Americanization of West Virginia in the
early 1920s, however, entailed a broader ideological application than the
anti-union struggle. The institutionalization of the tenets of industrial Ameri-
canization, by the American Constitutional Association and allied public
and private agencies in West Virginia, required mobilization on many fronts.
7
Voluntary Associations and
Americanization in the 1920s
Labor historian David Corbin has written that the federal government's war-
time patriotic propaganda mechanism created a demand for conformity that
ignited postwar explosions of nativism, antiradicalism, and the open-shop
fervor. John Higham explains the racial xenophobia and antiradicalism of the
"Tribal Twenties" as a revival of prewar nativist ferment that had temporarily
been refocused on the war crisis. The collapse of the wartime boom economy
by 1920—together with a dramatic increase in European immigration in the
spring of that year, reversing the wartime and immediate postwar trend of
migration back to Europe—recast much of Americans' economic frustrations
and political fears onto the foreign-born. Entrenched perceptions linking
foreigners with crime and political radicalism fostered unprecedented at-
tempts to regiment the moral and social behavior of all Americans by law,
markedly with the implementation of the prohibition amendment.1 The West
Virginia Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WVWCTU), a leading advo-
cate of middle-class Americanization, predicted that the "phenomenal
progress" made in the world crusade against alcohol would be as historically
prominent as "the unspeakable war itself." Whatever the long-term results of
the war, it had revealed "the true relation of drink to efficiency and success."2
One hundred percent Americanizers, grounded in quasi-scientific assump-
tions of Anglo-Saxon superiority and determined to alter the drinking cul-
ture of immigrant groups, set out to "usher in a purified, regenerate society."
Higham contends, however, that 100 percenters reflected a national psycho-
logical letdown after the war and were fraught with uncertainty as to the ulti-
mate defeat of "the forces of darkness." One hundred percent Americanism
therefore typically assumed a defensive posture, says Higham, taking the
form of retrenchment and suspicion rather than confidence in the resilience
of American institutions.3
Viewed in the light of national policies of diplomatic withdrawal, eco-
nomic protectionism, and immigration restriction of the early 1920s, post-
war campaigns to resurrect the wartime goals of "unity of thought and
purpose" indeed appear predominantly defensive.4 Nevertheless, the fabrica-
tion of industrial Americanization required more than negative legislation
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imposed to regulate immigration and moral behavior. Conformist patterns
of political and economic thought could not be guaranteed simply by re-
actionary outbursts against real or imagined enemies of social stability. It
was necessary to mobilize sustainable support for the business and indus-
trial sectors that emerged as the nation's most powerful arbiters of state and
private activity. Business, corporate, political, and educational elites, as well
as business unionists, realized the value of the engineering of consent to
promote their model for American society. "Wartime propaganda accelerated
the development of opinion molding," said Edward L. Bernays, and interest
groups became aware that "the great public could now perhaps be harnessed
to their cause."5
Essayist C. Wright Mills later outlined the authoritarian potential of the
"opinion business," warning against the power of elite institutional authori-
ties to manipulate cultural symbols of loyalty. The imposition of standards of
thought and behavior on a powerless public could render them merely a
"collectivity of individuals" rather than full participants in a democratic
polity.6 William Graebner points out that the social engineering of early
twentieth-century America implied conscious efforts at control, wherein
teachers, social workers, businessmen, and other avowedly democratic social
engineers attempted to shape the behavior of others who were "unaware of
the totality of what was happening to them." While this type of manipulation
suggests questionable ethics, says Graebner, its practitioners envisioned
social engineering as a democratic process designed to insure responsible
and orderly social behavior. From this process would develop standards,
practices, and values that had withstood the "competition of ideas in the
American marketplace."7
The range of acceptable thought and theory, or the boundaries of the
marketplace of ideas, thus became a central factor in state and private at-
tempts at "Mobilizing the Mind of America."8 Comments by some West Vir-
ginia opinion-makers suggest that the marketplace was restricted, resurrecting
de Toqueville's observation that praise for their institutions was always agree-
able to Americans, and offered as evidence of free speech. Should someone
dare to speak negatively of the country or its institutions, however, permission
to continue was "inexorably refused."9 Governor John J. Cornwell, to illus-
trate, proclaimed in 1919 that there could be no compromise on "questions af-
fecting our form of government or threatening its stability."10 West Virginia
Attorney General E.T. England warned that "free speech does not embrace dis-
loyal utterances against our government" and designated a wide field of intol-
erable utterances. Criticizing official acts and conduct of public officials was
permissible but "criticizing our government . . . is inexcusable." "We must
have," said England, "less disloyalty and less disrespect for the laws, and the
country in which we live. Let our slogan be 'America for Americans.'"11
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Following the standards for distribution of information pioneered
by the Committee on Public Information, the national government sug-
gested guidelines for molding patriotic citizens, whether native or foreign-
born. Morris R Shawkey announced that the U.S. Bureau of Education
had launched an Americanization drive to coordinate the work of agencies
nationwide.12 A War Department bulletin stressed that to guarantee the loy-
alty and respect necessary for social progress and stability, Americans must
be educated about fundamental facts and principles leading to "sound eco-
nomic, social, political and intellectual attitudes." Good citizenship was the
result of each individual's understanding that "growth in productive capac-
ity" was essential. Young men especially must be trained to be "productive
citizens and intrepid soldiers," equipped for industry, commerce, and busi-
ness. Civilian schools and colleges were advised to organize their courses
along military lines, emphasizing common ideas and standards of judgment.
Schools were the logical agencies to "train the potential soldier and citizen"
to adapt his interests to society's requirements.13
Americanization specialist John J. Mahoney declared that the task of
all teachers was the making of Americans. To Mahoney, Americanization im-
plied the formation of proper habits through "review and drill" administered
by teachers who were "American 100 per cent pure."14 The pursuit of pure
teachers led the Morgantown, West Virginia, school district to forbid teach-
ers from dancing, which allegedly would divert their energy and intrude on
their ability to put Morgantown schools "on the highest plane of efficiency."
When the state superintendent of schools declared that a contractual stipu-
lation prohibiting dancing was unenforceable, the Morgantown Board
simply issued a blanket order proscribing dancing."
The national government prepared citizenship texts for the nation's
public schools, principally for use in Americanization classes for the foreign-
born. It encouraged all states to adopt formal Americanization programs.
Many states and municipalities embarked on renewed Americanization pro-
grams after the war.16 West Virginia Superintendent of Schools George M.
Ford, who succeeded Shawkey in 1921, reported that the state Department
of Education had joined with the United States Bureau of Naturalization to
provide Americanization programs in the state. Ford acknowledged the ben-
efits of free text books provided by the Bureau, which would help West Vir-
ginia offset communication barriers with the state's foreign-born, which
drove them "into colonies" and isolated them from influences and associ-
ations "with which they should be related."17
Ford solicited the assistance of private clubs and organizations to assist
in the Americanization of the state's foreign-born.18 In Wheeling, the Ameri-
canization Committee of the Chamber of Commerce secured the cooper-
ation of local employers in establishing immigrant workers' noon meetings,
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which aided in "inclining the foreign-born to our way of doing and think-
ing." The Woman's Club of Weston planned special Americanization pro-
grams for 1922, and the Woman's Club of Thomas had joined forces with
the American Legion in "reaching the foreigner."19 West Virginia chapters of
the Daughters of the American Revolution distributed thousands of copies
of "The American's Creed," and combined English night schools with essay
contests on Patriotic Education and programs on radicalism and "National
Industries, the Outgrowth of National Freedom."20 The chair of the West
Virginia Federation of Women's Clubs (WVFWC) Americanization Division
feared that "the melting pot is not melting" and pledged to devote WVFWC
energies to make the United States "a nation of one people, one language,
and one flag." Mrs. A.L. Lehman recommended incorporating English in-
struction into immigrant women's cooking, sewing, and handicraft classes,
accompanied by lectures and patriotic music to illustrate America's institu-
tions and ideals. Immigrants should be taught to salute the flag and learn
the American's Creed and be discouraged from residing in segregated colo-
nies, where lonesomeness and homesickness would breed discontent, dis-
loyalty, and anarchy.21
The WVFWC acknowledged that Americanization among segregated
pockets of West Virginia's immigrants should be less daunting than many
areas of the country, particularly urban centers where a new immigrant was
inclined to "herd among members of his own nationality."22 Mrs. L.H. Cam-
mack, chair of the WVFWC Department of American Citizenship, reported
that West Virginia was "peculiarly fortunate" in its comparatively small
number of immigrants. Indeed, only about 10 percent of the state's 1.4 mil-
lion residents were foreign born, and many had "long since adopted the
Stars and Stripes and are counted our very best citizens."23
The veiled racial content of even the most benign architects of Ameri-
canization, such as the WVFWC and the WVWCTU, reflected the nativist
impulses of social engineering common to the era. American racial national-
ism, to use Higham's expression, derived from long-established assumptions
among American elites that Anglo-Saxon institutions were uniquely adapted
to political freedom and destined to spread its blessings.24 James Morton
Callahan's convictions about the natural civilizing influences of Anglo-
Saxon culture (see chapter 2) were grounded in fundamental and pervasive
early nationalist sentiments, which had led Alexis de Toqueville to comment
that "Nothing is more embarrassing in the ordinary intercourse of life than
this irritable patriotism of the Americans."25 The political and economic con-
tent of postwar nativism was a legacy of popular reinterpretations of tradi-
tional theories of cultural hierarchy, portrayed as scientific, which selectively
borrowed from Mendelian genetics to proclaim racial purity as a social ideal
under the banner of the eugenics movement. By the time of the Great War,
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the doctrine of Anglo-Saxonism had been formalized in tracts such as Madi-
son Grant's influential The Passing ojthe Great Race.26
Unlike the architects of industrial Americanization, Grant put race
consciousness above national consciousness. Postwar Americanizers left little
doubt, however, about their belief in the natural aptitude of the Anglo-Saxon
character to define universal values and political forms. As a corollary, states
or regions with small immigrant and black populations catered to racial nati-
vism in their campaigns for industrial development in the 1920s. Allen
Tullos notes the race-based strategies used by North Carolina Piedmont busi-
nessmen to attract investment. The Piedmont's population was advertised as
"marked by racial purity and unusually high character." Piedmont whites
were "native-born of old pioneer stock" and "not imbued by un-American
ideas or ideals."27 Likewise, the West Virginia Review, a journal boosting the
state's attractions and business climate, edited by ACA Managing Director
Phil Conley, emphasized the racial homogeneity of West Virginia. In the jour-
nal's first issue, his "The Man from West Virginia" column boasted of the
state's 89.9 percent white population, "the highest percentage of native born
white citizens to be found in any State in the Union." "We are proud of our
mountain people," said The Man, people who represented "the best Anglo-
Saxon blood to be found in America today." Subsequently, an article by Hays
Brown feted West Virginia's "Pure-Blooded Americans." "There is scarcely a
trace of foreign blood to be found," said Brown. With the exception of some
of the coal producing regions, West Virginia was spared the "extended inva-
sion of foreign immigrants." Likewise, "the mountain country has been com-
paratively free from negroes. . . . Negroes have never been in the mountains
to any extent and are not there now."28 The Huntington Chamber of Com-
merce proudly cited government figures indicating that the city's population
was 98 percent American born. Even if Huntington had "no other asset,"
manufacturers would therefore be impressed by the "sterling citizenship of
its laboring population."29
Although the state's relatively small immigrant population reduced
some obstacles, such as pervasive language barriers, to industrial Americani-
zation, the process demanded unifying native and foreign born "in perfect
support of American principles."30 Americanizers should work to assimilate
immigrants, but also bear in mind that the native born must be awakened to
their duty and allegiance to the country.31 Disloyalty was home-grown as
well as imported. Indeed, reported a West Virginia Americanizer, American-
born radicals led the movement to undermine American life and govern-
ment, radicals who must learn "to live in respect and strict obedience to
every law."32 West Virginians were reminded that the 1921 Miners' March,
when the state was "discredited in the eyes of the world," was "inspired by
radical leaders . . . and the distressing fact is that many of them were native
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born West Virginians."33 The WVFWC's director of citizenship training af-
firmed that whether foreign or American-born, proper citizenship was re-
quired "for all classes of Americans. . . . we want them to think as we do,
live as we do, and feel as we do, and have the same hopes that we have for
our country."34
It was partly his background in Americanization work that recom-
mended Philip M. Conley to Edwin Keatley when the latter was looking for
a manager for the American Constitutional Association. Keatley informed
Cornwell that Conley had been "engaged in morale work during the war"
and since had directed education, editing, and Americanization work among
foreigners. When Keatley approached Conley about joining the ACA,
Conley was working for Consolidation Coal Company in the company's
Elkhorn mining district, based in Jenkins, Kentucky.35 Keatley planned for
Conley to work primarily among the teachers and foreign-born workmen of
West Virginia.36
The February 1921 edition of Consolidation's employee magazine an-
nounced that Conley had left Jenkins to accept a lucrative post with the
American Constitutional Association.37 Conley became the only salaried em-
ployee of the ACA, lured from his position with Consolidation by Keatley's
offer of a $6,000 annual salary, remuneration that was equal to or higher
than many West Virginia state officials.38 He began his duties with the ACA
in Charleston on January 1, 1921.39
One of Conley's many public relations duties for the ACA was editing
and distributing the organization's newsletter, The American Citizen, a twice-
monthly publication that first appeared late in 1920.40 Conley envisioned
the newsletter as an aid for Americanization work in mining towns and for
"propaganda against radicalism and bolshevism," telling Keatley The Ameri-
can Citizen could be used "to preach a doctrine of law and order and
Americanism." The American Citizen would be invaluable in ACA efforts to
"develop a national consciousness," and Keatley reported that several large
factories in Wheeling and throughout West Virginia were furnishing em-
ployee lists to the ACA for shipment of the newsletter.41 High schools also
received copies of each edition, and Conley claimed that three thousand
copies of each issue were distributed. The ACA also sent out thousands of
"America First" placards semi-monthly. They contained Americanization
messages to be tacked on bulletin boards in factories, mills, and mines.42
The placards contained "snappy sentences" to arouse Americans to respect
the law and fight "those who are opposed to our Government." Conley
embarked on a whirlwind speaking campaign, addressing the Logan Coal
Operators Association and the Northern West Virginia Coal Operators, who
adopted unanimous resolutions of support for the ACA. He also spoke
before the annual meeting of the West Virginia Manufacturers' Association, a
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meeting of the Kanawha County Bar Association, a meeting of the Hunting-
ton Rotary Club, and a meeting of the county and district superintendents.
His message was especially well-received by the manufacturers, who re-
solved to support the work of the ACA.43
Conley was not alone in his public appearances. Committed to "a
patriotic speaker for every occasion," the ACA formed a speakers bureau
to provide Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions, chambers of commerce, women's clubs,
coal operators' associations, and Sunday school meetings with "four minute
speakers" on law, order, and patriotism themes.44 Founding members of the
ACA anticipated eventually forming a national constituency, providing for a
National Executive Committee to administer national policy for ACAs in
each state. In keeping with these plans, Conley attended a March 1921 meet-
ing in Washington of organizations doing patriotic and civic work, which
founded an advisory body called the National American Council. Conley
proudly announced that the council would probably designate the ACA as
"the official organization to carry on its work in West Virginia."45
Commenting earlier on the impending Washington meeting, Conley
had solicited a testimonial from Dr. I.C. White, West Virginia's most emi-
nent geologist, who praised the efforts of the ACA to "keep alive the flame of
patriotism which swept over the country during the late World War and
which needs constantly to be rekindled in the hearts of the immigrant and
foreign population as well as the home folks." Using a tactic perfected by the
CPI, White was identified only in his professional capacity as state geologist,
while his status as a director of the ACA was not mentioned.46
Perhaps the central maxim of the ACA was that "if real patriotism and
love of country is to be developed in this country, it must be done through
the public schools."47 Conley's commitment to work in the public schools
had personal antecedents. Before serving in the army in France during the
war, Conley had been superintendent of public schools in Marion County,
West Virginia. While director of welfare work for Consolidation Coal in Jen-
kins, Conley had also been superintendent of schools (white and colored) in
the Elkhorn District, where his accomplishments included night Americani-
zation schools, the introduction of industrial training, and the expansion of
domestic science programs in the communities of Burdine, McRoberts,
Dunham, and Jenkins.48 It is likely that Conley's background in school ad-
ministration served him well in his cordial association with West Virginia
Superintendent of Schools George M. Ford, who appointed Conley director
of Americanization work in the public schools. Ford also designated Conley
"Supervisor of Citizenship and Thrift," and in March 1921 the ACA moved
from its office on Hale Street in Charleston to the headquarters of the state
Department of Education.49 In exchange for office space, postage, steno-
graphic help, and telephone service, the ACA organized a school banking
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system, arranged school essay contests on patriotic subjects, and supervised
patriotic and civic instruction in the public schools.50 The ACA's partnership
with the schools therefore realized the pronouncement by Professor Robert A.
Armstrong that Americanism must be taught both by the schools and
"among many men in high places of trust and profit." The ACA's arrange-
ment with the schools, Conley informed the ACA Executive Committee,
would enable the organization "to reach the adults through the medium of
the children."51
The ACA's entree to the state's educational system, however, also in-
cluded direct contact with the most important of that system's adults, the
teachers. Conley and Ford arranged for the ACA to provide speakers at each
county teachers institute in the summer of 1921. Conley reported that the
ACA's vision of "American Ideals" could potentially reach eleven thousand
teachers through the institutes.52 Institute schedules for 1921 show that
practically every county institute included a weekly address on "American
Ideals," emphasizing the ACA perspective on property rights, abolition of
caste and class, and adequate reward for labor by "special instructors" from
the open-shop organization.53 The ACA described these ideals as "the civic
and political religion of this great nation." At their 1921 institute, Mineral
County teachers denounced "Bolshevistic tendencies" in the state and ad-
vised comprehensive teaching of Americanism, good citizenship, and mo-
rality to alleviate the problem.54
As part of its public school agenda, the ACA initiated essay contests in
West Virginia high schools. With Ford's blessing, Conley secured the co-
operation of high school principals for the contests, the first of which offered
prizes totaling $60.00 for the four top essays observing George Washington's
birthday. The ACA Executive Committee selected the topics, and Conley re-
ported that 576 students from forty-seven high schools participated. The
winner, Mabel West of Lost Creek, West Virginia, chose "Americanism: What
it Means" from the list of four approved topics and impressed the judges
with her declaration that "We do not want any hyphenated Americans. We
want red-blooded Americans who are willing to serve."55
School essay contests were commonly used by business and patriotic
organizations to secure a presence in the schools' daily routine. School ad-
ministrators recoiled from the potential class alliances implied by labor un-
ionism in the schools, but they usually welcomed civic-minded organizations
that avowedly refrained from partisan politics and encouraged patriotism and
habits of industry in the public interest above narrow concerns. The Bluefield
Chamber of Commerce, which carried the banner of the American Plan-open-
shop movement, could therefore deny the political content of its position and
gain access to public schools through an essay contest entitled "What a
Chamber of Commerce Means to Bluefield."56
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Writing in The Nation, F.B. Kaye chided the apolitical presumptions in-
herent in an Americanism that depended on "emotional debauchery" and
"mass conditioning" rather than natural, familial feelings of love for country.
The "intolerant patrioteering" of middle-class Americanization sweeping the
country, said Kaye, was an educational menace expressing a "bigoted objec-
tion to things unexperienced" and "hatred of the uncongenial." Americani-
zers were in fact doing a disservice to the children in public schools, seeking
to implant actions and opinions that reinforced narrow provincialism rather
than helping pupils develop independent vision. True belief in freedom of
thought, said Kaye, depended on resisting intolerance, overcoming unthink-
ing habits and fears, and abandoning "the egoism which makes us sanctify
our own reactions."57 De Toqueville wrote that an American felt obliged to
defend whatever was censured in his country, "for it is not only his country
that is then attacked, it is himself. The consequence is that his national pride
resorts to a thousand artifices and descends to all the petty tricks of personal
vanity." Similarly, Kaye identified postwar middle-class Americanism as es-
sentially a form of conceit:
Self-conceit, its direct gratification inhibited by civilization, finds
indirect methods of indulging itself. Thus, the flattery that would embar-
rass a man if aimed directly at him is quite acceptable to him if given to
the body of which he is a member, every man freely taking for himself
the praise given to all collectively. To some extent, therefore, patriotism
serves to gratify egoism; and the same bias that prevents a conceited man
from remodeling himself helps to fix a nation of uneducated patriots in
ultra-conservatism. Another element which enters into rendering naive
patriotism the mere tool of popular prejudice is the universal resistance
to breaking habits of any kind. Thus it comes that an undiscriminating
campaign for patriotism may become a campaign for conceit, provincial-
ism, and intolerance—for a state of mind of passionate self-satisfaction,
to which all things American are of equal perfection and importance—
Southern chivalry and Southern lynchings, Kentucky bluegrass and
Massachusetts blue laws.58
The Nation later singled out patriotic essay contests in public schools as
examples of the egoism of provincial Americanism, homing in on a favorite
target, the American Legion, which described itself as "wholly altruistic." In
fact, the Legion orated that never had a society or organization been formed
"with a holier, more unselfish, more patriotic purpose than the American
Legion." The Legion's access to public schools, The Nation reported, rein-
forced its assumption that it was an adjunct to the government of the United
States. The Nation's editors hoped school administrators would begin to
reject the essay contests, in which school children "are not invited to choose
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their own side of the question, as in a debate. They are simply told to argue
for a bit of prearranged propaganda," such as the Legion's 1923 topic, "Why
America Should Prohibit Immigration for Five Years."59
Despite these protestations, the American Legion was a pervasive force
in public schools nationwide. One of Phil Conley's first steps as managing
director of the ACA was to establish a working relationship with Dr. J.L.
Coulter, director of Americanization work for the Legion in West Virginia.60
Morris P. Shawkey praised the unflinching "crusade against disloyalty" car-
ried on by the Legion, predicting that the veterans' group would be a "domi-
nant influence for decades to come."61 Waitman Barbe welcomed the Legion
as a powerful ally of the public schools. National Legion Commander Alvin
Owsley told delegates to the 1921 AFL convention that the Legion sup-
ported responsible and patriotic labor organizations and stood against "the
autocracy of both the classes and masses." There was but one kind of accept-
able loyalty, said Owsley, "and that is the loyalty that we of the Legion have
adopted: undivided allegiance to the American government." The men of
the Legion would tolerate no disorder. Having saved the nation in the war,
they assumed the right to protect it in troubled peacetime.62
The American Legion was founded by a small group of American war
veterans in Paris in the spring of 1919.63 The West Virginia Legion began at a
meeting in Charleston on May 3, 1919, called by Lieutenant Colonel Jack-
son Arnold of Weston. Arnold, who was West Virginia's first state police su-
perintendent, had attended the founding caucus in Paris and became West
Virginia's first Legion commander. The West Virginia branch was founded as
part of an intensive national organizational campaign and a furious publicity
drive, leading to the Legion's first national convention in Minneapolis in
November 1919.64 The five-month media campaign was directed by public
relations wizard Ivy Lee, who had impressed corporate leaders with his deft
crisis management for Standard Oil after the 1913 Ludlow Massacre. For
$7,500 a month, Lee promoted the Legion through three hundred thousand
poster displays and by advertising in every newspaper in the country with a
circulation of over 150,000 or more.65 F.B. Kaye disparagingly remarked in
The Nation that the Legion considered itself part of the U.S. government; if
so, the members were not far wrong. The War Department pledged recogni-
tion and assistance to the Legion in August 1919, and the Congress be-
stowed a federal charter on the organization, which sanctioned the Legion as
the legitimate representative of American war veterans. Legion publications
were printed by the Government Printing Office, and the War Department
issued guns to Legion posts "for ceremonial purposes."66
During the Red Scare-steel strike period, state and national politicians
courted the Legion's favor. Every Legion post was urged to protect "consti-
tuted government authorities," and preserve law and order in times of public
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crisis. Wellsburg, West Virginia, Legionnaires volunteered to help keep order
during the 1919 coal strike, responding to Cornwell's plea for committees of
public aid and safety.67 Although Legionnaires spoke highly of patriotic
union men, they sometimes served as strikebreakers. The Legion was a pre-
dominantly middle-class organization, suspicious of change, disorder, and
challenges to private property. This fear often took the form of hostility to
industrial unionism.68 William Pencak, the organization's most recent his-
torian, says the Legion adopted a worst-case scenario in assessing domestic
radicalism. The Legion's definition of un-American encompassed a broad
spectrum of suspected subversives, ranging well beyond actual radicals and
social revolutionaries. Although the Legion preferred using legal means to
fight subversion, members' willingness to encroach upon civil liberties and
stifle dissent in the name of law and order was consistent with elite stand-
ards, which regarded the law mainly as guarantor of property rights and cus-
tomary power relationships.69 The concept of law as primarily a stabilizing
force, rather than as mainly the defender of free expression, was at the core
of one of the era's most omnipresent slogans, "Liberty is not license."™
The Legion was not without early challengers for the power to offi-
cially represent the rights and interests of World War veterans. Its most
meaningful early rival was a radical left group, the Private Soldiers and Sail-
ors Legion, more commonly called the World War Veterans. Allied with the
Industrial Workers of the World and the Farmers' Non-Partisan League, the
World War Veterans sought to place bread-and-butter veterans' rights issues
within a broad context of reform and social justice.71 The organization de-
manded that the government provide jobs for all veterans, distribute unused
mining, agricultural, and timber lands to World War veterans, and punish
incompetent military officers. The World War Veterans scorned the Ameri-
can Legion as the tool of "monopoly and privilege," called by one "a gang of
officers and dog robbers."72
A West Virginia member of the World War Veterans drew the attention
of the American Constitutional Association in 1922, and the statements of
the open-shop organization suggest both the Americanizers' defensiveness
about the country's institutions, observed by de Toqueville, and the collec-
tive conceit scorned by F.B. Kaye. Lawson McMillan of Rivesville, near Fair-
mont, reportedly told delegates to a World War Veterans convention in St.
Paul that coal miners in some parts of West Virginia were subject to the arbi-
trary power of their employers and the intimidations of "gunmen and
thugs." The ACA claimed that if McMillan had demonstrable evidence to
back up his charges, he should present it to the appropriate authorities, not
broadcast it nationally, adding that McMillan did not pass muster as a loyal
citizen of "one of the greatest States in the American Union." A St. Paul busi-
nessman cautioned Governor Ephraim F Morgan in 1923 that the World
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War Veterans were active in West Virginia, based on a letter from West Vir-
ginia Veterans in an issue of the Voice of Labor, a radical newspaper." The
World War Veterans claimed seven hundred thousand members, but Pencak
concludes this is a vastly inflated claim. (The American Legion had 843,013
dues-paying members by 1920.) Even if the organization initially drew large
numbers, it was soon overpowered by the American Legion's government
and financial support, its sophisticated "100 percent Americanism" public
relations campaigns, and the Red Scare.74
The American Legion was welcomed into the nation's public school-
rooms on the strength of its status as a "non-partisan and non-political"
patriotic organization." The Legion's Americanism commission included a
speaker's bureau, through which the Legion sought to instill Americanism
"by creating public sentiment in our favor." The Legion identified the West
Virginia Education Association and the American Constitutional Association
as two of more than a hundred civic organizations that had joined the
Legion annually in sponsoring "American Education Week," which began in
1921. The Legion grandly identified American Education Week as a na-
tional institution, although some other commentators were less impressed.76
Charles H. Ambler charged that the postwar surge of patriotism, which he
termed "reactionary," was marked by an increasing number of observances
and holidays that actually reduced the efficiency of school systems. The
Charleston Daily Mail complained during American Education Week that
one's patriotism seemed to be determined by being "thoroughly devoted to
observing every thing appointed to be observed." The AFL accused "re-
actionary interests" such as the American Legion, Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, National Association of Manufacturers, National Security
League, and National American Council of seizing control of public educa-
tion to influence the public schools against workers and progressive social
movements.77
Leading West Virginia educators either did not hear or dismissed such
criticism, particularly when directed against the American Legion. The West
Virginia School Journal called upon community newspapers, churches, cham-
bers of commerce, and social clubs to observe American Education Week.
The basic program, the WVS] explained, was prepared by the American
Legion, the National Education Association, and the U.S. Bureau of Educa-
tion, with emphasis on topics such as "America first," "The red flag means
danger," and "Stamp out revolutionary radicalism."78 The WVSJ promoted
the 1923 Legion essay contest, which allegedly attracted more than three
hundred thousand entries nationwide and encouraged West Virginia stu-
dents to participate in 1924, when the topic would be "Why Communism Is
a Menace to Americanism."79
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Waitman Barbe told readers of the WVSJ that educators everywhere
welcomed the cooperation of the American Legion. In a revealing passage,
Barbe commented:
The American Legion is one of the most powerful organizations in
the country, and it is going to be much more powerful than it is now.
More truly, perhaps, than any other body of men, it will run this country
for the next forty years. With this fact [emphasis added] in mind, it is
highly gratifying to see the attitude taken by the Legion in the matter of
public education; it places the school as the foundation of Americanism.
Barbe continued that, in the words of the Legion, the school "is to the nation,
in peace, what the barracks are in war. In it is developed the nation's char-
acter."80
Barbe's statement reflects the overlay of the tenets of scientific man-
agement and public relations. The social application of scientific manage-
ment combined ideology and practice that were designed to create a
political economy of facts and law, under the guidance of specially trained
managers.81 Walter Lippmann's model for molding public opinion relied on
the persuasive powers of trained experts, who were linked as dispensers of
facts to the general public by responsible leaders in positions of organiza-
tional authority, to create consent.82 The shibboleths of scientific manage-
ment endowed facts with the aura of "objective data," free of partisanship or
self-interest and therefore incontrovertible.8' Barbe's expression of a clearly
personal opinion about the American Legion—"More truly, perhaps, than
any other body of men, it will run this country for the next forty years"—he
immediately proclaimed as fact, endowing his claim with objectivity and ef-
fectively removing it from the realm of debate. Barbe apparently denied or
ignored the idea that facts had political content and could be organized to
serve particular social interests. His colleague Joseph Marsh, however, later
implicitly acknowledged the social and political power of "organized facts."
School children in West Virginia and across the nation, said Marsh, required
"more drill on the facts needed to back up our theories and practices in
government and in life."84
Waitman Barbe contended that the American Legion was fighting
a great struggle to unite loyal Americans, striving for "as great a victory as
any victory won by its members on the fields of Europe."85 In that struggle,
patriotic organizations such as the Legion and the American Constitutional
Association projected a social vision drawn from diverse but overlapping
dimensions of Americanism. These dimensions are outlined in historian
Gary Gerstle's complex paradigm of Americanism, which he describes as
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nationalist, democratic, progressive, and traditionalist. The nationalist im-
pulse focused on America's uniqueness and the mythology of American re-
ligious, military, and political heroes. The democratic dimension embraced
the ideals of a just society, such as democracy and freedom. The progressive
impulse praised the "ever-improving character" of American society, based
on technological advances and scientific social relations, to create abun-
dance and reduce social conflict. Finally, traditionalist Americanism rested
upon the ideals of Anglo-Saxon Protestant virtue as the model for the good
society. Traditionalist Americanism, says Gerstle, "infused movements of re-
ligious fundamentalism, anticommunism, racism, nativism, and imperialism
with extraordinary patriotic passion."86
While drawing from all of these dimensions, middle-class American-
ism as expressed by groups like the ACA and the American Legion were
firmly rooted in the nationalist and traditionalist impulses, legitimated by
subordinate rhetorical elements from the democratic and progressive dimen-
sions to essentially preserve and strengthen established society. To the Legion
and the ACA, the nation and the community were identified with the status
quo. Freedom did not imply "defiance of communal norms or the right to
criticize the legitimacy of established society."87 The Legion and the ACA,
therefore, naturally joined forces in West Virginia to win hearts and minds
"through the medium of the children" and to expel from public discourse
alien theories of Americanism espoused by competing interest groups like
the American Civil Liberties Union. The Legion, the ACA, and their allies
sought the national "integral unity" suggested by Woodrow Wilson's descrip-
tion of liberty as the freedom to be a piston in an efficient engine.88
Conversely, the ACLU defined freedom as the "unfettered right of dis-
gruntled elements to offer alternative visions of America's future." To state
officials, the Legion, and the ACA, then, when the ACLU launched a free
speech drive in West Virginia in 1923, it did so in the interests of "engender-
ing class hatred and fomenting civil strife and disorder."85 The ACLU's West
Virginia campaign was designed to help miners in southern West Virginia
win union recognition. The campaign culminated in March 1923, when sev-
eral ACLU representatives spoke on the courthouse steps in Logan. The
courthouse speeches were a direct challenge to Logan County's dictatorial
sheriff, Don Chafin, who had threatened to prevent the ACLU members
from speaking. Chafin chose not to interfere, however, perhaps thwarting
ACLU expectations of arrests, which would have further dramatized the
free-speech fight.90
The ACLU's campaign was thoroughly assaulted by various interests in
the state. The ACA identified ACLU activist Roger Baldwin as a "near-Bolshevist"
and warned that the ACLU advocated such un-American ideas as a guaran-
teed minimum wage. Governor Morgan was receiving police reports of IWW
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literature being distributed in Logan County, and Baldwin's record of cham-
pioning the Wobblies in earlier free-speech struggles on the West Coast no
doubt contributed to the savaging he endured from West Virginia patriots.91
Phil Conley issued a series of circulars concerning the ACLU and other "radi-
cal activities in West Virginia" to a "selected list of thinking citizens" of the
state. One circular disengenuously claimed that the ACA was uninterested in
the matter of "unionizing Southern West Virginia. . . .  That is a controversy
between the coal operators and the United Mine Workers." It further scored
the ACLU for advocating resistance to a court injunction prohibiting their
scheduled Logan meeting, calling it a mob of "Lenine [sic] and Trotsky types
who feel the responsibility of enforcing the laws in West Virginia."92
Governor Morgan spearheaded the vigorous counterattack against
ACLU charges that Logan County miners were denied the right to discuss un-
ionism and were physically intimidated by Chafin's officers. Morgan, as "ser-
vant of all the people," claimed the support of "the truthful, law-supporting
citizens of our great progressive state" who agreed with him that the ACLU
and its sympathizers were "destructive and un-American." Newspapers car-
ried the governor's missives, eliciting statewide praise from businessmen and
other patriots.93 An anonymous supporter congratulated Morgan for standing
up to "that Red-Neck, Russian organization." The National Association of
Manufacturers applauded Morgan's stance in an article in Industrial Progress;
across Morgan's copy of the article is a handwritten note from Phil Conley,
stating that "This is the kind of publicity we need." West Virginia American
Legion Commander Spiller Hicks also commended Morgan for his stand
against the ACLU, which was "composed of communists, anarchists, slackers
and draft evaders.'""
Morgan, the Legion, and the ACA also received support from John L.
Lewis of the UMWA, whose iron-union discipline extended to severe restric-
tions on free speech. As the ACLU was making ready for its Logan meetings,
UMW officers in Pennsylvania's District 5 refused permission to Alex Howat
for a protest against UMWA international officers.95 The AFL, with the con-
sent of an ailing Samuel Gompers, portrayed the ACLU as procommunist
and anti-American, accusing many of its leading figures—such as Baldwin,
Norman Thomas, and Scott Nearing—of engaging in "parlor Bolshevik
movements."96 The UMW] warned that communist propaganda was being
spread among the miners of West Virginia, and attacked Lewis rival John
Brophy for encouraging Bolshevik policies and principles in UMWA District
2. Working through the pen of UMW] editor Ellis Searles, Lewis accused
Brophy of promoting nationalization of the coal industry through an alliance
with the ACLU's "Greenwich Village coal diggers."97
Even after the ACLU controversy died down in Logan County, West
Virginians were advised to be on guard against the ACLU's "so-called
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reformers, liberal thinkers, bolshevists, I.W.W's and other government de-
stroying agents who live on money collected in various ways for propaganda
purposes." Phil Conley, writing in the West Virginia Review, warned that
radicals came in the guise not only of disenchanted bomb throwers, but as
intelligent, educated thinkers, trained in the arts of public speaking and per-
suasion. The West Virginia Review described itself as neutral in politics, re-
ligion, and other areas of controversy, and "not a cheap and flamboyant
purveyor of propaganda," but it did not contain its alarmist attacks on the
ACLU. Conley warned that Baldwin, Ward, Nearing, William Z. Foster, and
other such men were "detrimental to the best interests- of this government,"
and good citizens must develop "an awakened consciousness relative to the
menace" they represented.98
By 1924 the vision of Americanism shared by the ACA and the Ameri-
can Legion was well-established, in West Virginia and nationally. The ACLU
still called the Legion "the most active agency in intolerance and repression
in the United States," but The Nation noted that the Legion had moderated its
early dependence on violent extralegal intimidation of alleged enemies of the
state.w Much of the Legion's agenda for a well-ordered America was accom-
plished politically, in coalition with other patriotic groups, who influenced
the adoption of loyalty and antisedition legislation to stifle the expression of
speech or action that advocated fundamental changes in American institu-
tions. Pencak suggests that the Legion "might well have been more violent
had it not accomplished so much within the limits of American democ-
racy."100 In West Virginia the institutionalization of the Legion-ACA brand of
Americanism was symbolized by legislation in 1923 establishing loyalty
guidelines for teachers and patriotic instruction in the schools. The efforts of
the ACA, the Morgan administration, and the educational establishment in
West Virginia to guarantee loyalty and obedience to their model of American-
ism, in the context of the anticipated expansion of industrial capitalism, en-
dowed industrial Americanization with spiritual authority.
8
The Sanctification of
Industrial Americanization
In 1918 Interior Secretary Franklin K. Lane told teachers assembled in Pitts-
burgh that Americanism must become a "political religion," and that every
boy, factory, and dollar must be given to "the service of Christian civilization"
to win the war and transmit American ideals. In 1921 Phil Conley told West
Virginia teachers assembled in Huntington that "American ideals are the
civic and political religion of the United States." It was the primary job of
teachers to "plant in the plastic minds and hearts of the boys and girls in the
public schools the impressions that make them citizens." Training for citi-
zenship was "the ultimate end and sole justification" for the expenditure of
public money on education. The foundation of America's civic and political
religion, said Conley, included adequate reward for labor, property rights,
and freedom of speech and press. "So long as it is not seditious," Conley af-
firmed, "the press has unlimited power."1
Conley's work with the ACA demonstrated the maxim voiced by Her-
bert Hoover in 1920 that only by the manipulation of propaganda could the
American public be educated in the ideals of democracy. Likewise, Conley
was in accord with the statement by Edward L. Bernays that the age of mass
production required a technique not only for distribution of goods, but also
"for the mass distribution of ideas. Public opinion can be moved, directed,
and formed by such a technique." The conscious, intelligent manipulation
of the people's habits and opinions, said Bernays, was an important element
in democratic society.2 The technique for sanctifying industrial Americani-
zation rested on combining consistent training in institutional settings, pri-
marily schools, with ritualistic expressions of the emotional dimension of
the ideology. William Pencak notes that the American Legion instilled patri-
otism with symbols and ceremonies rather than intellectual principles. The
importance of ritual in creating an atmosphere in which America's civil re-
ligion could flourish was part of the consciousness of the Legion and other
civic and patriotic organizations. The devotion to manipulation of symbols
allowed their vision of Americanism to thrive, even in communities "that
had never seen a red or a Wobbly."3
As part of its campaign to match ritualistic devotion with systematic
training in schools, the American Constitutional Association inaugurated
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America First Day in 1921. Held annually in the early 1920s on the Sunday
of or before July 4, America First Day was conceived to "develop a national
consciousness" of loyalty and cooperation, to build a "greater and better
nation." Each year the association approached ministers, Sunday school
superintendents, and other community leaders to discuss American ideals.
It provided a guidebook prepared by prominent citizens outlining topical
presentations.4 The ACA also secured the cooperation of other patriotic and
civic organizations, such as the Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions clubs.5 The West
Virginia Federation of Women's Clubs joined with the "Constitutional Asso-
ciation . . . to have American Ideals preached from every pulpit in the State
on Sunday, July 2nd [1922]."6
Governor Ephraim E Morgan also endorsed America First Day, issuing
annual proclamations to be read in church and Sunday school services
and special meetings across the state. Whether the nation could "overcome
the storm of radicalism and other destructive movements," he declared,
depended on Americans' reconsecration to "the full duties of citizenship."
Morgan implored West Virginians to "hold a steady course, have faith in
your government, and stand firm for order and a strict enforcement of the
laws."7 For the inaugural America First Day in 1921, the mayor of Wheeling
called upon the people to "renew their pledges of patriotism and their cov-
enants of loyalty" to defeat forces that "threaten the very existence of organ-
ized society, and law and order." A Wheeling minister decried the disloyalty
and contempt in America for the law and agents of the law, contending that
"obedience to the law is liberty."8 The president of the West Virginia Sunday
School Association linked God's grace with the freedom to acquire material
comforts in a country that guaranteed "every liberty and every opportunity
that any right thinking man can ask." Edwin M. Keatley equated good citi-
zenship with Christianity, intoning that American Christians comprised the
nation's most substantial citizens. True Christians and loyal citizens could
demonstrate "pure Americanism" by obeying the laws and by insisting that
others do likewise.9
Accurate figures on the observation of America First Day are impos-
sible to determine. The ACA distributed postcards to Sunday school superin-
tendents, asking them to report on their patriotic observations. It is possible,
though not demonstrable, that the organization's estimates of America First
Day demonstrations were influenced by the number of cards sent out as well
as by the number of cards returned. Morris E Shawkey had employed a simi-
lar tactic in estimating wartime patriotic discussions at Parent-Teacher Asso-
ciation meetings, simply multiplying the number of organizations statewide
by the number of weekly or semimonthly meetings, to arrive at an "idea of
the amount of discussion and the number of people reached."10 By providing
the state's media with information and with no countervailing agency to
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challenge (or confirm) its claims, the ACA established its estimate of partici-
pation as fact. Its practice of flooding state newspapers with press releases,
particularly when the state's chief executive was involved, insured that the
celebrations became "news." The ACA claimed that over a thousand meetings
were held statewide in 1921. One ACA "news story" sent to every newspaper
in the state estimated that over three thousand meetings were held on Amer-
ica First Day in 1922, in nearly every section of the state." In 1923, Conley
claimed, over four thousand meetings were held.12 Many newspapers carried
the governor's annual proclamation of America First Day and reported that
the day was widely observed. An ACA press release affirmed that governors
in nine states intended to observe America First Day in 1922, with several
other chief executives considering the matter.13
The ACA's tactics of mobilization can be inferred from the organiza-
tion's recruitment of Andrew Price of Pocahontas County as county chair-
man of the 1922 America First Day observations. Price was one of the
county's most respected and influential citizens. He had served as the first
mayor of Marlinton, was the lawyer for the bank of Marlinton, and a corpo-
rate land attorney for many regional and national timber, land, and resource
companies. Price was also a naturalist, historian, essayist, and poet who was
often called "the Sage of Pocahontas." In 1892 the Price family purchased
the Pocahontas Times and Andrew Price became its editor. His brother Calvin
succeeded him in that position in 1900, when Price turned his full-time at-
tention to a thriving law practice. Andrew Price remained a columnist and
contributing editor until his death in 1930. Price was active in Democratic
politics and was Pocahontas County's chairman of Four-Minute Men during
the war.14
Edwin M. Keatley acting as president of the American Constitutional
Association, approached Price to be Pocahontas County chairman for the
1922 America First observances. "We are passing through one of the most
critical periods of our history," Keatley wrote to Price. "Bolshevists, I.WW.'s
and other radicals" had brought "unrest and discontent on every hand."
Keatley had no doubt that Price, a loyal American, would do his part as a
citizen, and he enclosed an ACA plan for arousing public interest in the
counties. Price accepted the responsibility, and Keatley later told him that
thirteen other states were following West Virginia's lead in the matter of
public displays of patriotism. Each minister in the state was sent a copy of
Morgan's proclamation and a copy of the ACA American Ideals bulletin.
Furthermore, each Sunday school superintendent received a suggested pa-
triotic program from the ACA.15
The ACA recommended that county chairmen encourage local minis-
ters to prepare a special sermon on American ideals or to invite a lay speaker
to preach on that subject. Churches should be decorated with American
138 The Americanization of West Virginia
flags, and patriotic songs should be sung. The local American Legion post,
DAR chapter, Colonial Dames, Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lion's clubs should be
asked to cooperate and include patriotic programs at their meetings prior to
America First Day. Each citizen should be asked to wear a small American
flag in his buttonhole. All local newspapers should be contacted, and chair-
men should "explain the plan fully to the editors, and give them information
from time to time" about the planned ceremonies.16
Price energetically pursued plans for Pocahontas County. He supple-
mented the ACA's guidelines with an address he prepared for all pastors and
Sunday school superintendents in the county, requesting that "some bright
boy or girl memorize it and deliver it" on America First Day. Price's memori-
zation exercise declared that "Americans were the people chosen" to hold
"aloft the light that enlightened the world." Furthermore, the American ex-
perience had proven that "it is an advantage to be born poor. . . . Nearly all
successful men were born poor. It is the land of opportunity." America's
greatness depended, said Price, on loyalty and truth being taught in the
schools and Sunday schools. Those schools would produce the patriots and
citizens who would "continue the good work."17
Keatley was delighted with Price's circular, and requested fifty-four
copies from Price to send to each county chairman.18 The Price family news-
paper, the Pocahontas Times, carried Governor Morgan's proclamation of
America First Day directly above an announcement by Marlinton's mayor,
Norman R. Price, that the citizens of Marlinton should observe the day in an
appropriate manner. The Times reported Price's communique to the church
administrators, announcing that "every Sunday school in Pocahontas County
has been requested to sound the note of patriotism in their service that day."
For good measure, Price's circular was reproduced in the paper. The Times
also noted that the Wesley Chapel in Hillsboro would observe America First
Day with a sermon entitled "A Study in Patriotism," linking "certain funda-
mental principles in the life of Jesus" to one's national patriotic obligations.19
On America First Day, some churches in the state displayed the American
flag next to the Christian flag, whose white field represented peace and
purity, and congregations recited the Christian pledge "to the Saviour for
whose Kingdom it stands." The Pocahontas Times denigrated "loose tongued
and irresponsible persons" who rejected the "plan of civilized life that has
brought so much peace, prosperity, happiness and contentment" to the
American people, but pointed out that the response to Morgan's America
First Day proclamation revealed the minimal levels of disaffection in the
country. After all, the requests by ACA organizers for public expressions of
loyalty had elicited not "a doubtful word or a hostile gesture."20
Given the saturation of nationalistic Americanism, it is unlikely that
many "discontented cranks" in Pocahontas County would venture to raise "a
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false clamor against our country." The Times announced that to the
"common people," the question of national loyalty was beyond debate; to
them, patriotism was "bred in the bone."21 Faith in the common people to
act independently for the well-being of the nation, however, was not often
shared by the managers of industrial Americanization. Theorists of efficient
social engineering saw the middle-class as the natural agency of social devel-
opment, which required the coordination of national life steered in such a
fashion as to "integrate, streamline, and provide efficient direction." Indus-
try and society could be intentionally arranged to effect a unified, intelligent
democracy, in which the acceptable habits of industry and cooperation
would become part of the peoples' consciousness. Industrial Americanizers
ignored or discounted the fact that the top-down inculcation of industrial
habits, compulsory patriotism, and scientific management in all spheres of
modern life imposed a hierarchical arrangement of discipline and depend-
ence, which were "hardly the habits of a sovereign populace."22
Essentially, the orderly vision of efficient, hierarchical industrial Ameri-
canization amounted to the elite determination of and planning for the na-
tional interest, a process that was called "guided" or "directed democracy" in
Italy in the 1920s. In fact, Commander Alvin Owsley of the American Legion
identified the Legion's readiness to defend American institutions as identical
to the Italian Fascisti's use of terror against leftist radicals. Owsley told Texas
Legionnaires that "the Fascisti are to Italy what the American Legion is to the
United States" and endorsed a Legion takeover of the government if subver-
sives gained undue influence. Legion spokesman John McQuigg said Fascisti
aims and ideals, if not their methods, were identical to those of the American
Legion.23
Neither the Legion nor other nationalistic Americanizers fully and
systematically adopted the Fascist rejection of parliamentary/representative
democracy, or its embrace of centralized social and productive power in the
political machinery of the national state. Practically, industrial Americaniza-
tion rendered the political state secondary in power to business and industry,
leaving American devotion to private property, a noninterventionist national
state, and free enterprise incompatible with a Fascist model. Moreover, as
Pencak demonstrates, many of the hierarchical goals of the Legion, the ACA,
and their civic and political allies were achieved by the absorption of their
principles into the postwar American political economy.24 This type of elite
social control is based not upon physical force but on strategies for deter-
mining the parameters of the psychological and ideological development of
the public.25 When E.D. Knight of Kayford, West Virginia, praised the "value
of the indirect approach to mine problems," symbolized by welfare capital-
ism, he anticipated by more than four decades a U.S. government document
promoting a "system of pressurized guidance," or the "American or indirect
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way" of accomplishing adherence to elite values, which in totalitarian coun-
tries is accomplished by force.26
Guided democracy and industrial Americanization depended upon
the peoples' acceptance that they were bound by standardized, uniform
"claims of morality and right upon conscience or conduct." William Walton
told an audience at the West Virginia School for the Blind that too many
Americans believed liberty meant license, and that the "principles of pure
living should be so thoroughly emphasized" that "the higher life of the
nation" would be promoted. Education should teach and instill loyalty, de-
veloping the moral strength of the nation. Walton feared that these qualities
were lacking, because the education received by many Americans was not
"the right type."" Phil Conley suggested the totality of the challenge to edu-
cators when he described West Virginia's greatest need as "a State con-
sciousness." Conley identified the interests of the people with those of
corporations. West Virginia would be unified only when the "manufactur-
ing interests, the coal interests, the agricultural interests, the gas interests,
the oil interests . . .  join hands for the good of the whole." Conley did not
include organized labor.28
Governor Morgan proclaimed the crucial role of educators in creating
the modern industrial state when he addressed the West Virginia Education
Association in 1921. Speaking on "The State and the New Education," Morgan
affirmed:
Let me say to the members of this association that, regardless of
the great progress made in our system of education, the greatest field
for the application of your energy is in the teaching of Americanism to
the youth of this land. Americanism means respect for American laws,
American ideals, and American institutions. It means respect for the
constituted authorities, obedience to law and the preservation of order.
I want to urge that you men and women reconsecrate yourselves to the
teaching of a loftier and more exalted Americanism in the schools of
this state and that your influence as citizens be extended to the adult
population of your communities in striving to inculcate the gospel of
Americanism among our people.
There is at present throughout the country, and in West Virginia of
much greater magnitude than is generally known, an insidious effort to
array every man who toils with his hands as an enemy of organized
government. . . . The purpose of the campaign is plain. It would create
unrest and discontent and make the workman an enemy of his govern-
ment, the best that has ever been devised by mankind for the protection
of the weak and less fortunate.
Forces of this character are what the school teacher must combat in
many of our communities, but, equipped with a knowledge of the pro-
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gressive achievements of this country, the manifest desire of every patri-
otic citizen to do equal and exact justice, I have no fear of the outcome.
It developed during the world war that there were employed in
many of the public educational institutions throughout the country
teachers and professors who were not in sympathy and accord with our
form of government. I do not know whether West Virginia has among
her teaching fraternity any of those who may be imbued with these un-
American ideas or not. I want to go on record as being unalterably op-
posed to the employment of any teacher or instructor, male or female,
in any of the educational institutions of this state who is not one hun-
dred percent American. Only those who stand ready to combat the
dangerous, deceptive, blighting, socialistic communistic bolshevistic
doctrines that are being disseminated throughout the country, striking
at every foundation of our free institutions, should be entrusted with
training the youths of the America of tomorrow.29
The American Constitutional Association believed warnings of subver-
sion among schoolteachers were overstated, estimating that there were prob-
ably less than one thousand disloyal American teachers. If citizens had
information about teachers who were radical, however, they should expose
them publicly, and refrain from implicating innocent teachers. In support of
this position, the ACA encouraged the West Virginia legislature's efforts to
ferret out the disloyal.30 Not willing to trust to the "bred in the bone" patriot-
ism of West Virginia teachers, Governor Morgan supported a 1923 law
introduced by Senator Wright Hugus, a Wheeling Republican, to institu-
tionalize the teaching of patriotism and citizenship in public schools. A
companion bill was introduced by Delegate ¥. Guy Ash, a Morgantown
Democrat, requiring loyalty oaths for teachers. Both bills were passed. The
West Virginia laws, and those of several other states, replicated New York
legislation that emerged from that state's wartime Lusk Laws against treason
and sedition, compelling demonstrable loyalty and obedience to the state by
teachers.31
Education historian Lewis Paul Todd emphasizes even earlier antece-
dents to the national burgeoning of patriotic legislation in the early 1920s.
The Spanish-American War, says Todd, had opened Americans' eyes to im-
perial possibilities and stimulated the sentiment of nationalism. Nationalistic
Americanism took the form of courses of study and manuals on patriotism,
and in legislation establishing patriotic observances. Courses and demon-
strations typically were played out "in terms of emotionalized responses to
the stimulus of symbols, rather than along the lines of a critical study of the
bases of American life." The First World War escalated, but did not initiate,
the trend in legally mandated patriotism. Todd points out that between 1903
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and 1923, 40 percent of all educational laws were designed to manufacture
local, state, and national patriotism.32
The West Virginia patriotism and citizenship law was broad in scope,
applying to all public, private, parochial, and denominational schools. The
state Board of Education drafted manuals and courses of study for the public
schools, to teach, foster, and perpetuate the "ideals, principles and spirit of
Americanism." Boards of authority in the private institutions were required
to prescribe citizenship and patriotism courses for their schools. Failure of
an administrator or teacher to abide by the law's requirements constituted a
misdemeanor, and, in the case of public school employees, was punishable
by suspension for one year.33 Under provisions of the loyalty oath bill, teach-
ers were required to swear loyalty to the state and national constitutions as a
condition of yearly employment contracts. By Superintendent Ford's direc-
tive, faithful observance of the oath required teachers to "use every effort" to
insure adequate patriotic education for their pupils.34 The patriotic educa-
tion and loyalty oath laws thus essentially formalized a recommended vol-
untary practice in West Virginia classrooms, that of recitation and discussion
of the "West Virginia School Creed":
To be loyal to West Virginia and to the United States; to learn and
perform intelligently my duties as a citizen and to support the American
ideals and customs; to hold patriotism above any individual, social class
or party; to oppose revolutionary movements such as Bolshevism, An-
archism, I.W.W-ism and other activities detrimental to the laws and the
Constitution of the United States; to play hard, study hard, work hard.
This shall be my creed on the footpath leading to the highway of good
dependable citizenship.35
State Superintendent of Schools George M. Ford welcomed the new
laws, praising a legislature that had "wisely enacted a law requiring the
teaching of American principles." Ford told teachers that the most effective
way to teach respect for constituted law and authority was to rigorously
obey all the laws of the land, and to make certain that their pupils strictly
obeyed national, state, and school laws. "Your belief in such a doctrine,"
Ford continued, "is now to be tested."36
Ford advised public school teachers to cooperate at every opportunity
with local civic and patriotic organizations in observances to generate patri-
otism. To Secretary Joseph F Marsh of the state Board of Education, the
compulsory patriotism laws must have seemed the culmination of his long
efforts to rationalize Americanism campaigns in the school system. Marsh
faithfully had advised teachers to invite speakers from "appropriate organi-
zations" to teach patriotic principles to their students. Teaching American-
ism, however, should not be a campaign "of temporary bombast, but rather
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a deliberate well organized effort to arouse our entire State to a higher sense
of obligation to our Government." Marsh could report in 1924 that
the schools have been surcharging the youth of our country with pa-
triotism. Each year our teachers solemnly swear to support the Consti-
tution and to teach the principles of Americanism. In West Virginia, you
may imagine some 400,000 boys and girls daily lifting their eyes to the
flag which floats over every schoolhouse and giving the familiar salute.37
To Marsh and other leaders in business and education, Americanization
required finding one's proper role in industrial America and staying with it.
Marsh, who directed the state's programs in vocational education, explained
that while the "old-time school gave pupils the promise of escape from toil
and grimy business," vocational guidance and training in "the new school"
would insure that the 95 percent of American pupils needed in the "work-a-
day-world" would realize the honor of their callings, just as the 5 percent
who ascended to the professions.38 It was therefore imperative to the main-
tenance of an orderly, law-abiding, and efficient industrial system that its
people understood that that system would "deliver all people from the world
of scarcity and conflict to the world of abundance and harmony."39 Such faith
must be enforced even in times of apparent hardship. Governor Morgan pre-
dicted that West Virginia's hills would some day "be stripped of their timber,
our mountains will be robbed of their coal, gas, and oil." If, however, "we
then have an intelligent and educated people of sturdy character and con-
duct, our future will remain secure and our happiness and safety will be
assured."40
Industrial Americanizers marshalled organized facts and statistics to
verify the fundamental soundness of corporate capitalism.11 The American
Constitutional Association indignantly asked who had the temerity to criti-
cize "so noble and so inviting a political and social structure as has been
erected in America?" More than twenty million Americans had been able to
buy Liberty Bonds. More than twelve million persons deposited money in
mutual, stock, or postal-savings banks. There were more than 266,000 miles
of railways in operation. America boasted more than three thousand public
libraries with seventy-five million volumes on hand. Total wealth "is not
now less than $225,000,000,000," and "the distribution of that wealth is
steadily becoming more equitable and more satisfactory under the operation
of the forces and principles that have guided America so long and so well."42
The West Virginia School Journal also lauded American production and
consumption. Although the United States had only 6 percent of the popula-
tion of the world, the nations's industrial and agricultural interests produced
66 percent of the world's oil supply, 52 percent of the world's coal, 85 per-
cent of the world's automobiles, and 75 percent of the world's corn. The
144 The Americanization of West Virginia
WVSJ attributed this staggering productivity to the same "brains and grit"
that had delivered the "knock-out blow" in the war. "Don't you believe," the
Journal asked, "that we can solve all of the problems of peace?" It was in part
the school pupil's drill in these kinds of facts that led Marsh to conclude that
modern students could easily match "grandfather with fact for fact, although
the new list will contain more of modern times and less ancient lore."43
The West Virginia School Journal predicted that the state's raw materials
and water power should make it one of nation's greatest manufacturing
states and recommended that West Virginia establish a school of manual
arts. Elsewhere, the Journal documented the trend in education toward na-
tional control, citing the Smith-Hughes Vocational Training Act and a War
Department plan for the enlistment of boys in college, to be trained as me-
chanics, which would render them "efficient for public service." Comple-
menting the expanding vocational programs in West Virginia schools were
the patriotism and citizenship lessons in which students learned the appro-
priate fundamental laws of production and consumption. These lessons in-
cluded historical study of the nation's economic revolution, emphasizing
industrial, commercial, and agricultural growth. One focus of this study was
the "career" of major corporations such as the Standard Oil Company. An-
other was an inquiry into ominous-sounding "Labor Combinations."44
The powerful labor combinations, however, vigorously embraced the
worship of productivity and expansion that fueled industrial Americaniza-
tion. The United Mine Workers of America consistently affirmed the nascent
business unionism espoused by John L. Lewis, pledging its devotion to in-
dustrial peace and stability. The UMWJ insisted in 1923 that continuous
growth under a capitalist system must be preserved. Only then could Ameri-
cans have "more for every one: more automobiles, more general education,
more modern plumbing, more gramophones, and bigger real wages."45 To
guarantee steady economic expansion, the UMWJ campaigned for additional
and more stringent restrictions on immigration. Advocating a plan, later
adopted, to put immigration on a "scientific basis" by 1924, the UMWJ fa-
vorably reported comments by a U.S. congressman that America must be
protected from "defective, dependent and objectionable or surplus aliens as
our other laws protect us from defective seeds, diseased plants, inferior live
stock and even surplus foreign goods made by pauper labor."46 The Journal
warned that unless immigration were restrained, Europeans would be fol-
lowed by Africans, "Hindoos, Japs and Chinese, and labor in America would
again be dragged down to the lowest level."47 Cleaving to the progressive
vision of an America freed from want by progress, technology, and efficiency,
the officialdom of the United Mine Workers of America agreed with a Wall
Street Journal forecast that any labor shortage caused by stricter immigration
laws would be offset by the mechanization of American industry.48
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The UMWA hierarchy, then, by 1923-24 fully shared the capitalist
faith in the potential of modern industry, with "its marvelous efficiency and
productivity," to establish a world of material abundance for all. This faith in
technological progress was not inconsistent with socialist or other noncapi-
talist visions but diverged from noncapitalist models on the fundamental
questions of ownership, distribution of wealth, and political authority. In-
dustrial Americanization, which was institutionalized in West Virginia by
1923, limited democracy to one's freedom to participate in the proscribed
marketplace of American capitalism. Industrial Americanizers anticipated
equality not in political or social terms but in the mass acquisition of effi-
ciently produced consumer goods. This vision did not question the "essen-
tial decision-making power in the shop, industry, the community or the
nation," which was reserved for the managers of industrial America.4"
By 1924 West Virginia's "army of young workers" was being system-
atically prepared for "some work suited to their training and talents that
needs to be done."50 Efforts at scientific management of the schools ex-
tended to officially approved history notebooks for junior- and senior-high-
school students, which should "adhere to a uniform plan of arrangement to
be worked out by the teacher and drilled into the pupils at the beginning
of the work in history." The scientific regimentation of historical training
would contribute to the students' understanding of "orderly development
and change" and yield "the high moral and ethical concepts of loyalty to
principles and institutions by revealing the cost at which the elements of
civilization have been secured for us."51 Time-and-motion studies were
employed in the school day's division of labor, with recitation and study
programs fragmented into ten, twelve-, thirteen-, fourteen-, fifteen-, and
twenty-minute segments. When elementary school students practiced
writing from 10:16 to 10:28 each morning, ideally the teacher saw that
they did so in this manner:
Position: See that the desks are properly adjusted to the pupils'
needs. In teaching position, always consider health and efficiency. An
erect, healthful position in writing usually leads to efficient work. All
through the year pupils should be trained in the essentials of good posi-
tion; such training is far more important than immediately apparent re-
sults. One of the aims of each lesson in which the pupils do any writing
should be the establishing of a good position habit. Right kind of train-
ing will lead to a good quality of work.
The body should face the desk in a square front position and in-
clined slightly forward from the hips, allowing a space of about two
inches between the body and the desk. The distance of the eyes from
the paper should be twelve or more inches, according to the size of the
pupil. The feet should be placed apart and squarely on the floor.
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Place both arms upon the desk, forming approximately right angles
at the elbows. Keep both elbows near the front of the desk. The left
hand, placed just above the writing line, holds and adjusts the paper.
The right arm rests only on its own weight on the muscles in front of the
elbow. The only other point of contact of the right arm with the desk
should be the nails of the third and fourth fingers bent under the hand,
forming the "gliding rest. . . ." Care must be taken that the paper be
moved upward and not the right hand downward as the writing pro-
gresses down the page.52
Allowances for left-handed students were not included in the teacher's
manual.
Standards for the course in citizenship were well developed within a
few years of the passage of the patriotic education and citizenship law. Objec-
tives included students' understanding the necessity for law and order in the
community and assisting in their preservation, and awareness that "breaking
the smallest law endangers the welfare of the entire nation." Students must
understand that "one will be as happy in his work as in his play, if he chooses
the right vocation," and "appreciate the desirability of finding one's life work
early, so that he may begin training for it." Standards for courses in social sci-
ence required students to learn "fundamental laws governing social and eco-
nomic life, and to obey them." Students must "follow the leadership of
recognized social and economic thinkers and leaders" and protect themselves
from "social and economic fallacies, misrepresentations and prejudices by
constant reliance on facts and principles accepted as valid."53
In March 1923, the Reverend J.L. Hardy of Shepherdstown's Trinity
Episcopal Church addressed the Shepherdstown Women's Club. Reverend
Hardy contended that while traditional religion had given people faith in
the meaning of life, "such religion has often been too narrow in its vision
and too formal and external to the experience of even its devotees." The
progress of science and industry, said the reverend, "outran moral and re-
ligious progress," so that traditional religion was incapable of ministering to
the masses through the "moral and industrial debauch of the great war,"
leading to "disillusionment and uncertainty" with traditional religion. Con-
sequently, many of the "best minds and spirits of the younger generation"
had lost touch with organized religion. Therefore, a "reconstruction of re-
ligion" was necessary. The reconstruction would have to be "intellectual and
social" and demonstrate that "essential Christianity is in no sense irrational
or incompatible with a scientific attitude toward life and nature." "This re-
construction has already made a great deal of progress among scholars and
specialists," said Hardy, "but a majority of lay people are almost completely
in the dark."54
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Hardy's call for a new spiritualism, integrating faith with science and
industrial progress, serving scholars and specialists, provided the spiritual
foundation for the civic and political religion created by West Virginia Ameri-
canizers to lighten the way for the lay people. Joseph F. Marsh carried this
middle-class view of religion further, when he announced that "the univer-
sity of the future is to have a vital influence upon religion1' [emphasis in the
original], which was "the supreme force in human society." The American
university, said Marsh, "through lofty teaching and holy and beautiful envi-
ronments, will be less sectarian and more Christian as it grows into its fuller
possibilities." Marsh recognized no incompatibility between Christianity and
the main purpose of the university, which, in his view, was to "be our best
producer of wealth.""
Institutional education, then, like its pupils, was reduced to a factor of
production. It is hard not to experience a sense of loss when Marsh's pur-
pose for the university is set against a quite different analysis of education in
the West Virginia School Journal in 1914, before that publication was taken
over by Morris P. Shawkey. "It may be excusable," reported the Journal, "to
use our educational system to increase the production of wealth and the
value of property; but surely its paramount purpose is to produce manhood,
womanhood, moral citizenship, and justice in social relations."56 Against
such simple and honest prewar sentiments, the principles of the civic and
political religion of the Americanization of West Virginia, though rhetori-
cally similar, ring hollow indeed.
Conclusion
The hierarchical vision of the West Virginia Americanizers was not forged
solely in the crucible of the First World War. Rather the war crisis gave new
form and urgency to perceptions that influential Americans traditionally
held about themselves and their obligation to steer the masses toward ac-
ceptable, dependable behavior that would profit the country as a whole. The
wartime worship of productivity, to use Robert Wiebe's expression, con-
firmed to industrial Americanizers that their values were sanctified as guide-
posts for the nation and the world in the postwar struggle for order and
industrial and commercial dominance.1 When Justus Collins congratulated
John J. Cornwell, and implicitly himself, for the establishment of the West
Virginia state police, he remarked that every decent man in the state "should
take his hat off to you. The rest don't matter."2
Collins articulated a twentieth-century belief that elites had tradition-
ally held about the virtue of their access to rule, and the righteousness of ex-
cluding the unworthy from such access. Kenneth Lockridge, historian of
town life and culture in Puritan New England, notes that Puritan leaders
held a firm belief in the natural inequality of men, and that obedience to
men of power and rank was recognized, at least by men of power and rank,
as the foundation of social harmony. The Puritan vision of the perfect corpo-
rate community demanded loyalty in exchange for membership privileges,
which included peace, security, and good order in a sometimes terrifying
wilderness. In such a community, there was no place for dissent or inde-
pendence of mind. The ideal society would be built upon a policy of con-
sensual exclusivity.3
There was, of course, a fundamental contradiction in the twentieth-
century industrial Americanizers' embrace of exclusivity and hierarchy in a
nation that exalted the goals of political and social democracy. The
Americanizers resolved this contradiction in part by endowing their particu-
lar vision of the just society with the spiritual vestments of, in their terms,
the "civic and political religion of the United States."4 States, Francis Jen-
nings has written, have historically understood that religion is too important
to be left "to the vagaries of individual choice," since it determines the social
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behavior of its adherents.5 The secular religion of corporate capitalism, in
the view of the industrial Americanizers, guaranteed freedom through the
social behavior of obedience to recognized authority. "Obedience," they in-
toned, "helps make men truly great."6
Capitalism, says economist Robert Heilbroner, is an arrangement of
social life based on the regenerative power of society's demand for new prod-
ucts and characterized by "distinctive hierarchies, imperatives, loyalties, and
beliefs." The idea of economic growth is as central to its nature, he contin-
ues, as the divine right of kings has been for other regimes. The principles of
economic expansion are "deeply embedded and widely believed" and articu-
lated by the system's most important representatives, business leaders. "It
must be conceded," Heilbroner states, "that the class of businessmen is the
only group that naturally thinks of itself, and is generally thought of, as
speaking for the social order as a whole." Heilbroner believes that the Ameri-
can "business class" is regarded, by itself and the American people, as the le-
gitimate embodiment of the values, goals, and sentiments of the entire
society. Although American capitalists do not have official authority in the
political arena, "ordinarily the government endorses the aims and objectives
of the business community," since "the political realm and the economic
realm are both parts of a single regime." Heilbroner concludes that capital-
ism has triumphed over state socialism, as practiced in the former Soviet
Union and China, largely because capitalism organizes the "material affairs
of human kind more satisfactorily than socialism." He acknowledges that
democratic socialism "at its core" has stood for social goals of moral eleva-
tion that are incompatible with or unattainable under capitalism, given that
system's dependence on concentrated economic power. He suggests, how-
ever, that the praiseworthy social vision of socialism is historically doomed,
as socialist experiments lead inevitably to "centralized planning."7
Heilbroner expresses, then, a systemic version of Justus Collins's divi-
sion of America into the decent people and the people who do not matter, or
John J. Cornwell's dichotomy of good people and bad people.8 Alternatives
for social and economic organization have been reduced to two, the state
capitalist model, which works "well enough," and the state socialist alterna-
tive, which, while grounded in inspirational potential, offers "no plausible
economic framework."9
This dichotomous perspective devalues or ignores other visions, some
of which have American origins. Lawrence Goodwyn, in his provocative
study of American Populism, observes that the triumph of industrial capital-
ism implies a "cultural presumption" of social progress so "thoroughly inter-
nalized within the society that it is part of the democratic culture itself."
This ideal of progress places American corporate capitalism at the top of the
evolutionary scale, and, says Goodwyn, condescendingly relegates historical
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democratic challenges to capitalist social organization to the sidelines of the
field of acceptable ideas.10 Cast out from the mainstream public discourse is
any substantive acknowledgment of the indigenous anticorporate American
social theories proposed by the Knights of Labor, the populist People's party,
the Industrial Workers of the World, and American socialism. Doctrinal, tac-
tical, and organizational differences aside, each of these offered an opposi-
tional vision of a cooperative commonwealth that challenged the hierarchical
corporate culture. At its heart was the premise that to neutralize the drift
toward concentration of power inherent in industrial society, the social values
of its people must preserve and respect the idea that labor must be vested
with the value of its product, that people could work collectively to be free
individually, and that, to quote William Haywood, "society can be no better
than its most miserable."11 This Jeffersonian vision of a decentralized demo-
cratic state, implying liberation through economic self-organization, was fun-
damentally at odds with the progressive certainty that in modern society, only
"certain kinds of people had a right to rule." Progressive industrial, political,
and educational elites rejected, and feared, the notion that legitimate demo-
cratic reform could challenge the prerogatives of those who ruled.12
The constricted boundaries of modern politics, Goodwyn concludes,
dating from the emergence of corporate capitalism after the American Civil
War, are reaffirmed in the ways the "reality of the American experience—the
culture itself" is conveyed to new generations. These include the commercial
bonding of mass society through mass communications, and the interpreta-
tion of the American past that is transmitted through private and public
education. To Goodwyn, these boundaries signal a "clear retreat" from the
democratic promise of the cooperative commonwealth.13 West Virginia Gov-
ernor Ephraim F. Morgan forcefully defended corporative education in
1921. Addressing a patriotic gathering in Welch, Morgan launched a verbal
attack against unidentified public school teachers and professors who were
instilling "socialistic, populistic, and bolshevistic doctrines," thereby engen-
dering "the spirit of treason in the plastic minds" of unsuspecting students.14
The processes of conveying acceptable values and beliefs, which will
not erode the standing or social power of society's molders of opinion, are
defined by educator John Gaventa in terms of hegemonic processes of
"breeding consensus." In describing the acquiescence of local workers in an
Appalachian valley to the encroachment and eventual dominance of indus-
trial corporatism in the first half of the twentieth century, Gaventa argues
that "the answer lies in the powers of the industrial society for establishing
control and breeding consensus." That power, built exponentially upon
corporate influence in politics, education, and communications, results in
the dominance of a set of values prescribed for the ruled by the rulers. The
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process is successful when the values of the dominant class are accepted and
internalized by subordinates.15
It is this dynamic of the conscious manufacture of general public con-
sent to elite principles of social organization that I have examined in The
Americanization oj West Virginia. I have sought to demonstrate how adher-
ents to the hierarchical elements of industrial capitalism attempted, I believe
with great success, to implant their ideology into the consciousness of a cul-
ture and turn its tenets into cultural values that are so deeply imbedded as
to practically transcend debate. I have attempted throughout to follow the
example of Francis Jennings, who analyzed the ideology of colonial con-
quest that sanctified the destruction of Native American cultures in New
England. Jennings recognized in himself a "strong aversion" toward the Puri-
tan elites who articulated the ideology and "tried to compensate for it by
documenting heavily from their own writings whenever possible." Jennings
studied the documents left by the Puritan gentry, extracting reliable data
from "excruciating cant and masterful guile."16
Likewise in this study, I have relied heavily on the words of the indus-
trial Americanizers themselves and on contemporary and recent documenta-
tion for context. It has not been my intent to pass personal judgment on the
political, labor, educational, industrial, and social elites whose private and
public records are woven into this work. Indeed, I am well aware and appre-
ciative of their many positive and sincere contributions to their fields and
communities. My goal has been to present a fresh examination and interpre-
tation of a formative era in West Virginia's history that has been strangely ne-
glected, aside from extensive work on the coal industry. I have done so in a
way that offers a countervailing perspective to the generally hagiographic
contemporary accounts in which the West Virginia protagonists of this study
are mentioned. In the process, I have tried to apply to them their own func-
tional view regarding the human factors of production in modern industry. I
have consciously viewed their relevance to this study less in terms of their
human strengths and weaknesses than in terms of their dedication to effi-
cient social and industrial systems. Within the parameters of this study, the
industrial Americanizers are treated as pistons in an engine, just as Wood-
row Wilson would have it. After all, as Frederick W Taylor explained, "In
the past the man has been first; in the future, the system must be first."17
That was both the triumph and the tragedy of the Americanization of West
Virginia.
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